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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation focuses on two types of problems, both of which are related to 
systems with uncertainties. 
The first problem concerns network system anomaly detection. We present several 
stochastic and deterministic methods for anomaly detection of networks whose normal 
behavior is not time-varying. Our methods cover most of the common techniques in 
the anomaly detection field. We evaluate all methods in a simulated network that con-
sists of nominal data, three flow-level anomalies and one packet-level attack. Through 
analyzing the results, we summarize the advantages and the disadvantages of each 
method. As a next step, we propose two robust stochastic anomaly detection meth-
ods for networks whose normal behavior is time-varying. We develop a procedure for 
learning the underlying family of patterns t hat characterize a time-varying network. 
v 
This procedure first estimates a large class of patterns from network data and then 
refines it to select a representative subset. The latter part formulates the refinement 
problem using ideas from set covering via integer programming. Then we propose two 
robust methods, one model-free and one model-based, to evaluate whether a sequence 
of observations is drawn from the learned patterns. Simulation results show that the 
robust methods have significant advantages over the alternative stationary methods 
in time-varying networks. The final anomaly detection setting we consider targets the 
detection of botnets before they launch an attack. Our method analyzes the social 
graph of the nodes in a network and consists of two stages: (i) network anomaly 
detection based on large deviations theory and (ii) community detection based on a 
refined modularity measure. We apply our method on real-world botnet traffic and 
compare its performance with other methods. 
The second problem considered by this dissertation concerns sequential decision mak-
ings under uncertainty, which can be modeled by a Markov Decision Processes (MDPs). 
We focus on methods with an actor-critic structure, where the critic part estimates 
the gradient of the overall objective with respect to tunable policy parameters and the 
actor part optimizes a policy with respect to these parameters. Most existing actor-
critic methods use Temporal Difference (TD) learning to estimate the gradient and 
steepest gradient ascent to update the policies. Our first contribution is to propose an 
actor-critic method that uses a Least Squares Temporal Difference (LSTD) method, 
which is known to converge faster than the TD methods. Our second contribution 
is to develop a new Newton-like actor-critic method that performs better especially 
for ill-conditioned problems. We evaluate our methods in problems motivated from 
robot motion control. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Anomaly Detection for Stochastic Systems 
1.1.1 An Overview 
A system is a set of components that work together under some organization. A 
stochastic system is a system whose components are influenced by randomness. Unlike 
a deterministic system, a stochastic system does not always produce the same output 
for a given input. A few components of systems that can be stochastic in nature 
include stochastic inputs, random time-delays, noisy disturbances, etc. 
Each system has its own design goal and desirable working status. A system anomaly 
refers to a phenomenon that the system fails to maintain its desirable status. Anoma-
lies could be caused by either internal system failures or outside attacks, and can result 
in huge economic loss as well as casualties. Anomaly detection of systems is a pro-
cedure of identifying and reporting anomalies of the system through a time series of 
system observations, i.e., a series of observations measured in time spaced at uniform 
time intervals. 
The first part of this dissertation focuses on one type of stochastic system, i.e. , com-
puter networks, and describes. some methods for network anomaly detection. Our 
1 
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methods, however, can be easily generalized to other stochastic systems. A com-
puter network is a communication network that allows computers to exchange data. 
The best-known computer network is the Internet, which is by far the most com-
plex network system the human beings have built. In only four decades, computer 
networks have become one of the most essential infrastructures of our society and 
our economy. As a result, ensuring the safety and stability of computer networks 
is very significant-yet challenging-problem. A network anomaly is any unusual and 
potentially malicious traffic sequence that has implications for the security of the 
network. Although automated online network anomaly detection has received a lot 
of attention, this field is far from mature. 
People are interested in two types of information about a network anomaly: ( i) time 
of occurrence for the anomaly, and ( ii) network nodes associated with . the anomaly. 
This information corresponds to the following two problems: 
• Temporal anomaly detection. The goal of this problem is to identify the time of 
occurrence of an anomaly. Temporal anomaly detection focuses on identifying 
the anomaly and generating an alarm as soon as possible. Upon receiving the 
alarm, human analyst will inspect the cause of the anomaly manually. Due to 
the high costs of human involvement, a good temporal anomaly method should 
be capable to be adjusted according to a desirable level of false alarms. 
• Malicious node detection. The goal of the problem is to identify the network 
nodes associated with an anomaly. For those anomalies caused by cyber attacks, 
node detection is of great importance to prevent the attacks happening again 
in the future . Usually cyber attacks can be effectively alleviated by blocking 
malicious network nodes. It aiso helps law enforcement by revealing the human 
users behind the attack, thus intimidating the potential attackers. 
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This dissertation discusses anomalies related to two types of attacks: ( i) network 
intrusion for which detecting the time of occurrence is more important and ( ii) botnet-
based attacks for which detecting the associated network nodes is more important. 
Network Intrusion 
Network intrusion refers to a cyber attack in which some malicious users obtain 
unauthorized access to a private network or a network host. 
Network intrusion is becoming a more and more serious problem because of a variety 
of reasons. First, with the development of cloud technology, more and more personal 
information is stored in the cloud rather in local machines. The high concentration 
of user information, and particularly sensitive information l,ike credit card numbers, 
in cloud servers makes them targets of malicious hackers. Second, companies build 
diverse corporate networks to satisfy business needs. A lot of corporate networks are 
poorly managed, and internal users are often granted unnecessary privileges [Ponemon 
Institute LLC, 2014]. These widespread privilege abuses make the corporate networks 
more vulnerable to network intrut)ions. 
Data exfiltration is a common goal for network intruders. Data exfiltration, also 
known as data extrusion, is the unauthorized transfer of data from a computer. The 
data could be financial information, usernames and passwords in databases, and sen-
sitive files. An Intrusion Detection System (IDS) gathers and analyzes information 
to identify the occurrence of intrusion. An IDS can be installed in the gateway of a 
private network to protect the network from intruders, or in a network host to protect 
it from malicious users. 
Three types of data are available for IDS [Brown et al., 2002]: 
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• Network Traffic. All network intrusions result in some abnormal network ac-
tivities. As a result, monitoring network traffic is the most direct and effective 
way for detecting the network intrusion. However, there are two challenges 
when analyzing network traffic. First , the amount of network traffic is usually 
very large, making it essential to aggregate or to sample the data before feeding 
them to the IDS. Second, the huge number of IP addresses, especially for IPv6, 
makes traffic analysis very challenging. 
• File System Operations. Most data exfiltration attempts require abnormal op-
erations in file systems. In particular, changes or frequent accesses to sensitive 
files can provide clues for network intrusions. 
• System Calls. With modifications of the host's kernel, an IDS can observe all the 
system calls that are made. It can provide the IDS a very rich data. However, 
since getting them requires modification of system kernels and requires a high 
privilege, system calls are often not available for many situations. 
In spite of their different ways of collections, all types of data presented above satisfy 
a streaming data model, which has the following definitions: ( i) Data consist of a 
sequence ordered by timestamps. ( ii) Data are generated continuously and the total 
amount could be very large. Although this dissertation focuses on network traffic , 
the methodology can be easily adapted to analyze any streaming data, including file 
system operations and system calls. 
Bot net-based Attack 
A botnet is a network of compromised nodes (bots) controlled by a "botmaster." 
The most common type of botnets is botnet of network computers, which is usually 
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used for Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks, click fraud and spamming, 
etc. DDoS attacks comprise packet streams from disparate bots, aiming to consume 
some critical resource at the target and to deny the service of the target to legitimate 
clients. In a recent survey, 300 out of 1000 surveyed businesses have suffered from 
DDoS attacks and 65% of the attacks cause up to $10,000 loss per hour [Neustar, 
2012]. Both click fraud and spamming are harmful to web economy. Click fraud 
exhausts the advertisement budgets of businesses in pay-per-click services [Daswani 
and Stoppelman, 2007], and spamming is popular for malicious advertisements as well 
as manipulation of search results [Gyongyi and Garcia-Molina, 2005]. 
Botmasters need some specific channels, named as Command and Control ( C&C) 
channel, to command their bots [Strayer et al., 2006; Su and Zhang, 2012]. Some 
botnet detection methods focus on C&C channels as they are critical for botnets. 
One mechanism is to filter specific types of C&C traffic (e.g. , IRC traffic) [Binkley 
and Singh, 2006; Goebel and Holz, 2007; Gu et al., 2008b]. Recently, ·botnets have 
evolved to bypass these detection methods by using more flexible C&C channels, 
such as HTTP and P2P protocols [Bu et al., 2010; Daswani and Stoppelman, 2007]. 
P2P botnets like Nugache [Lemos, 2006] and Storm worm [Bu et al., 2010] are much 
harder to detect and mitigate because they are decentralized. In addition, more 
types of C&C channels are emerging; recent research shows that botnets start to use 
Twitter as C&C channel [Singh, 2012]. 
Although bots are usually network computers, botnets could also be formed by a large 
number of zombie social networking accounts (Twitter, Face book) [Egele et al., 2013]. 
These botnets, referred to as botnets of social accounts, can automate the creation of 
new social networking accounts used to befriend unsuspecting users and can spread 
malware by spamming enticing links [Thomas and Nicol, 2010]. 
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Botmasters for botnets of social accounts may not be social networking accounts but 
standalone software programs that control zombie accounts. As a result, C&C traffic 
is invisible to the administrators of social networks for this type of botnets. 
Both types of botnets share some characteristics. First, hots ' activities are more 
correlated with each other than that of normal nodes [Al-Hammadi and Abdulla, 
2010; Gu et al., 2008b]. Second, hots have more interactions with a set of pivotal 
nodes, including targets and botmasters. 
1.1.2 Related Work 
Intrusion Detection 
The approaches of network intrusion detection can be roughly grouped into two 
classes: signature detection, where known patterns of past intrusions are used to 
identify ongoing intrusions [Roesch and Others, 1999; Paxson, 1999], and anomaly 
detection that identifies patterns that substantially deviate from normal patterns of 
operations [Barford et al., 2002; Lu and Ghorbani, 2009; Paschalidis and Smarag-
dakis, 2009]. It has been shown that the detection rates of systems based on pattern 
matching are below 70% [Lippmann et al., 2000b]. Because signatures of all past 
attacks need to be stored and signatures of attacks become more and more sophisti-
cated, the complexity of signature detection systems increases rapidly after deploy-
ment . Furthermore, such systems cannot detect zero-day attacks, i.e., attacks not 
previously seen, and need constant (and expensive) updating to keep up with new 
attack signatures. In contrast, anomaly detection methods are considered to be more 
economic and promising since they can identify novel attacks. In this work we focus 
on anomaly detection methods, in particular on statistical anomaly detection that 
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leverages statistical methods [Chandola et al., 2009; Qian and Saligrama, 2012]. 
Standard statistical anomaly detection consists of two steps. The first step is to 
learn the "normal behavior" by analyzing past system behavior. The second step is 
to identify time instances where system behavior does not appear to be normal by 
monitoring the system continuously. 
From a methodological perspective, network anomaly detection methods can be clas-
sified as stochastic and deterministic. Stochastic methods fit reference data to a 
probabilistic model and evaluate the fitness of the new traffic with respect to this 
model [Lakhina et al., 2005; Locke et al. , 2012; Paschalidis and Smaragdakis, 2009]. 
Deterministic methods, on the other hand, try to partition the feature space into 
"normal" and "abnormal" regions through a deterministic decision boundary [Shorr 
and Moon, 2007; Gu et al., 2008a]. 
From an implementation perspective, network anomaly_ methods can be either packet-
based [Hareesh et al. , 2011], flow-based or window-based. Packet-based methods 
evaluate the raw packets directly while both flow-based and windows-based methods 
evaluate aggregated flows. With the increase of network bandwidth, the amount of 
raw packets in a high-speed network is usually too large to be processed directly by an 
anomaly detection system. This issue can be addressed by either down-sampling the 
packets or aggregating packets into a higher-level data format . Flows are generally 
considered as the format with the best trade-off between cost of collection and level 
of detail [Sommers et al., 2011]. Flow-based methods evaluate flows individually and 
window-based methods group consecutive flows together. This dissertation focuses 
on flow-based and window-based methods. 
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Botnet Detection 
Botnet detection has recently sparked a lot of interests in the research community. 
There are two directions of botnet detection. Botnets grow by infecting new com-
puters through network intrusion. The first direction is to identify the bot infections 
using IDS. Snort is an open-source IDS focusing on signature detection [Roesch and 
Others, 1999]. By adding botnet infection signatures, snort can be used to detect 
botnets. This signature-based method can only detect known botnets. BotHunter 
takes advantage of snort's signature engine and complements it with two anomaly 
detection engines [Gu et al., 2007]. Both of the methods, however, are unable to 
detect mature botnets whose infectious activities are significantly reduced. 
Analyzing the C&C channel, which is the defining characteristic of a botnet , is also 
an important direction for botnet detection. IRC is the first protocol leveraged by 
botnets as their C&C channels, thus it has received a lot of attention. [Abu Rajah 
et al., 2006] provides an in-depth analysis of botnets that use IRC as C&C channels 
through IRC and DNS tracking techniques. [Binkley and Singh, 2006] proposes a 
botnet detection method that combines IRC detection component with a TCP scan 
heuristic for IRC based botnets. 
Recently botnets evolved to use other protocols, such as HTTP and P2P, as C&C 
channels to avoid being detected. In this cat-and-mouse game, protocol-dependent 
botnet detection methods are unfavorable because they can be easily bypassed if bot-
nets change their protocols. As a result, protocol-independent methods have recently 
aroused a lot of research interest. All of these methods are based on the observation 
that hots within the same botnet will likely demonstrate spatial-temporal correlation 
and similarity. [Gu et al., 2008b] proposes BotSniffer, a botnet detection framework 
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using anomaly detection techniques to evaluate IRC and HTTP traffic. CoCoSpot 
uses average-linkage hierarchical clustering to identify C&C traffic [Dietrich et al. , 
2013] . CoCoSpot is traffic-oriented since it clusters similar network flows. However, 
in the botnet detection problem, people usually care more about detecting suspicious 
nodes (bots) rather than flows. Later, [Gu et al., 2008a] formulates the definition 
of botnet as "a coordinated group of malware instances that are controlled via C&C 
channels" and proposes BotMiner, a protocol-independent botnet detection that uses 
clustering analysis. Note that although BotMiner aims to report suspicious nodes , it 
has to cluster all network flows as a prerequisite. Since the number of flows is usu-
ally significantly larger than the number of nodes, clustering flows requires intensive 
computation. This extra work in the traffic domain is unnecessary. Different with 
these previous works, the method in this dissertation is node-oriented. We model the 
interactions and relationships among nodes as social graphs and use graph analysis 
to identify bots. 
There are a few research efforts about detecting botnets of social accounts. Initial 
efforts focus on detecting fake social identities on social networks. COMPA uses a 
composition of statistical modeling and anomaly detection to identify accounts that 
experience a sudden change [Egele et al., 2013]. 
Some research works focus on customized approaches for specific types of botnets. 
[Daswani and Stoppelman, 2007] provides an anatomy of Clickbot.A, a botnet that 
attempts a low-noise click fraud attack against syndicated search engines. SBotMiner 
is a framework that focuses on detecting search botnets [Yu et al., 2010]. 
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1.1.3 Data Representation 
This section describes the data used in our methods of network anomaly detection 
and some data preprocessing procedures.· 
Packets 
Most of the existing computer network systems are packet-switched networks in which 
packets are the natural system observations. Packets can be easily exported using 
tools like Wireshark [Combs and Others, 2007]. Network router vendors like Cisco 
also support packet capture and export. 
Let S = { s1, .. . , sl5 1} denote the collection of all packets on the host which is moni-
tored, where each element of S is one packet. Denote the source IP address in packet 
si as x! and the destination IP address as x~ , whose format will be discussed later. 
The size of si is bi E [0, oo) in bytes and the starting time of transmission is ti E [0 , oo) 
in seconds. Using this convention, packet si can be represented as (x!, x~ , bi, ti) for 
all i = 1, ... , lSI . 
Network Flows 
Due to the vast number of packets, we consolidate this representation of network 
traffic by grouping series of packets into flows. We compile a sequence of packets 
s1 = (x!,x~,b1 ,t1 ), ... , sn = (x~,xd,bn,tn) with t1 < ··· < tn into a flow f = 
(x5 ,Xd,b,dt,t) if X5 = x! = ··· = x~ , xd = x~ = · · · = xd , and ti- ti-l< Op for 
i = 2, ... , nand some prescribed Op E (0, oo). Here, the size b is simply the sum of 
the sizes of the packets that comprise th.e flow . The value dt = tn - t 1 denotes the 
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flow duration. The value t = t 1 denotes the starting time of the flow. In this way, we 
can translate the large collection of traffic packets S into a relatively small collection 
of flows F = {f\ ... , fiFI}. 
We first distill the "user space" into something more manageable while enabling us 
to characterize network behavior of user groups instead of just individual users . For 
simplicity of notation, we only consider the IPv4 address. If xi = (xi, x~, x~ , xi) E 
{0, ... , 255}4 and xj = (xi, xt xt x{) E {0, ... , 255}4 are two IPv4 addresses, the 
distance between them is defined as: 
(1.1.1) 
This metric can be easily extended to IPv6 addresses if needed. Suppose X is the set 
of unique IP addresses in F. We apply the typical K-means clustering on X [Harti-
gan and Wong, 1979; Lloyd, 1982]. For each x E X, we thus obtain a cluster label 
k(x). Suppose the cluster center for cluster k is x_k, then the distance of x to the cor-
responding cluster center is da(x) = d(x, x_k(x)). Using user clusters, we can produce 
our final representation of a flow as: 
(1.1.2) 
Note that in the special case of monitoring flows to a host, i.e., host-based anomaly 
detection, the xd is always the host IP address thus constant, thus (1.1.3) can be 
shortened as 
(1.1.3) 
and X 8 is referred to as user IP address in this case. 
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Windowing Technique 
Some of our methods apply a windowing technique during detection. A window 
is a detection unit, which means the flows in the same window are evaluated as a 
whole. Let h be the interval between the starting points of two consecutive time 
windows and W 8 be an appropriate window size; then the total number of windows is 
nw = i(tiFI_ t1 - ws)/hl We say flow fi with starting time ti belongs to window j 
if t 1 + (j - 1) h ~ ti < t 1 + (j - 1) h + w s , V j = 1, ... , nw . Let Fj be the set of all flows 
in window j; then F = Uj~1Fj if h ~ W 8 • Note that there will be overlap between 
two consecutive time windows if h < W 8 and {Fj : Vj = 1, ... , nw} is a partition of 
F in the special case h = w s. 
Let gi be the attributes in fi without the starting time ti and let gi = {g1 , ... , giQil} 
be the counterpart of Fi. Let 9ref be the set of all nominal flows used as reference, 
which are usually generated by removing suspicious flows from a small fragment of 
data through human inspection. The window-based methods will compare gi with 
9ref for all j = 1, . . . nw· 
Except for cluster labels, all attributes in gi are continuous. We also quantize gi into 
quantized flows. For each flow g , we define its quantized flow to be a(g) E ~' where 
~ is the discrete alphabet for quantization. 
1.1.4 Software Packages 
To improve network anomaly detection algorithms usually requires extensive algo-
rithm validation and evaluation, in which realistic traffic data with labeled anomalies 
are essential. In network traffic data collection, there is a tradeoff between the cost 
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of collection and the level of detail captured by the data . 
The most realistic way (with the highest level of detail) to obtain traffic data is to 
gather data directly from operational networks. However, these data are usually 
limited in their availability and lack labels for abnormal events. Labeling such data 
requires huge human effort. 
In contrast, network simulation provides a convenient and low-cost way to get labeled 
data. Network simulation can be done at both the flow level and the packet level, 
which are complementary to each other. On the one hand, flow-level simulation is fast 
and cost-saving, making it useful for evaluating an algorithm for various situations. 
On the other hand, packet-level simulation provides additional details, making it 
useful for finding the best algorithm for a specific type of attack. We develop two open 
source software packages to provide flow-level and packet-level validation datasets, 
respectively. 
SADIT: Systematic Anomaly Detection of Internet Traffic 
SADIT [Wang, 2012b] provides an annotated flow record generator and provides a 
unified interface to compare multiple anomaly detection methods. In the annotated 
flow record generator, the anomalies are specified by changing the parameters of the 
distributions for some flow features. The SADIT software consists of four modules 
and Figure 1.1 depicts its overall structure. The CONFIGURE module converts the 
input configuration script, which is a typical python script, about normal and abnor-
mal flow characteristics to a graphviz DOT file [Bilgin et al., 2013; Wang, 2012bJ. 
Based on the fs simulator [Sommers et al., 2011], the SIMULATOR module takes the 
DOT file generated by the CONFIGURE module as input and simulates flow records 
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Figure 1.1: Overview of SADIT. 
in the network. The DETECTOR module provides a unified interface for a collection 
of anomaly detection methods, including all the methods in this dissertation. By 
controlling the interactions among different modules, the EXPERIMENT module pro-
vides several workfl.ows as follows: ( i) Data generation: only the CONFIGURE module 
and the SIMULATOR module are invoked. ( ii) Algorithm validation: the CONFIGURE 
module, the SIMULATOR module, and the DETECTOR module are invoked sequen-
tially. (iii) Algorithm comparison: the CONFIGURE and the SIMULATOR modules are 
invoked once while the DETECTOR module is invoked multiple times. 
IMALSE: Integrated MALware Simulator and Emulator 
In some cases, we need labeled data for some specific types of network attacks. One 
way to get such data is through packet-level simulation. Simulation at the packet-
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level takes more computation resources but can mimic certain attacks, like botnet-
based attacks, in a more realistic way. Another way to get such labeled data is 
through emulation in which the corresponding malware is qeployed and monitored in 
a controlled network. 
IMALSE (Integrated MAL ware Simulator and Emulator) [Wang, 2012a] is a software 
package that helps researchers implement prototypes of network malware. The proto-
types can be run in a simulated network as well as be deployed in a controlled network. 
IMALSE consists of three modules: ( i) Attacking scenario module that implements 
the behavior of malware. ( ii) Background traffic generation module that implements 
the behavior of normal nodes. (iii) Network simuiation and emulation module that 
generates packet-level data according to the specfied normal and attacking behaviors. 
The simulation and emulation support are based on the NS3 simulator and the netns3 
software, respectively [Henderson et al., 2008; Wang, 2012a]. 
1. 2 Dynamic Decision Making for Stochastic Systems 
A Markov Decisions Process (MDP) is a model for a discrete-time stochastic system 
that evolves under a decision maker or a controller. At each time, the decision maker 
takes an action froin an allowable action set and the system returns a reward. The 
goal of the decision maker is to optimize the overall reward it receives from the 
stochastic system by choosing an optimal policy. Markov Decision Processes (MDPs) 
and Dynamic Programming (DP) provide a mathematical framework for posing and 
analyzing problems of sequential decision making under uncertainty. However, it is 
well known that DP suffers from the so-called "curse of dimensionality." In addition, 
in many cases, transition probabilities are not explicitly available, instead we must 
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resort to simulation or experimentation for the transition model. 
To address these problems, some Approximate Dynamic Programming (ADP) tech-
niques have been proposed by a variety of researchers [Sutton and Barto, 1998; Bert-
sekas and Tsitsiklis, 1996]. The existing ADP methods can be divided in to three 
groups [Konda and Tsitsiklis, 2003b; Grondman and Busoniu, 2012] . 
1. Actor-only methods . Actor-only methods work by optimizing a parameter-
ized family of policies [Marbach and Tsitsiklis, 2001; Glynn, 1986]. Focusing on 
a family of parameterized policies helps alleviate the "curse of dimensionality" 
by taking advantage of prior knowledge about the policy. However, in actor-only 
methods, the gradient of the overall reward with respect to the actor parameters 
is directly estimated by simulation and may have a large variance. Furthermore, 
if the policy changes, a new gradient will be estimated independently with the 
previous learning process, thus the previous "learned" information is not fully 
utilized. 
2. Critic-only methods. Critic-only methods rely exclusively · on value func-
tion approximation [Boyan, 1999, 2002; Geramifard et al., 2007; Sutton, 1988]. 
Value function is a function mapping a state or a state-action pair of the sys-
tem to a "desirability score", usually expected total reward received i-n the 
future. The first problem of critic-only methods is that they need to approxi-
mate the value function for each state of the system, which is computationally 
intensive. Although function approximation can be leveraged to reduce compu-
tational complexity, those approximations introduce some biases that influence 
the performance of the policy. The idea of critic-only methods is that a better 
approximation of value function results in a better policy. However, there is no 
reliable guarantee for this idea, especially when biases exist. 
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3. Actor-critic methods. Actor-critic methods combine the advantages of both 
actor-only methods and critic-only methods. Similar to actor-only methods, 
actor-critic methods optimize some Randomized Stationary Policies (RSPs) us-
ing policy gradient estimation. RSPs are policies parameterized by a parsimo-
nious set of parameters. Similar to critic-only methods, actor-critic methods 
need to approximate the value function when estimating the gradient of the 
overall reward with respect to the parameters, and the critic .helps to reduce 
the variance of the gradient estimation. The critic part in actor-critic methods 
usually takes less computational cost because it needs only information that is 
related to gradient rather than the complete value function. Many different ver-
sions of actor-critic algorithms have been proposed and they have been shown to 
be effective for many applications (for example, in robotics [Peters and Schaal, 
2006], power management ofwireless transmitters [Berenji and Vengerov, 2003], 
biology [Khamassi et al., 2005], navigation [Samejima and Omori , 1999], and 
optimal bidding for electricity generation [ Gajjar et al., 2003]). 
This dissertation focuses on a particularly attractive design of the actor-critic ar-
chitecture proposed in [Konda and Tsitsiklis, 2003b], where the critic estimates the 
policy gradient using sequential observations from a sample path and the actor up-
dates the policy at a slower time-scale. It has been proved that the estimate of the 
critic tracks the ·slowly-varying policy asymptotically under suitable conditions. The 
critic of [Konda and Tsitsiklis , 2003b] uses first-order variants of the Temporal Dif-
ference (TD) algorithm (TD(1) and TD(.\)). However, it has been shown that the 
least squares methods - Least Squares TD (LSTD) and Least Squares Policy Eval-
uation (LSPE) - are superior in terms of rate of convergence (see [Bertsekas et al., 
2003; Boyan, 1999; Bradtke and Barto, 1996; Konda, 2002; Nedic and Bertsekas, 
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2003]). We combine LSTD and the actor-critic structure together and apply the 
LSTD actor-critic method to robot motion control [Ding et al. , 2012; Estanjini et al., 
2011a, 2012] with a Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) specification. 
A lot of existing actor-critic methods, including the TD methods proposed in [Konda 
and Tsitsiklis, 2003b] and the LSTD actor-critic method, use the steepest (or un-
sealed) gradient ascent method to update the RSP. However, it is well-known that 
the steepest gradient ascent method has a slow rate of convergence for ill-conditioned 
problems in which the reward function is sensitive to some parameters but not sensi-
tive to the others. 
[Amari, 1998] proposes the idea of using a so-called natural gradient in stochastic 
learning, where the gradient is scaled by the covariance matrix of the parameters. 
The advantage of using the covariance matrix as the scaling matrix is that it is always 
positive-semidefinite. [Kakade, 2001a] proposes an estimate of the natural gradient . 
Later, [Peters and Schaal, 2008] proposes a clean estimate of the natural gradient 
but its accuracy can be influenced by the choice of the basis functions; an episodic 
algorithm was then proposed to guarantee the unbiasedness of the estimate [Peters 
and Schaal, 2008]. [Bhatnagar et al., 2007] suggests several incremental methods with 
the natural policy gradient. [Konda, 2002] suggests a Quasi-Newton Actor-Critic 
(QNAC) method similar to the methods in [Peters and Schaal, 2008] and shows that 
some requirements for the basis functions are necessary, which can explain the reason 
why the basis functions influence the estimate in [Peters and Schaal, 2008). [Richter 
et al., 2007] proposes an Online Natural Actor-Critic (ONAC) method using a natural 
gradient and applies it to a road traffic optimization problem. ONAC has almost the 
same form as the Quasi-Newton method suggested by [Konda, 2002), indicating that 
there is an intrinsic relationship between the two methods. 
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The natural gradient has been shown as very efficient in stochastic learning. However, 
the objective in MDP is quite different with that of stochastic learning, which is to 
minimize the Kullback-Leibler (K-L) divergence of the estimated distribution and the 
underlying distribution. Newton's method that utilizes the Hessian is a more direct 
way to improve the rate of convergence. [Kakade, 2001b] proposes an estimate of Hes-
sian for discounted reward problem using a sample path of a MDP [Kakade, 2001b]. 
Later, [Kakade, 2001a] discusses the relationship between the Hessian estimate in 
[Kakade, 2001b] and the natural gradient in [Kakade, 2001a]. 
1.3 Contribution and Outline of This Dissertation 
For network anomaly detection, our contributions are: 
1. For some networks, we can assume that their normal behavior does not change 
with time, i.e., the network environment is stationary. We propose several 
methods for anomaly detection in stationary networks and give a comparative 
analysis of all the methods, which helps reveal their advantages and disadvan-
tages. 
2. A challenging problem in the evaluation of anomaly detection methods is the 
lack of test data with ground truth. We develop several software packages 
to generate label~d data, including a flow-level anomaly data generator (SA-
DIT [Wang, 2012b]) and a packet-level botnet attack data generator (IMALSE 
[Wang, 2012a]). 
3. T he normal behaviors of a lot of computer networks are not stationary. The 
challenges for anomaly detection of time-varying networks are two-fold. First, 
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the methods used for learning the "normal behavior" are usually quite sensitive 
to the presence of non-stationarity. Second, · the modeling and the prediction 
of multi-dimensional and time-dependent behavior are hard. We propose a 
framework for anomaly detection in time-varying networks that addresses these 
challenges. 
4. Traditional anomaly detection methods only report binary output indicating 
whether there is any anomaly or not and give little information about the net-
work nodes associated with the anomaly. For anomalies caused by botnet-based 
attacks, we propose a framework of malicious node detection to identify the 
nodes in the botnet. 
For sequential decision making, our contributions are: 
1. We combine the LSTD learning and the actor-critic structure and propose an 
LSTD actor-critic method. We also apply this method into a problem of robot 
motion control. 
2. The existing actor-critic methods use steepest gradient ascent, which is known 
to suffer from slow convergence for ill-conditioned problems, to optimize the 
RSPs. We propose a general estimate for the Hessian of the overall reward 
with respect to the parameters and propose an actor-critic method with better 
convergence rate for ill-conditioned problems. 
The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 summanzes sev-
eral stochastic and deterministic anomaly detection methods for stationary networks. 
Chapter 3 describes a robust anomaly detection framework for networks whose normal 
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behaviors are time-varying. Chapter 4 describes a method for malicious node detec-
tion using social graph analysis. Chapter 5 describes our LSTD actor-critic method 
and its application to a problem of robot motion control. Chapter 6 describes a 
Hessian actor-critic method that improves the convergence rate for ill-conditioned 
problems. Chapter 7 concludes this dissertation. 
1.4 Notational Conventions 
Throughout the paper all vectors are assumed to be column vectors. We use lower case 
boldface letters to denote vectors and for economy of space we write x = (xi, ... , xn) 
for the column vector x, where n is the length of the vector x. x' denotes the transpose 
of x, lxl its Euclidean norm, and 0, 1 the vector of all zeros and ones, respectively. 
We use upper case boldface letters to denote matrices and A = [aij] indicates the 
matrix A with (i,j)th element aij· We write I for the identity matrix and 0 for the 
matrix of all zeros. We use diag(x) to denote a diagonal matrix with the elements of 
the vector x in the main diagonal and zeros elsewhere. Similarly, diag(AI, ... , An) 
denotes the block diagonal matrix with matrices AI, ... , An in the main diagonal. 
Finally, we use calligraphic letters to denote sets. For any set X, lXI denotes its 
cardinality. 
Chapter 2 
Temporal Anomaly Detection .for 
Stationary Networks 
2.1 Method Overview 
This chapter presents five methods to the problem of network anomaly detection and 
provides a comparative analysis [Wang et al., 2013]. The goal of the comparative 
analysis is to help identify the advantages and the disadvantages of each method. 
The first two methods are based on Statistical Hypothesis Tests (SHT) [Lehmann 
and Romano, 2005], utilizing results from Large Deviations Theory (LDT) [Dembo 
and Zeitouni, 1998] to compare current network traffic to probability laws governing 
nominal network traffic. The two methods fit traffic, which is a sequence of flows , 
with probabilistic models under i.i.d. and Markovian assumptions, respectively. We 
refer to these two methods as model-free and model-based methods. 
The next two methods are based on an 1-class Support Vector Machines (SVM). 
In the first of the two methods, individual data transmissions from a given source 
are examined independently from neighboring transmissions, producing a flow-by-
flow detector. In the other, sequences of flows within a time window are considered 
together to construct a window-based detector. These two methods will be called 
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flow 1-class SVM and window 1-class SVM method, respectively. 
Finally, in order the comparison complete, we also present a clustering method [An-
derberg, 1973] based on Adaptive Resonance Theory (ART) [Carpenter and Gross-
berg, 1987], which is a machine learning technique originating in the biology field. 
This algorithm, named ART clustering [Rossell, 2012; Wang et al., 2013], partitions 
network traffic into clusters based on the unique features of the network flows. A 
similar clustering technique has been proposed in an application of simulation mod-
eling [Cassandras et al., 2000]. 
The relationships among these methods are depicted in Figure 2.1. The flow 1-
class SVM and the ART clustering method are flow-based and capable of identifying 
individual network flows that are anomalous. By contrast , the remaining methods are 
window-based, under which the flows are grouped into a window based on their start 
time and only suspicious windows of time can be identified as anomalous. Model-
free and model-based methods are stochastic as they fit traffic with probabilistic 
models under i.i.d. and Markovian assumptions, respectively. In contrast, all SVM 
and clustering-based methods are deterministic. 
A challenging problem in the evaluation of anomaly detection methods is the lack of 
test data with ground truth, due to the limited availability of such data. The most 
widely used labeled dataset, DAPRA intrusion detection dataset [Lippmann et al., 
2000a], was collected 14 years ago. Since then, the network condition has changed sig-
nificantly. In order to address this problem, we developed several software packages to 
generate labeled data, including a flow-level anomaly data generator (SADIT [Wang, 
2012b]) and a packet-level botnet attack data generator (IMALSE [Wang, 2012a]) . In 
the comparative study, we evaluate all of our methodologies on a simulated network 
and compare their performance under three flow-level anomalies and one Distributed 
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Figure 2.1: Relationships among the five evaluated methods. 
Denial of Service (DDoS) attack. 
All the five methods in this chapter take flows defined in Section 1.1.3 as input. 
In the comparative study, we focus on host-based anomaly detection in which the 
destination address for the flow is always the host. An anomaly in network traffic is a 
set of flows that does not conform to existing normal traffic patterns. The anomalies 
considered in the comparative analysis are: ( i) nominal network traffic transmitted 
by an unknown user, (ii) network traffic with abnormal flow size, and (iii) network 
traffic with abnormal flow transmission rates . In addition to flow-level anomalies, 
we also consider a Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack from a botnet to the 
server and compare the performance of different approaches accordingly. 
2. 2 Stochastic Methods with Large Deviations Theory 
This section will describe two stochastic anomaly detection methods, in which network 
traffic (flows) are aggregated using windowing techniques described in Section 1.1.3 
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and each window is evaluated as a whole. In stochastic methods, we model the 
network environment as a stochastic process and estimate its parameters through ref-
erence traffic, which is a sequence of quantized flows L,(Yref) = { a(gi), ... , a(gl9retl)} 
(see Section 1.1.3) viewed as a sample path of the stochastic process. We hereby 
abbreviate the quantized flow a(gi) as gi and abuse the notation Q to denote the 
sequence of quantized flows in a window rather than the original flows. Then the 
problem of network anomaly detection is equivalent to testing whether the observed 
traffic in a window is a sample path of the stochastic process. 
As stated above, the normal network traffic is viewed as the sample path of a stochas-
tic process C§ = { e 1 , ... , en} with joint distribution p( e 1 , ... , en). For a sequence 
of observation g = {g1 ' ... 'gn}' g should be the sample path of c;§ if there is no 
anomaly and not otherwise, thus the problem of anomaly detection is equivalent to 
test whether Q is a sample path of the sequence of random variables C§. The problem 
is a binary hypothesis testing problem with the null hypothesis 1l0 being "Q is a sam-
ple path of C§" and alternative hypothesis ilo being 'Q is not a sample path of C§". 
Estimating the high dimensional jointly distribution p( e 1 , ... , en) suffers from the 
so-called "curse of dimensionality" [Wikipedia, 2004] and is still an open question in 
the research community. In the following two sections, two methods will be presented 
to address this problem under different simplifications. 
2.2.1 Stochastic Model-free Method 
In this section, we provide a model-free approach to solve the problem presented 
above. This approach assumes that the random variables C§ = { e 1 , ... , en} are 
i.i.d., thus the joint distribution can be represented as p(C§ = Q) = re=l pF (gi), · 
where pF(·) is the Probability Distribution Function (PDF). We refer to the vector 
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pF = (pF(G = a 1), ... ,pF(G = a1~1)) as the model-free Probability Law (PL). 
For any sequence of observation (} = {g1 , ... , gn}, the model-free empirical measure 
is given bye~ = (G"j(ai), ... 'G"j(al~l)), where 
J = 1, ... , II; I, (2 .2.1) 
and 1(·) is an indicator function. e~ is a II;I x 1 probability vector, i.e., it sums to 1. 
For two probability vectors v and 1-£ , define the model-free divergence of probability 
vector v with respect to 11- as 
(2.2.2) 
The model-free divergence is the cross-entropy between 11- and v and characterizes 
their mutual information. We remark that when applying (2.2.2) in practice we 
substitute p,(ai) and v(ai) to D(ai) = max(v(aj), co) and fl(ai) = max(p,(aj), co), 'ij, 
and co is a small positive constant introduced to avoid underflow and division by zero. 
The model-free empirical measure for the reference flows Yref is a good estimate of 
the model-free PL pF. For every probability vector v with support I;, 
(2.2.3) 
is a good indicator of abnormality for v because of the following theorem. 
Theorem 1. (Sanov's Theorem for the . Model-free Case) Let PF(-) be the 
probability distribution of observations when the model-free P L is pF. For every 
probability vector v with support I;, and for any set r of probability vectors with 
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support 'E 7 
. 1 hmsup -log PF (£~ E f) < - inf J1 (v), 
n--+oo n vEr 
liminf~logPF(£~Ef) > - inf J1 (v), 
n--+oo n vEro 
where n = 191 and ro denotes the interior of r. 
Proof See Theorem 2.1.10 of [Dembo and Zeitouni, 1998]. D 
This theorem provides a description for the behavior of the empirical measure £~ 
as the sequence of flows () grows in size. Namely, £~ becomes "closer to" v with 
probability that behaves as 
Considering this characteristic of empirical measures on observed sequences of flows, 
we have a basis for which new sequences of flow states from 'E can be considered 
irregular with respect to the normal behavior depicted by pF. We declare the activity 
within a sufficiently large sequence of flows () anomalous if 
(2.2.4) 
where E is some threshold. Letting A = -~logE, we define the model-free anomaly 
detector to be: 
I(Q) = { 1, I1(£~) _"2 A, 
0, otherwise. (2.2.5) 
According to (2.2.4), E is the false alarm rate of the detector asymptotically. 
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2.2.2 Flow Group Analysis for Stochastic Model-free Method 
Recall that the stochastic anomaly detector slides an evaluation window over network 
traffic. Each evaluation window corresponds to a sequence of flows. As the presented 
stochastic anomaly detection procedure only provides a binary result for each window, 
it will be helpful to have an intuition for which flows within the window produce the 
anomalous response if an alarm happens. To achieve this goal, we group the flows in . 
a window according to their quantization symbols and propose two metrics to analyze 
the flow groups that may contribute to the alarms. We say a flow g belongs to flow 
group j if the quantization symbol of g is Oj . 
In the model-free case, suppose the model-free PL is pF = (pF(a1 ), ... , pF(al~l)). For 
each flow sequence Q, we define the zeroth-order information of the flow group j in 
Qas 
(2.2 .6) 
where c~g(aj) = 0 if e:j(aj) = 0 or pF(aj) = 0. Note that c~g(aj) is the contribution 
of flow group j to ! 1 (£}) in (2.2.3). 
Similarly, we define the first-order information of the flow group j to be the derivative 
of the ! 1 ( efj,) with respect to e:j ( ai), 
(2.2.7) 
c~g(aJ and cj/1(aj) are two channels of observation for flow group j . 
Suppose the model-free stochastic anomaly detector has been applied to several win-
dows, in some of which alarms are reported. Allow A to denote the set of flow se-
quences, each flow sequence corresponding to a window, that result in alarms; namely, 
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A is a set of sequences such that, for all 9 E A, I1 (e~) 2 -\. Also, allow W to denote 
the set of all sequences which have not resulted in an alarm. We define the following 
alarm contribution measure to represent the degree a flow group j contributes to the 
anomaly found in A, 
L::QEW c;•g(aj) 
IWI (2.2.8) 
form E {0, 1}. Large values of F'F(O"i) indicates that the flow group j is a large 
contributor to the anomaly found in the set of sequences A. Thus, the human analyst 
can put higher priority to this flow group. 
2.2.3 Stochastic Model-based Method 
We turn to the case in which the random process C§ = { G1, . .. , en} is a Markov Chain 
(MC), namely the PDF of random variable in Gi only depends on Qi-1 ,\fi = 2, ... ,n. 
We assume the knowledge of an initial random variable G0 . Then the joint distribution 
p(C§ = Q) = p8 (g1 lg0 ) IJ~,:--11 p8 (gi+1 lgi), where p8 (·1·) is the transition probability 
and g0 is an ,initial observation which is assumed to be known. Let p8 (ai, ai) be 
the probability of seeing two consecutive states (ai, ai)· We refer to the matrix 
P 8 = [p8 (ai,aj)Ji~~1 as the model-based PL. 
We define the model-based empirical measure as e~ = [6"ff(ai,ai)Ji~~1 , where 
i,j=1, . . . ,1~1, (2.2.9) 
and 1(·) is an indicator function. By design, each model-based empirical measure e~ 
is a 1~1 x 1~1 probability matrix, which means the sum of all elements in e~ equals 
1. For every I~ I x I~ I probability matrix Q ----: [q(ai, ai)Ji~~ 1 and IT= [1r(ai, ai)Je~1 , 
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define the model-based divergence between Q and II as 
(2.2.10) 
As in the model-free case, when applying this detection rule in practice we substi-
tute q(cri, cri) = max(q(cri, crj), co) and ?r(cri, cri) = max(1r(cri, crj), co) in the place of 
q(cri, cri) and 1r(cri, crj) in (2.2.10), respectively, where co is some small positive con-
stant introduced to avoid underflow and division by zero. 
The model-based empirical measure of reference traffic Yref is a good estimate of the 
model-based PL pB. For every probability matrix Q with support ~ x ~' we can 
define the indicative metric for being an anomaly as: 
(2.2.11) 
Following a similar procedure as in the i.i.d. case, we state an analog of the Sanov's 
theorem for the Markovian case as the basis for our model-based stochastic anomaly 
detector. We say a probability matrix P = [PiiJ1~~ 1 is shift invariant if2..:.::j Pii = 2..:.::j Pii 
for Vi= 1, ... , 1~1-
Theorem 2. (Sanov's Theorem for the Model-based Case) Let PB(·) be the 
probability distribution of observations when the model-based empirical measure is pB. 
For every shift invariant probability matrix Q with support ~ x ~ and any set r of 
shift invariant probability matrices with support ~ x ~, 
1 limsup-logPB(£~Er) < -infJ2(Q), 
n-+oo n QEr 
1 liminf -logPB(£~ E r) > - inf J2(Q), 
n-+oo n QEro 
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where ro denotes the interior of r. 
As in Theorem 1, this result states that for a sequence of flows Q whose flow number 
is large enough, its empirical measure is "close to" Q with probability that behaves 
as 
So we can flag the behavior captured in the sequence of flows Q as anomalous whenever 
(2.2.12) 
where E is some appropriate threshold. Then the model-based anomaly detector is: 
!1, IB(Q) = . 0, (2.2.13) otherwise, 
where IB(Q) is an indicator of anomaly for Q and.\= -~log E. According to (2.2.12), 
E is the false alarm rate of detector (2.2.13) asymptotically. The model-based detector 
has been proved in [Paschalidis and Smaragdakis, 2009] to be asymptotically Neyman-
Pearson optimal. 
2.2.4 Flow Group Analysis for Stochastic Model-based Method 
A similar procedure as Section 2.2.2 can be constructed for the model-based anomaly 
detector. In the model-based case, each group is identified by a tuple of symbols 
(cyi, ai). We say a flow g belongs to the group ( i, j) if its quantization symbol is 
either ai or ai. Suppose the reference empirical measure is pB = [pB(ai, ai)J1~~1 . For 
each flow sequence Q, We define the zeroth-order information of a flow group ( i, j) in 
32 
Qas 
(2.2.14) 
and the first-order information as 
(2.2.15) 
where C~O, l},g ( ai, aj) = 0 i.f tff_E ( ai, ai) = 0. As in the model-free case, let A be a set of 
flow sequences that result in alarms and let W represent a set of flow sequences which 
• 
have not resulted in alarm; we can define the following alarm contribution measure 
to represent the contribution of a group ( ai, ai) to be the cause of an anomaly found 
in A, 
(2.2.16) 
formE {0, 1 }. Here, flow groups with larger values of FJ3(ai , aj) should be assigned 
greater priorities in examination by human analysts. 
2.3 Deterministic SVM Method 
We turn now to deterministic methods based on the construction of a decision bound-
ary in some space. When flows or sequences of flows lie on the side of the decision 
boundary opposing nominal network activity, we deem those flows or sequences of 
flows abnormal. In this section, we will focus on one widely used technique named 
1-class Support Vector Machine (SVM) [Scholkopf et al., 2001; Locke et al., 2012]. 
First, we assume we have a set of data points Z = { z1, ... , ziZJ}. 
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2.3.1 Background of SVM 
SVM is a well established machine learning technique for binary classification prob-
lems [Cortes and Vapnik, 1995]. The premise is to find a hyperplane that separates 
two classes of data. Namely, the class of a data point z is determined by the sign of 
a linear decision function 
fw,b(z) = w'z- b. 
In order to train a SVM, we need also labels Y = {y1 , ... , yl 2 1} of data points z, 
where yi is a binary variable with domain { -1, + 1} indicating the class of point zi. 
We say two classes in Z are linear separable if there exists a hyperplane fwo,bo(z) = 0 
represented by Wo and bo, such that yifwo,bo(zi) ~ 0 for all i = 1, ... , IZI. Such a 
hyperplane is referred to as a separating hyperplane. 
In many cases, separating hyperplanes are not unique, so we need to find the optimal 
separating hyperplane that will report fewest error for test data. Intuitively, the 
optimal hyperplane should maximize the margin between two parallel hyperplanes 
w~z - b0 = 1, and w~z ~ b0 = -1, (2.3.1) 
which should also separate the data in Z correctly, i.e., 
i = 1, ... , IZI. (2.3.2) 
Since the margin between the two hyperplanes in (2.3.1) is 2 the optimal (w~wo)l/2' 
separating hyperplane can be found by solving the following Quadratic Program (QP) 
mln _21 (w'w) w,b 
s.t. yi(w'zi- b) ~ 1, i = 1, ... ' IZI. (2.3.3) 
Instead of solving (2.3.3) directly, people usually solve its dual problem [Bertsekas, 
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1999] as follows: 
"'I.ZI a · -""· . a·a·yiyi(zi)'zi L....t=l t L..t,] t J 
"'IZI a·yi = O 
L....t=l t ' s.t. (2.3.4) 
ai :2: 0, i = 1, ... , I Z j. 
The solution a * can help find the vector perpendicular to the optimal separating 
hyperplane as w* = l:i:~ a;yixi. Intuitively, w* is linear combination of training data 
in Z such that a; is positive (support vectors). This is the reason why the method 
is named as support vector machine. Let Zsv be the support vectors identified, then 
the optimal separating hyperplane's offset is 
(2 .3.5) 
where 1 ( ·) is an indicator function . 
In the case that the data Z are not linearly separable, (2.3.3) can be modified to allow 
some mis-classifications. For all i = 1, ... , IZI, instead of ensuring that yi(w'xi- b) :2: 
1, the requirement is relaxed to yi(w'xi-b) :2: 1-~i, where ~i is the error allowed for zi. 
We want to minimize the total error, i.e., l:i:~ ~i· Besides, it is often useful to map the 
data Z to a higher dimensional space using mapping 1>( ·). In the higher dimensional 
space, the data become more sparse thus more likeiy to be linearly separable. The 
QP problem (2.3.3) can be augmented as: 
minw,b ~ ( w'w) + C l:i:~ ~i 
s.t . yi(w'1>(zi)- b) :2: 1- ~i, 
~i 2': 0. 
The dual problem of (2.3.6) is: 
s.t. 
i = 1, . .. 'IZI, (2.3.6) 
(2.3.7) 
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where K(zi, zJ) = <I>(zi)'<I>(zJ) is a kernel function. Using a kernel function instead 
of <I>(·) directly helps avoid computation in high dimensional space. Two popular 
choices of kernel functions are the Gaussian kernel K( u, v) = exp( -1( u- v )' ( u- v)) 
with parameter 1, and the d-ord~r polynomial kernel K(u, v) = (u'v + 1)d, where d 
is a positive integer. 
Let a*= (ai, ... , aj21 ) be the optimizer of (2.3.7), the "kernelized" decision function 
is then: 
IZI 
f(z) = LYia7K(z,zi)- b*. (2.3.8) 
i=l 
In this case, a point zi is a support vector only if 0 < a; < C in the optimizer 
a* of (2.3.7). Under this new definition of support vectors, the optimal separating 
hyperplane's offset is 
IZI 
b* = 12
1 I L 1(zi E Zsv )(K(zi, zj)- yi), 
sv i,j=l 
where 1 ( ·) is .an indicator function and Zsv is the set of support vectors. 
2.3.2 1-class SVM for Anomaly Detection 
(2.3.9) 
SVM can be applied to anomaly detection. The main challenge is that we only have 
data for normal data and lack data for anomalies. That is, the training data Z 
consists of only data with + 1 labels. 
In the so-called 1-class SVM [Manevitz and Yousef, 2002; Chen et al., 2013], instead of 
finding an optimal separating hyperplane that separates the two classes, the algorithm 
finds a hyperplane to separate a small portion of training data from the majority. Let 
{~1, ... ,~121} be a set of nonnegative margins, the hyperplane and the margins can 
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be found by solving the QP 
minw,b,c lw'w + _1_ ""I_ZI ti - b 
.. 2 viZI L......t=l S. 
w'<I>(zi)- b 2:: -~i, i = 1, .. . , IZI, (2.3.10) 
~i 2:: o, i = 1, ... , 1 z I· 
The dual problem of (2.3.10) is: 
mm 
s.t. (2.3.11) 
where K(zi, zi) is a kernel function and vis a tunable parameter effectively tuning the 
false alarm rate. Here, the optimal vector a* identifies the support vectors from Z, 
as well as the parameters of the separating hyperplane used for anomaly detection. 
Denote by Zsv = { zi E Z : 0 < at < vl~l} the set of support vectors, then the 
indicator of anomaly for z is defined as 
[ 
IZI l Is(z) = sign[f(z)] = sign ~a: K(z, zi)- b* , (2 .3.12) 
where the intercept b* is given by b* = IZ!vl 2:t:~ l(zi E Zsv) 2:j:11 ajK(zi, zi). 
2.3.3 Flow 1-class SVM 
We consider a set of flows 9 = {g1 , ... , gl91} that need to be evaluated. According 
to (1.1.3), each flow has the format of g = (k(x5 ), da(x5 ), b, dt), which has already 
provided a rather compact representation of network traffic. We choose all attributes 
except cluster labels as features to the flow by flow detector. The new data are 
Z = {z1 = (da(x!), b1 , di), ... , ziZI = (da(x~ZI), biZI , dlZI). The reasoning for this is 
that, since we are measuring departures from nominal users , the actual cluster a user 
belongs to is less important than the distance that user has from the remainder of 
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the cluster center, provided the members of each cluster are reasonably dense. This 
actually brings up an important aspect to kernel function selection. The radial basis 
function examines the difference of each value of da(x8 ), b, dt of a test flow from the 
set of support vectors that construct the anomaly detector and then amplifies these 
differences. Considering that in this context, our best hope is to identify individual 
flows that deviate from the set of nominal flows in Z with these these characteris-
tics, the radial basis function K(u , v) = exp ( -1(u- vf(u- v)) is an appropriate 
selection for the kernel function [Locke et al., 2012]. 
2.3.4 Window 1-class SVM 
In this section, we propose -a window-based 1-class SVM method using the windowing 
techniques described in Section 1.1.3. For each window j with flows Yj, we can get the 
model-free empirical measure £~ and the model-based empirical measure &fj. Let 
the feature vector for window j be yj = { £~, efj, l9j I}. Let y = {Y1 , ... , yiYI} be 
a time series consisting of the features for all windows, then an 1-class SVM can be 
used to evaluate Y, resulting in a window-based anomaly detector. Note that since 
the dimension of feature YJ is usually very large, it often helps to apply Principal 
Component Analysis (PCA) [Pearson, 1901] to reduce the dimensionality first. 
2.4 ART Clustering Method 
In this section, we present a clustering algorithm based on ART theory [Carpenter 
and Grossberg, 1987; Rossell, 2012; Cassandras et al. , 2000] and apply it to network 
anomaly detection [Wang et al., 2013]. The algorithm first organizes inputs into 
clusters based on a customized distance metric. Then, a dynamic learning approach 
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is used to update clusters or to create new clusters. 
Note that the flow representation of ART clustering method is slightly different with 
the rest methods because there is no need to cluster the IP addresses using K-means 
method beforehand. Instead of using the IP address directly, we use a compact 
representation that characterizes the properties of users. Let nJ(x8 , xd) be the number 
of flows transmitted between X 8 and xd. The flow representation used by the ART 
cluster method is: 
(2.4.1) 
where d(·, ·) is the distance metric defined in (1.1.1). 
Let gi be the flow attributes in fi without the starting time ti and assume we have 
a set of flows g = {gi , ... , gl91} , each flow is a 4-dimensional vector. In this section 
we assume that the data in g has already been normalized. Suppose gii is the jth 
attribute of flow gi for all i = 1, ... , 191 and j = 1, ... , 4. 
Let ~ be the set of all flows in cluster k. Letting ck represent the center of cluster k 
and c{ be its j component, then 
(2.4.2) 
where 1(·) is an indicator function. Let C be the set of all cluster centers. Define the 
distance metric 
D(p, q) = t (P{ ~ :~)2 
j = I J 
(2.4.3) 
for two m-dimensional vectors p = (PI, ... ,Pm) and q = (qi, ... , qm), where v = 
(VI, ... , vm) is a set of parameters Vj E [0, 1) which controls the vigilance in dimension 
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J. For every c E C and a prescribed r, 
D(g, c) :::; r, g E IRm (2.4.4) 
defines an ellipsoid in IRm. A higher vigilance in one dimension means the ellipsoid is 
more shallow in this direction. 
The ART clustering algorithm is shown in Algorithm 1. Initially C is empty. For 
each flow gi E 9, we calculate the set D which consists of all clusters whose ellipsoids 
defined by (2.4.4) contain gi. Suppose E(g, c) is the Euclidean distance between g 
and c. If Dis not empty, gi is assigned to the cluster whose center has the smallest 
Euclidean distance with gi and the corresponding cluster center is updated; otherwise 
a new cluster is created. Instead of applying (2.4.2) directly, we can update the cluster 
center in an adaptive way. Suppose that flow gi will be assigned to cluster k, let cf: 
and c{ be the jth component of the center of cluster k before and after the assignment, 
then 
·I p · 1 ·· 
cJc = p+1cfc+ p+1lJ,\:fj= 1,··· ,m, (2.4.5) 
where p is the number of flows in cluster k before the assignment. Because of the 
adaptive update, some assignments may become unreasonable after update as some 
flows may become closer to other cluster centers. As a result, the algorithm processes 
flows in 9 again until an equilibrium is reached. 
To use the ART clustering algorithm as an anomaly detection method, we make an 
assumption that anomalous network traffic comprises a relatively small percentage of 
total network traffic. Once a stable equilibrium is reached, small outlying clusters are 
Require: Flow Data 9 = {g1 , ... , gl91} 
C =Clast={} 
while C-=/:- Clast do 
Clast = C 
fori= 1 -t 191 do · 
D = { c E C : D(gi, c)) < r} 
if IDI = 0 then 
C={C,gi} 
else 
C0 = arg mincEC E(gi, c) 
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h, = {h_, gi}, k is the index of C 0 in C. 
Recalculate cluster center of h. using (2.4.5) 
end if 
end for 
end while 
Algorithm 1: ART clustering Algorithm 
identified as anomalous based on the rule 
{
1, iflh_l< ~~~ XT 
IA(h) = . 
0, otherwise, 
(2.4.6) 
where IA(h.) is an indicator of anomaly for h_, T E [0, 1] is a prescribed detection 
threshold, ICI and 191 are the total number of clusters and flows, respectively. T deter-
mines how small a cluster must be to be considered as anomalous, thus it influences 
the number of alarms. 
2.5 Comparative Analysis 
This section provides a comparative analysis of the methods described above on a 
simulated network. We validate our algorithms with the help of the SADIT and 
the IMALSE software packages described in Section 1.1.4. The workflow diagram 
Flow level 
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Figure 2.2: Workflow of algorithm validation. 
Figure 2.3: Simulation setting. 
I 
of the simulation is shown in Figure 2.2. The data generated by the fs simulator 
and IMASLE are tested independently with each algorithm. Note that the output 
of IMALSE is of pcap format [Wang, 2012a] . Since all the methods noted above use 
flow records as input, the pcap files are transformed into flow records first. 
The setting we use is shown in Figure 2.3 . The network is clearly partitioned into an 
internal network with a hub and spoke topology that connects to the Internet via a 
gateway. The internal network consists of 8 normal users ( CT1-CT8) and 1 server 
( SRV) with some sensitive information. We monitor the traffic on the server. 
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2.5.1 Flow-level Anomalies 
First, we generate a dataset with flow-level anomalies. The size and transmission of 
the nominal flows for user i is assumed to follow a Gaussian distribution N(mi , CJt) 
and Poisson process with arrival rate 7Ji , respectively. We investigate three most 
common types of flow-level anomalies. 
The first one mimics the scenario according to which a network intruder or unautho-
rized user downloads restricted data. A previously unseen user who has a large IP 
distance to the rest of the users starts transimission for a short period. The second 
one is a user i with suspicious flow size distribution characterized by a mean mf higher 
than a typical value mi. Usually flows with substantially large flow size are associated 
with the situation when some users try to download large files from the server, which 
can happen when the attacker tries to download the sensitive information packed into 
a large file. The last one is a user increasing its flow transmission rate to an unusual 
value 7Jf , which could be indicative of the user finding an important directory on the 
server and downloading, repeatedly, sensitive files within that directory. 
2.5.2 Packet-level Anomalies 
A second anomalous dataset is created using the tool IMALSE [Wang, 2012a]. The 
nominal traffic is generated using the on-off application in NS3 [Henderson et al., 
2008; Wang, 2012a] in which the user sends packets for tan seconds and the interval 
between two consecutive transmission is taff· The traffic is a Poisson process, which 
means the on time and the off times are exponentially distributed with parameter 
7Jon and 7Jof f , respectively. 
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We assume there is a botnet in the network. There is a botmaster controlling the bot 
network and a Command and Control ( C&C) server issuing control commands to the 
bots. In our simulation; both the botmaster and the C&C server are the machine 
INT2 in the Internet, and CT1-CT5 in the internal network have been infected as 
bots. We investigate a DDoS Ping flood attack initiated by this botnet, which is 
a very common type of DDoS attack. In Ping flood attacks, the attacker sends an 
·overwhelming number of ping packets, usually using the "ping" command from unix-
like hosts, to the victim to exhaust the bandwidth of the victim. Upon the request 
of the C&C server, each bot will launch a Ping flood attack to the server SRV in the 
internal network. 
The attack is simulated at the packet-level and the data are then transformed into 
flow records using techniques described in Section 1.1.3. With appropriate oF, the 
tan becomes the flow duration of nominal flows and the taft determines the flow 
transmission rate of nominal flows. The initiating stage of the attack is similar to 
the first case in the previous section. During the attack, both the flow transmission 
rate and the flow size of the bots may be affected. First, the flow transmission rate 
is increased as the bots ping SRV more frequently. Second, the ping packets have 
different sizes from normal network traffic. Also, consecutive ping packets may be 
combined together if they are sent over a short time interval. The resulting flows 
may be very large in size if these combinations are common or very small otherwise, 
depending on the attack pattern. 
2.5.3 Results for Anomaly of Atypical User 
Figure 2.4 shows the response of all methods described above when there is an atypical 
user trying to access the server between 1000s and 1300s. For window-based methods, 
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the interval between the starting point of two consecutive time windows is h = 30s and 
the window size is chosen as W 8 = 200s, so there is overlap between two consecutive 
time windows. We also distill the user space by using K-means clustering with 3 
clusters. The quantization levels for flow size, distance to cluster and flow duration 
are 3, 2, 1, respectively, thus I:EI = 18. The x-axis in all graphs corresponds to time(s) 
and the total simulation time is 5000s. · The first two graphs depict the indicative 
metric defined in (2.2.3) and (2.2.11) of the model-free and model-based methods, 
respectively. For both graphs, the green dashed line is the threshold when the false 
alarm rate is E = 0.01. The interval during which the indicative metric is above the 
threshold line (the . red part) is the interval the method reports as abnormal. The 
x coordinates of the red points with a '+' marker in the following three graphs are 
the starting point of the flow or the window the method reports as abnormal. The 
parameter v for the flow 1-class SVM and window 1-class SVM are 0.002 and 0.1, 
respectively. The threshold T for ART clustering is 0.05. 
We can observe from Figure 2.4 that stochastic methods, including our model-free 
and model-based methods, tend to have more stable results in the sense that they 
generate fewer false alarms. At the same time, the flow 1-class SVM and ART 
clustering methods, both of which are flow-based, can provide higher identification 
resolution in the sense that they can identify the suspicious flows, which is beyond 
the capabilities of the stochastic methods. In window 1-class SVM, we can tune the 
window size to adjust the tradeoff of resolution and stability. However, the window 
size in model-free and model-based methods has to be reasonably large since the 
optimality of the decision rule (2.2.5) and (2.2.13) relies on the assumption of a large 
flow number in each window. 
This observation indicates that these methods are complementary to each other. One 
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Figure 2.4: The results of five methods in the atypical user case. 
way to combine them is to use stochastic methods and window-based deterministic 
methods to get a rough interval of an anomaly. Then, only the flows that are both 
-identified as suspicious by flow-based deterministic methods and belong to the interval 
need to be further evaluated. Figure 2.5 shows the Receiver Operating Characteristic 
(ROC) curve of the ART clustering method, which is a flow-based method, and the 
combination of the ART clustering and the model-free method. The ROC curve has 
been substantially improved after combining the two methods. 
2.5.4 Results for Anomaly of Large File Download 
Figure 2.6 is the output of all methods in the case where a user doubles its mean flow 
size between 1000s and 1300s. Again, the first two graphs show the indicative metric 
and threshold line of the model-free and model-based methods. The total simulation 
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Figure 2.5: ROC of ART method alone and with model-free method. x-axis is the 
false alarm rate and y-axis is the true alarm rate. 
time is 5000s. The window parameters h and W 8 are the same as in the previous 
case. The false alarm rate is E = 0.01 for both model-free and model-based methods. 
The parameter v for flow 1-class SVM and window 1-class SVM is 0.0015 and 0.1, 
respectively. T = 0.01 for ART clustering. 
2.5.5 Results for Anomaly of Large Access Rate 
Figure 2.7 shows the response of model-free, model-based, window 1-class SVM and 
ART clustering methods when a user suspiciouly increases its access rate to 6 times 
of its normal value during 1000s and 1300s. The total simulation time is 2000s. The . 
parameters for the algorithms are the same in the atypical user case. 
Note that fiow 1-class SVM cannot work for this type of anomaly since it is purely 
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Figure 2.6: The results of five methods in the large file download case. 
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Figure 2.7: The results of five methods in the large access rate case. 
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Figure 2.8: Model-free alarm contribution measure in descending order 
temporal-based. The flow itself does not change but its frequency does. There is 
no way to identify the frequency change by just observing the individual flows with 
representation in (1.1.3). ART clustering works fairly well for this case because 
the number of flows from the attacker to the server increases during the anomaly. 
Interestingly, the model-based and model-free methods can work very well since the 
portion of traffic originating from the attacker changes, influencing the empirical 
measure defined in (2.2.1) and (2.2.9). The two methods will not be effective in the 
very rare case when all users increase their rate by the same ratio synchronously. 
Figure 2.8 shows the model-free alarm contribution measure F~(CJi) and Fj;,(CJi) for 
the anomaly of large access rate and for all i's . Figure 2.9 shows the model-based 
alarm contribution measure F~(CJi, O"j) and F~(CJi, O"j) for the anomaly of large access 
rate and for all i and j 's. All metrics are plotted in the descending order. In all 
figures, we can observe turning points clearly, which means that only a small portion 
o"'D 
u. 
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Figure 2.9: Model-based alarm .contribution measure in descending order 
of flow groups are the main cause of the alarms. The human analysts only need to 
focus on the flows that belong to those flow groups. 
2.5.6 Results for DDoS Attack 
Figure 2.10 shows the response of the model-free, the model-based, window 1-class 
SVM and flow 1-class SVM methods when there is a DDoS attack targeting SRV 
between 500s and 600s. The total simulation time is 900s. For window-based methods, 
the interval between consecutive time windows is h = lOs and the window size is 
w 8 = lOOs. The false alarm rate for the model-free and model-based method is E = 0.01 
and v = 0.05 for window 1-class SVM. 
Since the nominal traffic in IMALSE is based on an i.i.d. assumption, it is hard 
for the model-based method to capture a good Markov transitional model. But the 
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Figure 2.10: The results for DDoS attack. 
model-based method still detects the start and the end of the attack, during which 
the transitional behaviour changes the most. Model-free and window 1-class SVM 
are more stable while flow 1-class SVM method provides higher resolution. 
The ART clustering method is also not suitable to detect these type of attacks because 
the unsupervised learning model is based on the assumption that malicious network 
traffic represents a small percentage of total network traffic. A DDoS attack generates 
a large number of packets and without some prior ~nowledge of good or bad network 
traffic, the ART clustering algorithm cannot distinguish between the nominal and 
abnormal flows. It is also the reason for the relatively unsatisfactory performance 
of the flow 1-class SVM method. However, window 1-class SVM is not affected by 
this because despite the large number of abnormal flows , the number of abnormal 
windows is still very small. 
Chapter 3 
Temporal Anomaly Detection for 
Time-varying Networks 
3.1 Method Overview 
Section 2.2 presents two methods to characterize the normal behavior of a network 
and to assess deviations from it based on the Large Deviations Theory (LDT) [Dembo 
and Zeitouni, 1998]. Both methods consider the traffic, which is a sequence of flows , 
as a sample path of an underlying stochastic process and compare current network 
traffic to some reference network traffic using LDT. One method, which is referred to 
as the model-free method, characterizes the empirical measure of an independent and 
identically distributed (i.i.d.) sequence of network flows [Dembo and Zeitouni, 1998]. 
The other method, which is referred to as the model-based method, models traffic as 
a Markov Chain. Both methods rely on a stationarity assumption postulating that 
the properties of normal traffic in networks do not change over time. 
However, the stationarity assumption is rarely satisfied in real networks [Leavitt, 
2010]. Internet traffic is subject to weekly and diurnal variations [Thompson et al., 
1997; King et al., 2014]. Internet traffic is also influenced by macroscopic factors such 
as important holidays and events [Sandvine, 2013]. Similar phenomena arise in local 
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area networks as well. 
The challenges for anomaly detection of time-varying networks are two-fold. First, 
the methods used for learning the "normal behavior" are usually quite sensitive 
to the presence of non-stationarity. Second, the modeling and prediction of multi-
dimensional and time-dependent behavior are hard. 
To address these challenges, we generalize the model-free and model-based methods in 
Section 2.2 (referred to as vanilla methods) and develop what we call the robust model-
free and robust model-based methods [Wang and Paschalidis, 2014b,d]. The novelties 
of our new methods are as follows. First, our methods are robust and optimal in 
the generalized Neyman-Pearson sense. Second, we propose a two-stage method to 
estimate Probability Laws (PLs) that characterize normal system behaviors. Our two-
stage method transforms a hard problem (i.e., estimating PLs for multi-dimensional 
data) into two well-studied problems: ( i) estimating one-dimensional data parameters 
and (ii) set cover problem). Being concise and interpretable, our estimated PLs 
are helpful not only in anomaly detection but also in understanding normal system 
behaviors. Moreover, our two-stage method is suitable for distributed computation. 
The structure of this chapter is as follows. Section 3.2 formulates system anomaly 
detection as a binary composite hypothesis testing problem and proposes two robust 
methods. Section 3.3 applies the methods presented in Section 3.2. Section 3.4 
explains the simulation setup and presents results from our robust methods as well 
as their vanilla (stationary) counterparts. 
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3.2 Binary Composite Hypothesis Testing 
Similar to Section 2.2, we transform the network anomaly detection problem as a hy-
pothesis testing problem to test whether a sequence of observations 9 = {g1 , ... , gn} 
is a sample path of a stochastic process C§ (hypothesis 1l0 ). Historical traffic time 
series can be used to estimate a set of parameters for the stochastic process, giving 
rise to what we call Probability Law (PL). The stochastic process C§ is assumed to 
be discrete-time thus can be denoted as C§ = { e 1 , ... , en}. All random variables ei 
are discrete and their sample space is a finite alphabet ~ = { a1 , ... , aiEl}, where I~ I 
denotes the cardinality of ~. All observed symbols gi belong to ~' too. Different 
with Section 2.2, we assume the joint probability distribution Po(el, ... , en) is pa-
rameterized by some parameter e E 0 , where 0 is the space where e take values. The 
parameter e is considered unknown and {Po ( e 1 , . . . , en) : Ve E 0} can be viewed 
as a family of PLs characterizing 1l0 . This problem is a binary composite hypothesis 
testing problem, whose solutions are so-called decision rules. 
A decision rule S is a set such that 9 E S "' {911lo is rejected}, indicating an 
anomaly, and 9 rj::_ S "' { 9 I 1l0 is accepted}, indicating no anomaly. For a deci-
sion rule S, we define a5 (e) = Pol1-lo (9 E S) to be the false alarm rate for S, and 
(35 (e) = Pol 'flo (9 rj::_ S) to be the miss detection rate, where Pol1-lo (-) is the probability 
evaluated assuming 1l0 is correct and Pol 'flo ( ·) is the probability evaluated assuming 
the alternative hypothesis is correct. 
We use the term exponent to refer to the quantity limn---+oo ~ log P( ·) for some proba-
bility P( ·) if the limit exists ; if the exponent is d, then the probabilities approach zero 
as e-nd. We next present the definition of the Generalized Neyman-Pearson Criterion 
for decision rules. 
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Definition 3. (Generalized Neyman-Pearson (GNP) Criterion). A decision ruleS is 
optimal if it satisfies 
(3.2.1) 
and maximizes -liiDn-,Jooo sup f3s~e) uniformly for \f() E 0 . 
Because the joint distribution pe( G1 , ... , en) becomes complex when n is large, we 
focus on two types of simplifications. One is to assume all random variables Gi are 
i.i.d. , the other is to assume the stochastic process t§ is a Markov chain. 
3.2.1 A Model-free Method 
We propose a model-free method that assumes the random variables Gi are i.i.d .. 
Each Gi takes the value Oj with probability pf(Gi = ai), j = 1, ... , I:EI , which is 
parameterized by() E 0. We refer to the vector. p: = (pf(Gi = a 1), ... ,pf(Gi = 
a
1
r: 1)) as the model-free Probability Law (PL) associated with B. Then the family of 
model-free PLs pF = { p: : () E 0} characterizes the stochastic process t§. Similar 
to Section 2.2.1, the model-free empirical measure of the observation Q is e~ = 
(G"j(ai), ... , G"j(atr:t)), where G"j(ai) is defined in (2.2.1). 
Definition 4. (Model-Free Generalized Hoeffding Test). Let pF = { p: : () E n} 
be the set of PLs for underlying stochastic process t#. The model-free generalized 
Hoeffding test [Hoeffding, 1965] is to reject 1i0 when Q is in the set: 
where .X is a detection threshold and DF(·) is defined in (2.2.2). 
We refer to infeEn DF(e~ II pn in Definition 4 as the generalized model-free diver-
gence between e~ and pF. A similar definition has been proposed for robust local-
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ization in sensor networks [Paschalidis and Guo, 2009]. We introduce the following 
theorem . 
. Theorem 5. The model-free generalized Hoeffding test satisfies the GNP criterion. 
Proof. Denote by £n !::; {v I v = £g for some 9} the set of all possible model-free 
empirical measures, i.e., types (Definition 2.1.1 of [Dembo and Zeitouni, 1998]) of 
sequences with length n. The type class of a model-free empirical measure v is 
Tn(v) = {Y E L;n I£~ = v} . Note that a type class consists of all permutations of a 
given vector in this set. Suppose Pr(vlpf) is the probability for empirical m(C)asure v 
when PL is pf (1l0 is correct). Lemma 2.1.9 in [Dembo and Zeitouni, 1998] shows 
(3.2.2) 
For all 0 E n, the false alarm rate of the model-free generalized Hoeffding test is 
< 
Pel1io (Q E s;) 
L Pr(vlpf) 
{viTn(v)s;;;S}} 
{viTn(v) s;;;S}} 
< (n + 1)1~1 e-n>-. 
The first inequality comes from (3 .2.2). For the second inequality, we use the definition 
of S'F and the fact that 1£~1 ~ (n + 1)1~1 (cf. Lemma 2.1.2 in [Dembo and Zeitouni, 
1998]). Furthermore, 
1 * lim SUp -log O'.SF (e) < 
n-+oo n 
1 lim sup -log ((n + l)l~ l e-n>. ) 
n -+oo n 
lim sup[II;Ilog(n + 1) -.X] 
n-+oo n 
-.X, 
which proves that s;., satisfies (3.2.1) . Let now S be some other decision rule satisfying 
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(3.2.1). For all E > 0 and large enough n 
which is equivalent to 
In addition, we have 
a
5 (B) l: Pr(vlpn 
{viTn(v)~S} 
> z= (n + 1)-l~le-nDp(viiP:l. 
{viTn(v)~S} 
(3.2.3) 
The inequality comes from (3.2.2). If n is large enough, (n+ 1)-1~1 ~ e-ne. Moreover, 
(n + 1)-l~le-nDp(viiP:J > 0, \1 v E Ln, so 
Combined with (3.2.3), we obtain 
which means Dp (v II p:) ~ ).. for all v such that Tn(v) <;;:;; s and B E n. Conse-
quently, s <;;:;; s;. and /35 (B) ~ f35 'F (B) for all B E n, so the model-free generalized 
Hoeffding test satisfies the GNP criterion. D 
3.2.2 A Model-based Method 
We now turn to the model-based method where the random process C§ = { G1 , . . . , en} 
is assumed to be a Markov chain. Under this assumption, the joint distribution of C§ 
becomes Po (C§ = Q) = pf (g1) rr~:l1 pf (gi+l I gi), where pf(·) is the initial distribu-
tion and pf (· I ·) is the transition probability; all parametrized by BEn. 
Let pf (ai, ai) be the probability of seeing two consecutive states (ai, aj)· We refer 
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to the matrix Pf = [pf(ai, aiJl~~1 as the model-based PL associated with () E n. 
Then, the family of model-based PLs pB = {Pf : () E 0} characterizes the stochastic 
process C§. We define the model-based empirical measure of observation 9 as the 
matrix£~= [6"j(ai , ai)Je~1 . Similar to the model-free case, we present the following 
definition: 
Definition 6. (Model-Based Generalized Hoeffding Test). The model-based general-
ized Hoeffding test is to reject 1£0 when 9 is in the set: 
where>. is a detection threshold and DB(-) is defined is (2.2.10). 
We refer to infoEn DB(£~ II Pf) as the generalized model-based divergence between 
£~and pB. GNP optimality can be established in this case, too (cf. Definition 3). 
Theorem 7. The model-based generalized Hoeffding test satisfies the GNP criterion. 
Proof. Let Ln 6 { Q : Q = £~, for some 9 E L:n} be the set of possible model-based 
empirical measures, i.e., types of the sample paths of Markov chains with length n. 
Note that every component of the vector Q E Ln belongs to the set {~ , ~, ... , ;}, 
whose cardinality is n + 1. Q is specified by at most II: 12 such quantities, which means 
l£nl ::; (n + 1)1EI2 • Suppose Pr(QIPf) is the probability for observation Q when PL 
is Pf (1£0 is correct). According to Lemma 3 in [Csiszar et al., 1987], 
(3.2.4) 
Similar to the model-free case, define the type class of a model-based empirical measure 
Q be Tn(Q) = {Y E L:n I£~= Q}, and we have the false alarm rate for the model-
based generalized Hoeffding test as 
< 
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PoiHo (Q E s;) 
L Pr(QIP:) 
{ QITn(QKS8} 
{ QITn(Q)~S8} 
< (n + 1)12:12 e-n..X., 
where the first inequality comes from (3.2.4), and the second one is because l£nl is 
bounded by (n + 1)12:12. Then 
lim sup .!. log a5s ( ()) < 
n-+oo n 
lim sup .!.log ((n + 1)12:12 e-n>- ) 
n-+oo n 
. 1 hm sup -[l~ l 2 log(n + 1)- n>.] 
n-+oo n 
->.. 
So the model-based generalized Hoeffding test satisfies (3.2.1). Let now S be some 
other decision rule which satisfies (3.2.1) , for all E > 0 and large enough n. Then, 
Also, 
{QITn(Q)~S} 
> L (n + 1) - (II:I 2+II:I)e-nDB(QIIP:). 
{QITn(Q)~S} 
(3.2.5) 
The inequality comes from (3.2.4). If n is large enough, (n + 1)-(12:12+12:1) > e-m, 
which indicates 
Window 1 
Window 2 
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Figure 3.1: Structure of the robust anomaly detection algorithms. 
for all Q such that Tn(Q) E S and for ()En. Combining it with (3.2.5), we get 
e-n(DB(QIIP:)+E) < e-n(.A+E) 
- ' 
and DB(Q II P f) ~ A for all Q s.t. Tn(Q) E s and() E n. Consequently, s <;;: s~ 
and (35 ( ()) ~ (35'8 ( ()), so the model-based generalized Hoeffding test satisfies the GNP 
criterion. 0 
3.3 Robust Network Anomaly Detection 
Fig. 3.1 outlines the structure of our methods. For each window, we apply the gen-
eralized Hoeffding tests in Section 3.2 with PLs estimated from some reference flows 
(Section 3.3.1) . The estimation of PLs consists of a rough estimation stage (Sec-
tion 3.3.2) to generate a large candidate set and a refinement stage (Section 3.3.3) to 
improve accuracy. 
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Figure 3.2: Range for starting times of flows governed by a PL for shifting net-
works (A) and periodic networks (B). 
3.3.1 Anomaly Detection for Time-varying Networks 
For each window j, an empirical measure of Yj is calculated. We then leverage the 
model-free and the model-based generalized Hoeffding tests (Definition 4,6) , which 
require a set of PLs {pf : 0 E 0} and {Pf : 0 E 0}. We assume 101 is finite, and 
divide our reference traffic Yref into finite groups; the traffic of each group is governed 
by the same PL. The empirical measure of each group is then a PL. Denote by M(j) 
the indices of all flows in group j. Motivated by two representative types of time-
varying networks, we consider two approaches of dividing Yref, i.e, identifying M(j) 
for allj = 1, . .. , 101. In both approaches , M(j) is identified based on t = {t1 , . .. , tn}, 
the set of starting times of flows in Yref. 
Shifting networks 
The first approach is motivated by so-called shifting networks whose properties of 
normal traffic shift with respect to time. This means that the flows close in time are 
more likely to be governed by the same PL. We divide Yref into segments, each with 
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a duration of a prescribed value td. The flows in each segment are used to estimate 
one PL (Fig. 3.2A). The flow indices in segment j are 
(3.3.1) 
where j = 1, . .. , l ( tn - t1) / tdJ . td characterizes how quickly we expect the statistical 
properties of the traffic to shift. Larger td indicates a slower shifting of traffic prop-
erties in the network. One can choose a variety of td, and for each td generate the 
corresponding M(j) and the resulting PLs. 
Periodic networks 
The second approach is motivated by periodic networks whose properties of the nor-
mal traffic change periodically. In addition to having close starting times, two flows 
can be governed by the same PL when the difference of their transmission equals the 
period (Fig. 3.2B). Let td characterize the shift within the period and let tP be the 
period. For j = 1, ... , ltp/tdJ, let 
(3.3.2) 
where Kj = {k: ktp + (j- 1)td > ti and ktp + jtd < tn}. M(j) is the union of a 
sequence of segments spaced by tp. Again, we can choose a variety of tp's and td's 
with each combination contributing to ltP/tdJ PLs. 
Practical networks can exhibit both types of non-stationary behaviors described 
above. Moreover, the periodicity and the degree of shift may change over time, too. 
To increase the robustness of the set of estimated PLs to these non-stationarities, we 
first propose a large collection of candidates and then refine it using integer program-
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Figure 3.3: Histogram of intervals between two consecutive flows with a specific 
feature quantized to the same discrete value. 
ming. 
3.3.2 Estimation of Candidate PLs 
We now present a procedure to generate estimates of td and tp described in the 
previous section based on a sequence of reference quantized flows Yref = {g1 , ... , gn} 
and the corresponding starting times t = { t 1 , ... , tn}. Recall that each quantized 
flow gi consists of quantized values of a cluster label k(xi), a distance to cluster 
center da(xi) , a flow size bi and a flow duration d~, which are called features 1, ... , 4, 
respectively. For a= 1, 2, 3, 4 and b = 1, ... , II:al, we say a flow gi belongs to channel 
a-b if g~ equals ab' , where g~ is the value of feature a for flow gi . We first analyze each 
channel separately to get a rough estimate of td and tw Then, channels corresponding 
to the same feature are aggregated to generate a combined estimate for this feature . 
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Estimation in one channel 
We define Cab = { ti : g~ = ab'} to be the ordered sequence of starting times for flows 
in channel a-b. The interval between two consecutive flows in channel a-b is T:b = 
t~b- t~b" 1 , k = 2, . .. , ICabl, where t~b is the kth element in Cab· 
For shifting networks , since the majority of flows in each channel belong to a continu-
ous time range, the intervals between two consecutive flows are small. The histogram 
of the intervals { T:b : k = 2, ... , ICabl} will have a heavy head and a small tail (Region 
1 in Fig. 3.3). The end of the tail can be used as an upper bound on the interval 
between two consecutive flows and is a good option for td. 
For periodic networks, the histogram for intervals in { T:b : k = 2, . . . , I Cab I} is also 
heavily skewed to small intervals, thus the td can be estimated in the same way as 
with shifting networks. However, the intervals between two consecutive flows can be 
large. Fig. 3.4 shows an example of a feature that exhibits periodicity. There will be 
two peaks around tp1 and tp2 in the histogram of intervals for flows whose values are 
between the two dashed lines. We can select tP such that (tp1 + tp2 ) /2:::::::: tp/2. There 
can be a single or more than two peaks because of the randomness in the network; 
in either case, we can choose the mean of all peaks as an approximation of tP/2 ( cf. 
Fig. 3.3) . 
Aggregation for channels of a feature 
Denote the estimate of td and tp based on channel a- b as td,b and t~b, respectively. 
We use the subscript { d, p} to unify the notations for both estimates. t~b = 0 if 
no periodicity is found in channel a-b. For a = 1, 2, 3, 4, let 7{~,p} = {t{~,p} : b = 
-0 
0) 
::::::! 
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Figure 3.4: Illustration of the peaks in Region 2 of Fig. 3.3. 
1, ... , l~al, and t{~,p} > 0} be the collection of estimates for all channels of feature a. 
We define the combined estimate of td and tP for feature a as t{d,p} =MEAN ( T{d.,p}), 
where MEAN(·) calculates the sample mean of a set. 
If T;a is empty, the network is non-periodic according to feature a, thus, a family 
of candidate PLs can be generated using td and (3.3 .1). Otherwise, the network is 
periodic according to feature a, and a family of candidate PLs can be generated using 
td, t~, and (3.3.2). In addition, in case that some prior knowledge of td and. tp is 
available, the family of candidate PLs can include the PLs calculated based on this 
prior knowledge. 
3.3.3 PL Refinement with Integer Programming 
Using techniques in Section 3.3.2, we can get a large family of candidates for PLs, 
many of which are redundant or inaccurate. The larger the family of PLs is, the more 
likely it overfits 9ref· Furthermore, a smaller family of PLs reduces the computation 
cost. With these motivations, this section introduces a method to refine the family 
of candidate PLs. 
65 
For simplicity, we only describe the procedure for the model-free method. The pro-
cedure for the model-based method is similar. Hereafter, the divergence between a 
collection of flows and a PL is equivalent to the divergence between the empirical 
measure of these flows and the PL. 
Suppose the family (namely the set) of candidate PLs is the set P = {pf, ... , p~} of 
cardinality N. Because no alarm should be reported for Yref, or any segment of Yref, 
our primary objective is to choose the smallest set pF ~ P such that there is no alarm 
for Yref . We aggregate Yref into M windows using the techniques of Section 1.1.3 and 
denote the data in window i as CJ:ef· Let Dij = Dp(£g~ef II pf) be the divergence 
between flows in window i and PL j for i = 1, ... , M and j = 1, ... , N. We say 
window i is covered (namely, reported as normal) by PL j if Dij < A . With this 
definition, the primary objective becomes to select the minimum number of PLs to 
cover all the windows. 
There may be more than one subsets of P having the same cardinality and covering 
all windows. We propose a secondary objective characterizing the variation of a set 
of PLs. Let Nj = { i : Dij < A} be the index set of windows covered by PL j and 
d · b N(l) N(lNil) th d d l t f N D fi -n - {N(i) N(i-l) · enote y i , ... , j e or ere e em en s o j. e ne v j - j - j . 
i = 2, ... , !Nil} the set of differences between consecutive window indices covered by 
PL j. The coefficient of variation for PL j is defined as ct = STD('Dj)/MEAN('Dj), 
where STD('Dj) and MEAN('Dj) are the sample standard deviation and mean of set 'Dj, 
respectively. A smaller coefficient of variation means that the PL. is more "regular." 
The secondary objective is to minimize the sum of coefficients of variation for selected 
PLs. We formulate PL selection as a weighted set cover problem in which the weight 
of PL j is 1 + 1c{, where 1 is a small weight for the secondary objective. Let xi 
be a 0- 1 variable indicating whether PL i is selected or not; let x = ( x1 , ... , x N). 
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Let A = [aij] be an M x N matrix whose (i,j)th element aij is set to 1 if Dij < ). 
and to 0 otherwise. Here, ). is the same threshold we used in Definition 4. Let 
cv = (c~, ... , c~). The selection of PLs can be formulated as the following integer 
programming problem: 
mm 
s.t . 
' ' 1 X+ I Cv X 
Ax 2: 1, 
Xj E {0, 1 }, j = 1, 0 0 0 ' N, 
(3.3.3) 
where 1 is a vector of ones. The cost function equals a weighted sum of the primary 
cost 1' x and the secondary cost <x. The first constraint enforces there is no alarm 
for g;ef ' i = 1, . .. , M. 
function HEURISTICREFINEPL(A, Cv, r, lth) 
Init: bestCost := oo, 1 := 1, x * := 0 
while 1 2: l th do 
x := GREEDYSOLVE(A, 1, cv), I := Tl 
if 1' x + l th<x < bestCost then 
bestCost := 1' x + lthc~x 
x* :=x 
end if 
end while 
return x * 
end function 
function GREEDYSETCOVER(A, 1, cv) 
lnit : x 0 := 0, C := 0 
while ICI < M do 
·+ ._ I:ii!C a;j J .- arg maXj:x[j)=O l+r'cv[i) 
x[j+] := 1, C := C U { i : aij+ = 1} 
end while 
return x 
end function 
Algorithm 2: Greedy algorithm for PL refinement . 
Because (3.3.3) is NP-hard, we propose a heuristic algorithm to solve it (Alg. 2) . 
HEURISTICREFINEPL is the main procedure whose parameters are A , Cv, a discount 
ratio r < 1, and a termination threshold lth· In each iteration, the algorithm decreases 
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1 by a ratio r and calls the GREEDYSETCOVER procedure to solve (3.3.3). The 
algorithm terminates when 1 < lth· In the initial iterations, the weight 1 for the 
secondary cost is large so that the algorithm explores solutions which select PLs with 
less variation. Later, the weight 1 decreases to insure that the primary objective plays 
the main role. Parameters lth and r determine the algorithm's degree of exploration, 
which helps avoid local minimum. In practice, one can choose small lth and large r 
if there is enough computation power. 
G REEDYSETCOVER uses the ratio of the number of uncovered windows a PL can 
cover and the cost 1 + ICv as heuristics, where Cv is the corresponding coefficient 
of variation. GREEDYSETCOVER will add the PL with the maximum heuristic 
value to pF until all windows are covered by the PLs in pF. Suppose the return 
value of HEURISTICREFINEPL is x*. Then, the refined family of PLs is pF = 
{pf : xj > O, j = 1, . .. ,N}. 
Note that the PL refinement procedure aims to find a minimum "dictionary" of nor-
mal behaviors that is sufficient to describe all the reference traffic, which is similar to 
the goal of BasisDetect method [Eriksson et al., 2010]. However, our PL refinement 
procedure differs with BasisDetect in several ways. First, while BasisDetect requires 
labels for both normal and abnormal events, our method only needs normal labels be-
cause our anomaly detection framework focuses on deviations from normal patterns. 
This significantly reduces the workload to label reference traffic. Second, because our 
candidate PLs are motivated by shifting and periodic changes, the patterns learned 
by of our PL refinement procedure are more interpretable compared with those of 
BasisDetect. Third, previously learned (or guessed) patterns can be added to the 
candidate set without worrying about redundancies and mistakes, which can be auto-
matically filtered by the PL refinement procedure. Last, the patterns in our method 
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can be leveraged by the generalized Hoeffding tests, which have been proved GNP 
optimal. 
3.4 Simulation Results 
Lacking data with annotated anomalies is a common problem for validation of network 
anomaly methods. We use the SADIT [Wang, 2012b] software described in Section 
1.1.4 to generate flow-level datasets with annotated anomalies. We use the same 
network settings as Section 2.5 (see Figure 2.3). For all links, the link capacity is 10 
Mb/s and the delay is 0.01 s. All internal and Internet nodes communicate with the 
SRV and there is no communication between other nodes. The normal flows from all 
nodes to SRV have the same characteristics. 
We consider two representative types of changing patterns for normal traffic: shifting 
pattern, a common pattern for traffic to booming web services, and day-night pattern, 
a common pattern for traffic to services with geographically concentrated users (e.g., 
www. boston. com). For the shifting pattern, we assume the size of the normal flows 
follows a Gaussian distribution N(m(t), 172 ). For the day-night pattern, we consider 
both the case when the flow size follows a Gaussian distribution N(m(t), 172 ) and 
the case when the flow size follows a log-normal distribution ln N ( m ( t), 17) . For all 
cases, the arrival process of flows is assumed to be a Poisson process with arrival 
rate 'TJ(t). Both m(t) and 'TJ(t) change with time t. For both patterns, we monitor 
the traffic on the server and evaluate the performance of the robust model-free and 
model-based methods for an anomaly associated with attacks in which some hackers 
exfiltrate sensitive information through SQL injection [Stampar, 2013]. 
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3.4.1 Shifting Pattern 
When a web service is booming, its users tend to generate and download more and 
more contents from its servers. From the flow perspective, this means that the average 
flow size is shifting to higher values. As a simple model, we assume all users exhibit 
the same shift pattern that is linear with respect to time. We also assume flow arrival 
rate is stationary. As a result, m(t) is a linear function of time as m(t) = at+ b, 
where a and bare two parameters characterizing the shift of the traffic and ry(t) is a 
constant. In our simulation, we set b = 4 Mb, a = 3.6 Kb/h, and a 2 = 0.01 for all 
users. The flow arrival rate is constant and ry(t) = 0.1 fps (flows per second). Using 
this shifting pattern, we generate reference traffic Yref for one week (168 hours). 
To obtain the traffic patterns in Yref, the procedure of Section 3.3.2 is applied to 
identify td and tp· For window aggregation, both the window size Ws and the interval h 
between two consecutive windows is 2000 s. The number of user clusters is K = 2. For 
the quantization, the number of quantization levels for the distance to cluster center, 
the flow size, and the flow duration (features 2, 3, 4) are 2, 2, and 8, respectively. 
The values of tp and td can be estimated by inspecting the histograms of the 8 channels 
of feature 3 ( cf. Fig. 3.5). Most channels have tails for small interval ·values but no 
peak caused by periodicity, which clearly indicates that the normal pattern is shifting 
and non-periodic, thus, tp is unnecessary. The combined estimate of td based on flow 
size is t~ = 3.89h. There are 43 candidate model-free and model-based PLs, each PL 
being calculated using a segment of Yref. 
For the model-free method, because m(t) and ry(t) shift with time, the PL calculated 
based on the flows in one interval has very small divergence during this interval, but 
the divergence becomes larger for times away from this interval (cf. Fig. 3.6A). There 
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channel 3-1 channel 3-2 
Figure 3.5: Histogram of intervals for a network in which flow size exhibits a shifting 
pattern. Each plot corresponds to a channel. There are 30 bins and all plots share 
the x-mcis. For all plots, the first bin is not plotted because it is significantly higher 
than the rest of the bins. 
are 4 PLs selected by the PL refinement procedure when the detection threshold is 
set to A= 2 (Fig. 3.6B). 
We say PL j* is active during window i if its divergence with traffic in this window 
is the smallest among all selected PLs, namely j* = arg mini Dij. Each selected PL 
is active for a continuous range of time, which is consistent with the fact that the 
traffic pattern is shifting (Fig. 3.6C). The active PL oscillates before it switches to 
a new PL. Although the number of PLs is reduced after refinement, the generalized 
model-free divergence between each g;ef and the set of selected PLs is very close to the 
corresponding divergence between g;ef and the set of all candidate PLs (Fig. 3.6D). 
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Figure 3.6: Results of PL refinement for model-free PLs in a network with shifting 
pattern. (A) and (B) plot the model-free divergence between g;ef and all candidate 
PLs or just selected PLs, respectively. (C) depicts the active PL at each time. (D) 
plots the generalized model-free divergence between g;ef and all candidate PLs or 
selected PLs. The x-axis corresponds to the starting time of the various windows i. 
This implies that the reduced set represents 9ref welL 
For the model-based method, 6 PLs are selected by the PL refinement procedure when 
..\ = 2 (Fig. 3.7 A,B). Each PL is active for a continuous range of time with similar 
oscillations as in the model-free method during the transition between two active 
PLs (Fig. 3.7C). Again, the generalized model-based divergence between each g;ef and 
either the set of selected PLs or the set of all candidate PLs is very similar (Fig. 3.7D). 
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Figure 3.7: Results of PL refinement for model-based PLs in a network with shifting 
pattern. (A) and (B) plot the model-based divergence between g;ef and all candi-
date PLs or just selected PLs, respectively. (C) plots the active PL for each win-
dow. (D) plots the generalized model-based divergence between g;ef and all candidate 
PLs/selected PLs. 
3.4.2 Day-night Pattern 
The traffic of local web services usually exhibits diurnal variations because people 
browse websites more frequently during day than night. Fig. 3.8 shows the normalized 
average traffic to American social websites over a day [Akamai, 2013]. 
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Figure 3.8: Traffic pattern of social network websites. 
Flow Size with Truncated Gaussian Distribution 
For this case study, we assume the flow size of all users follows a Gaussian distribution 
N(m(t), a2 ) truncated to be positive, and the flows arrive according to a Poisson 
process with arrival rate rJ(t). Both m(t) and rJ(t) are time-varying. We assume that 
the flow arrival rate and the mean flow size have the same day-night pattern. Let p(t) 
be the function shown in Fig. 3.8, and assume rJ(t) = Ap(t) and m(t) = Mpp(t), where 
A and Mp are the peak arrival rate and the peak mean flow size. In our simulation, we 
set Mp =4Mb, a 2 = 0.01, and A = 0.1 fps for all users. Using this day-night pattern, 
we generate reference traffic 9ref for one week (168 hours) whose start time is 5 pm. 
Again, an estimation procedure is applied to estimate td and tp. The parameters for 
window aggregation and quantization are the same as in Section 3.4.1. 
The period can be estimated by inspecting the histograms of the 8 channels of feature 
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3, namely the flow size feature (Fig. 3.9). Peaks can be observed in all channels except 
for channel 3-4 and 3-5. The combined estimate of the period based on flow size is 
t; = 24.56 h, which has only 2.3% error with the real value of 24 h. 
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Figure 3.9: Histogram of intervals for the day-night pattern where the flow size follows 
a Gaussian distribution. Each subfigure corresponds to one channel. All subfigures 
share the x-axis and the total number of bins is q = 30. The first bin is not plotted 
in the histogram because it is significantly higher than the rest of the bins. 
For the model-free method, there are 64 candidate model-free PLs proposed in the es-
timation stage. The model-free divergence between each window and each candidate 
PL is a periodic function of time, too. Some PLs have smaller divergence during the 
day and some others have smaller divergence during the night (cf. Fig. 3.10A). How-
ever, no PL has small divergence for all windows. 3 PLs out of the 64 candidates are 
selected when the detection threshold is,\= 0.6 (cf. Fig. 3.10B). The 3 selected PLs 
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Figure 3.10: Results of PL refinement for the model-free method in a network with 
day-night pattern where the flow size follows a Gaussian distribution. All figures 
share the x-axis. (A) and (B) plot the divergence of traffic in each window with 
all candidate PLs and with selected PLs, respectively. (C) shows the active PL for 
each window. (D) plots the generalized divergence of traffic in each window with all 
candidate PLs and selected PLs. 
are active during day, night, and the transitional time, respectively (cf. Fig. 3.10C 
for the active PLs of all windows). For all windows, the model-free generalized di-
vergence between Yref and all candidate PLs is very close to the divergence between 
gref and only the selected PLs (Fig. 3.10D). The difference is relatively larger during 
the transitional time between day and night. This is because the network's behavior 
changes more rapidly during this transitional time, thus, more PLs are required to 
represent the network accurately. 
For the model-based method, there are 64 candidate model-based PLs, too. Similar 
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Figure 3.11: Results of PL refinement for the model-based method in a network with 
day-night pattern where the flow size follows a Gaussian distribution. All figures 
share the x-a:x:is. (A) and (B) plot the divergence of traffic in each window with 
all candidate PLs and with selected PLs, respectively. (C) shows the active PL for 
each window. (D) plots the generalized divergence of traffic in each window with all 
candidate PLs and selected PLs. 
to the model-free method, the model-based divergence between all candidate PLs and 
flows in each window in Yref is periodic (Fig. 3.11A) and there is no PL that can rep-
resent all the reference data Yref· 2 PLs are selected when..\= 0.4 (Fig. 3.11B). One 
PL is active during the transitional time and the other is active during the stationary 
time, which consists of both day and night (Fig. 3.11C). As before, the divergence 
between each g;ef and all candidate PLs IS similar to the divergence between g;ef 
and just the selected PLs (Fig. 3.11D). 
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Figure 3.12: Results of PL refinement for the model-free method in a network with 
day-night pattern where the flow size follows a log-normal distribution. All figures 
share the x-axis. (A) and (B) plot the divergence of traffic in each window with 
all candidate PLs and with selected PLs, respectively. (C) shows the active PL for 
each window. (D) plots the generalized divergence of traffic in each window with all 
candidate PLs and selected PLs. 
Flow Size with Log-normal Distribution 
A lot of flows correspond to file transfers or similar file operations. [Crovella, 2000] 
argues that the sizes of transferred files in the Internet follows a mixed model in which 
the body of the file size distribution can be well modeled by a log-normal distribution 
ln N ( m, O") with probability density function 
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Figure 3.13: Results of PL refinement for the model-based method in a network with 
day-night pattern where the flow size follows a log-normal distribution. All figures 
share the x-axis. (A) and (B) plot the divergence of traffic in each window with 
all candidate PLs and with selected PLs, respectively. (C) shows the active PL for 
each window. (D) plots the generalized divergence of traffic in each window with all 
candidate PLs and selected PLs. 
where m and u are referred to as the location parameter and the scale parameter, 
respectively. In this section, we assume the flow size (in bytes) follows a log-normal 
distribution lnN(m(t), u), where m(t) = Mpp(t) is a time-varying parameter. Again 
p(t) is the pattern function depicted in Fig. 3.8. We let MP = 7.881 (in bytes) and 
u = 1.339, both of which are estimated from some real network traffic [Crovella, 
2000] . We assume that all users flows arrive according to a Poisson process with rate 
0.1 fps. 
For the model-free method, there are 32 candidate model-free PLs proposed in the 
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estimation stage and only 3 PLs are selected when A = 0.1 (Fig. 3.12). One PL 
represents the "high activity" pattern between 10 pm and 1 am, one PL represents 
the "low activity" pattern between 2 am and 11 am, and one PL represents the 
"moderate activity" pattern for the remaining time. 
For the model-based method, there are also 32 candidate model-based PLs and only 3 
PLs are selected when A= 0.1 (Fig. 3.13). The meaning of the three selected PLs for 
the model-based methods is similar to their counterparts for the model-free methods. 
The results show that the PL refinement procedure is effective and the refined family 
of PLs is meaningful. Each PL in the refined family corresponds to a "pattern of 
normal behavior." This information is useful not only for anomaly detection but also 
for understanding the normal traffic in time-varying networks. 
3.4.3 Comparison with Vanilla Stochastic Methods 
For both types of normal patterns in Section 3.4.1 and Section 3.4.2, we compared 
the performance of our robust model-free and model-based method with their vanilla 
counterparts in Section 2.2. In the vanilla methods, all reference traffic Yref is used 
to estimate a single PL. We used all methods to monitor the server SRV for one 
week (168 hours) under the two patterns. 
For all types of time-varying networks, we consider an anomaly in which node CT2 
increases the parameter m(t) by 30% at 59h and the increase lasts for 80 minutes 
before the parameter returns to its normal value. This type of anomaly could be 
associated with a situation when attackers try to exfiltrate sensitive information (e.g., 
user accounts and passwords) through SQL injection [Stampar, 2013] . 
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Figure 3.14: Comparison of vanilla and robust methods for network with shifting 
pattern. (A) , (B) show detection results of vanilla and robust model-free methods 
and (C), (D) show detection results of vanilla and robust model-based methods. 
For all methods, the window size is W 8 = 2000s and the interval h = 2000s. The 
quantization parameters are equal to those in the procedure for analyzing the reference 
traffic 9ref· The simulation results show that the robust model-free and model-based 
methods perform better than their vanilla counterparts for both types of normal 
traffic patterns (Fig. 3.14 and Fig. 3.15). 
For the case when normal traffic exhibits a shifting pattern, the detection threshold 
). equals 2.0 for all methods. The vanilla model-free method misses the anomaly 
when the normal traffic shows a shifting pattern (Fig. 3.14A). To make it worse, it 
generates false alarms for the first 30 hours. In contrast, the robust mode-free method 
detects the anomaly successfully without false alarms (Fig. 3.14B). False alarms also 
appear in the detection results of the vanilla model-based method, though it detects 
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Figure 3.15: Comparison of vanilla and robust methods for network with day-night 
pattern where the flow size follows a Gaussian distribution. (A), (B) show detection 
results of vanilla and robust model-free methods and (C), (D) show detection results 
of vanilla and robust model-based methods. 
the anomaly successfully (Fig. 3.14C). Again, the robust model-based method reports 
no false alarm (Fig. 3.14D). 
Compared with the shifting pattern, the day-night pattern has more influence on the 
results of the vanilla methods. Fig. 3.15 shows the results for the case when the flow 
size follows a Gaussian distribution. For both the vanilla and the robust model-free 
methods, the detection threshold).. equals 0.6. The vanilla model-free method reports 
all night traffic (between 3 am to 11 am) as anomalies (Fig. 3.15A). The reason is 
that the night traffic is lighter than the day traffic , so the PL calculated using all of 
9ref is dominated by the day pattern, whereas the night pattern is underrepresented . 
In contrast , because both the day and the night pattern is represented in the refined 
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Figure 3.16: Comparison of vanilla and robust methods for network with day-night 
pattern where the flow size follows a log-normal distribution. (A), (B) show detection 
results of vanilla and robust model-free methods and (C), (D) show detection results 
of vanilla and robust model-based methods. 
family of PLs (Fig. 3.10B), the robust model-free method is not influenced by the 
fluctuation of normal traffic and successfully detects the anomaly (Fig. 3.15B). 
The day-night pattern has similar effects on the model-based methods. When the 
detection threshold >. equals 0.4, the anomaly is barely detectable using the vanilla 
model-based method (Fig. 3.15C). Similar to the vanilla model-free method, the di-
vergence is higher during the transitional time because the transitional pattern is 
underrepresented in the PL calculated using all of Yref. Again, the robust model-
based method is superior because both the transitional pattern and the stationary 
pattern are well represented in the refined family of PLs (Fig. 3.15D). 
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Fig. 3.16 shows the results for the case when the flow size follows a log-normal distri-
bution. For all methods we use detection threshold>.= 0.1. The anomaly can not be 
observed in both the vanilla model-free method and the vanilla model-based method 
due to the high variance of the normal traffic. Again, vanilla methods report a lot of 
false alarms, most of which come from "moderate activity" and "low activity" pattern 
as that are underrepresented. In contrast, the robust methods can successfully detect 
the anomaly. 
Chapter 4 
Malicious Node Detection using Social 
Graph Analysis 
For some anomalies, in particular those related to botnet-based attacks, identify-
ing malicious nodes associated with the anomalies is important. In this chapter, we 
propose a unified detection framework, named SoBotDet, for detecting nodes in bot-
nets [Wang and Paschalidis, 2014c]. Instead of focusing on C&C channels, SoBotDet 
detects botnets by analyzing the social relationships modeled as graphs of nodes. Two 
types of social graphs are considered: ( i) social interaction graphs in which two nodes 
are connected if there is interaction between them, and ( ii) social correlation graphs 
in which two nodes are connected if their behaviors are correlated. We apply the 
SoBotDet method to real-world botnet traffic, and the results show that SoBotDet 
has high detection accuracy. 
4.1 Method Overview 
We assume a sequence of interaction records; each record r = (timestamp, id1 , id2) 
contains a timestamp and the IDs of the two participants. For botnets of network 
computers, interaction records are network packets. For botnets of social accounts, 
interaction records could be friendship requests or events of posting comments on 
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people's pages. 
We group interaction records into windows based on their timestamps. For all k, 
we denote by Wk the collection of interaction records in window k and present the 
definition of the Social Interaction Graph (SIC) for window k as follows. 
Definition 8. (Social Interaction Graph). Let £k be an edge set such that (i,j) E £k 
if there exists at least one interaction record r E Wk whose participant IDs are i and 
j. Then the SIG gk = (V, £k) corresponding to Wk is an undirected graph whose 
vertex set Vis the set of all nodes in the network and whose edge set is £k . 
On a notational remark, throughout this chapter we will use n to denote the number 
of nodes in the network (cardinality of V). 
Our method consists of a network anomaly detection stage and a botnet discovery 
stage (see Fig. 4.1). In the network anomaly detection stage, each SIG is evaluated 
with a reference model and abnormal SIGs are stored into a pool A. The botnet 
discovery stage is triggered whenever the size of the pool A is greater than a threshold 
p. A set of highly interactive nodes, referred to as pivotal nodes, are identified. Both 
botmasters and targets are very likely to be pivotal nodes because they need to interact 
with bots frequently. These interactions are C&C traffic for botmasters and are 
attacking traffic for targets. No mater in which case, the interactions between each bot 
and pivotal nodes should be correlated. To characterize this correlation, we construct 
a Social Correlation Graph {SCG ), whose formal definition is in Section 4.3.2. We can 
detect bots by detecting the community that has high interaction with pivotal nodes 
in the SCG. We propose a novel community detection method based on a refined 
modularity measure. This modularity measure uses information in SIGs, i.e., pivotal 
interaction measure (see Section 4.3.4), to improve detection accuracy. 
Stage 1: Graph Anomaly Detection 
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Degree Distribution 
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Figure 4.1: Overview of SoBotDet. 
4.2 Network Anomaly Detection 
As noted above, the goal of the network anomaly detection stage is to identify abnor-
mal SIGs given some knowledge of what can be constructed as normal. A natural way 
is to monitor the degree distributions of graphs and to compare them with reference 
distributions that are estimated from some reference SIGs. 
This chapter focuses on two types of models: and Erdos- Renyi (ER) model and a 
Preferential Attachment (PA) model. The Generalized Likelihood Ratio Test (GLRT) 
is leveraged to select the most appropriate model based on some reference SIGs. Note 
that ER and PA are just two representatives for random graphs with Poisson and 
power-law degree distributions, and the method we will present can also be applied 
to alternative models in addition to these two. Based on the result of GLRT, we then 
apply composite hypothesis testing correspondingly. 
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4.2.1 Large Deviation Principle for Undirected Random Graphs 
First, we present a Large Deviation Principle (LDP) for undirected random graphs. 
Let Gn denote the space of all simple labeled undirected graphs of n vertices. For 
any graph Q E Gn, let d = (d1 , ... , dn) denote the labeled degree sequence of Q. Also 
let m = ~ 'L-7=1 di denote the number of edges in Q. We assume that any two nodes 
are connected by at most one edge, which means that the node degree in Q is less 
than n. For 0 ::; i :S n- 1, let hi = 'L-7=1 1 (di = i) be the number of vertices in 
Q of degree i, where 1(·) is an indicator function. Henceforth, h = (h0 , .. . , hn_1 ), 
a quantity irrelevant to the ordering of vertices, will be referred to as the degree 
frequency vector of a graph Q. The empirical distribution of the degree sequence d, 
defined by J-t(n), is a probability measure on N0 = N U {0} that puts mass hd L:-7:~ hi 
at i, for 0 ::; i ::; n- 1. A random graph model is said to satisfy an LDP if it satisfies 
the following condition. 
Condition 1. (Large Deviation Principle (LDP)). For every closed set r of proba-
bility measures in N0 , 
. 1 hm sup -log P n (J-t(n) E r) < - inf I(~-t), 
n-too n p,Er 
1 lim inf -log P n (J-t(n) E r) > - inf I (J-t), 
~oo n ~t~ 
where ro denotes the interior of r and p n (.) is the probability law associated with the 
random graph model. 
More intuitively, Condition 1 states that when n is large enough, the empirical degree 
distribution behaves as 
( 4.2.1) 
We will refer to the exponent I (JL) as the exponential decay rate of P n (~-t (n) ~ 1-£). 
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This dissertation will focus on two random graph models that satisfy Condition 1: (i) 
an Erd6s-Renyi (ER) model with Poisson degree distribution and ( ii) a Preferential 
Attachment (PA) model with power-law degree distribution. 
4.2.2 Erdos-Renyi Model 
In the Erd6s-Renyi model G(n,p), the distribution of the degree of any particular 
vertex v is binomial. Namely, 
where n is the total number of vertices in the graph. It it well known that when n ---+ oo 
and np is constant, the binomial distribution converges to the Poisson distribution. 
Let (3 = np denote the constant. Then in the limiting case, the probability that the 
degree of a node equals to k equals 
which is independent of the node label. Let P,a = (P,ao, ... , P,aoo) be the Poisson 
distribution viewed as a vector whose parameter is /3. 
Let JP>(N0 ) be the space of all probability measures defined on N0 . We view any 
probability measure J.L E JP>(N0 ) as an infinite vector J.L = (J-Lo, ... , f-L=). Let S = 
{J.L E JP>(N0 ) : Jl := L..::o if..Li < oo} be the set of all probability measures on N0 with 
finite mean. It is easy to verify that p ,a E S. Let P n ( ·) be the Erdos-Renyi dis-
tribution on space Gn with parameter /3/n. [Mukherjee, 2013] proves the following 
theorem. 
Theorem 9. The Erdos-Renyi model with parameter (3 satisfies Condition 1 with 
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rate function IER: S--+ [-oo, oo] defined as follows: 
where D (J-£ II P/3) = I:i f.Li log(-:;) is the Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence of 1-£ with 
respect to P/3· 
Proof. See [Mukherjee, 2013]. D 
4.2.3 Preferential Attachment Model 
Preferential Attachment (PA) processes are graph networks that evolve in time by 
linking new nodes progressively to existing nodes, and the probability of each existing 
node to be linked is positively related to its connectivity. We view a PA process as a 
sequence of random graphs r.§ = Hh, . .. , YN }, where Yj is the random graph at time 
j. We assume that only one new node is attached each time, i.e. , IYj+ll- l9il = 1 
for all j = 1, ... , N - 1. 
Initially, the graph 91 comprises two vertices with a single (undirected) edge between 
them. At time j + 1, a new node is linked to vertex x E Yj with probability pro-
portional tow (dx(j)) , where dx(j) is the degree of node x at time j. The system is 
"scale-free" when w( d) = d + a and a > -1. 
Generalized Polya urn model 
The evolution of degree distribution in the PA model is equivalent to a generalized 
Polya urn model [Collevecchio et al., 2013; Choi and Sethuraman, 2013; Chung et al., 
2003] %' = {U0 , ... , UN} as follows. Initially, U0 has only one urn with one ball. 
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Suppose p(t) : [0, 1] -+ [0, 1] and f3(t) : [0, 1] -+ [0, oo) are two given functions. At 
each time j + 1, we first add a new urn with no ball in to the collection and then 
1. with probability p(jiN), we place a new ball in this new urn. 
2. with probability 1-p(j IN), we place a new ball in one of the other urns x E Uj 
with probability proportional to w(bx) = bx + f3 (jiN), where bx is the number 
of balls in Urn X of Uj. 
LDP for Degree Distribution in the PA Model 
For 0 ~ j ~ N and d > 0, define hd(j) = (h0 (j), ... , hd(j), hd+I(j)) to be the 
d-truncated degree distribution at time j, where hd+l (j) = Lk2:d+l hk(j) . .ffd = 
{hd(O), ... , hd(N)} is a Markov chain with initial state hd(O) corresponding to the 
initial urn configuration U0 . We interpolate .ffd IN into a continuous process f£d = 
{ xd(t) : 0 ~ t ~ 1} as follows : 
Suppose c.p(t) = (cp0 (t), ... , 'Pd(t), IPd+I(t)) is an empirical d-truncated degree distribu-
tion over all t, where IPd+I(t) = 1- _E~=O 'Pk(t). Let cp(t) = (cpo(t), . .. , tPd(t), cPd+I(t)) 
be the time derivative of <p(t) and [cp(t)t = .2::~=0 cpj(t). For d ~ 0, an LDP applies 
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to 2:d and the rate function Id is [Choi and Sethuraman, 2013] 
{1 (1 [. (t)] ) lo 1- [cp(t)Jo Jo - t.p 0 g p(t) + (1- p(t)) ,B (t) <po(t) 
. (l+,B (t))t 
+ ~ (1- [ · (t)] .) lo 1 - [cp(t)]i ~ 'P t g (1 - (t)) (i+,B(t))<p;(t) 
t=l p (l+,B(t))t 
+ ( 1 - ~ (1 - [<,O(t)];)) X 
log 1- 2:::~=0 (1-;; [~(t)]J dt. 
(1 _ p(t)) ( 1 _ 2.:;-o(t+ ,B(t))<p;(t)) 
. . (l+,B(t))t 
(4 .2.2) 
The result can be extended to the infinite-dimensional case ( d = oo) , and 
Note that ( 4.2.2) is a general result assuming knowledge of the degree histogram r.p(t) 
for all time t in the process of attachment. In our application, we assume the observed 
graph is generated by a process that evolves with a constant rate, i.e., r.p(t) = JJ,t, 
where J-t is the degree histogram at time n (with n vertices). Under this assumption, 
the graph growth rate is cp(t) = 1-£. We consider two special cases of the PA model 
whose degree distributions satisfy a power-law asymptotically [Choi and Sethuraman, 
2013]. 
Offset Barabasi-Albert (BA) Process 
If p(t) _ 0, f3(t) = 1 +a, then the generalized urn model becomes a so-called "offset" 
BA process with weight w(d) = d +a. An "offset" BA process generates trees with 
no circles. In this model, the probability for a node to have degree k is PsA (k; a). It 
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has been proved that 
where ( (x) = 2::1 k-x is Riemann's zeta-function [Titchmarsh, 1986]. Given the 
parameter a of the offset BA process, the rate function ( 4.2.2) corresponding to this 
model is: 
'"""' 1- [JL]i ~ (1 - [JLL) log (i + 1 +a) J-Ld (2 +a) 
+ (1- L iJ-Li) log (2 +a). 
i2:0 
(4.2.3) 
Chung-Handjani-Jungreis (CHJ) Model 
If p(t) _ p and (3(t) _ 1, the generalized urn model corresponds to an attachment 
scheme that can generate graphs instead of trees [Choi and Sethuraman, 2013]. At 
each step, with probability p, a new node is attached to existing nodes similar to the 
BA process. Besides, with probability 1- p, two existing nodes are attached. It is a 
special case of CHJ model, and the asymptotic degree distribution PcHJ (k;p) is 
where ( (x) = 2::1 k-x is Riemann's zeta-function [Titchmarsh, 1986] . Using similar 
techniques with the BA process, we can calculate the rate function for the CHJ model 
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with parameter p as: 
1 - J.Lo 
(1 - J.Lo) log p + (1 _ p) ~ 
~ 1- [JL]i 
+ L..,. (1- [JL]i) log (1- ) ill . 
i=l p 2 f.Lt 
+ (1- L iJ.Li) log 1: . i~O p 
4.2.4 Model Selection 
Our network anomaly detection method depends on the random graph model we 
use. This section describes a method to select the most appropriate model using the 
GLRT decision rule. Our model selection method does not need global information, 
i.e., the adjacent matrices of reference SIGs. Instead we only assume M independent 
observations of the degree sequence !/) = { d1 , ... , dM} under normal operation of the 
network, which reduces the complexity of reference data collection. In practice, we 
could pick l nodes in the network randomly as monitoring points and observe the 
degrees of these nodes in K different SIGs. Then we will get M = Kl samples. 
Note that the observations at those l points are not independent theoretically. The 
dependence, however, is negligible if l is much smaller than the graph size. 
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ER Model 
For the ER model with degree distribution PER (k; (3) ~~<~~ ~ , the log likelihood 
function is: 
LER (~; (3) M ((3c4 -~) ~log d~! 
M 
(log (3) L di - (3M + C, (4.2.4) 
i=l 
where C = - L:i log (di!). Taking the derivative with respect to (3, we get the Maxi-
mum Likelihood Estimator (MLE) ~ = ~~ di . 
PA Model 
For both the offset BA model and the CHJ model, the asymptotic degree distribution 
is power-law with the form PPA (k ; 1) = k--y /( (r), where 1 is a parameter. The log 
likelihood is: 
M L log ( d;:'Y / ( ( 1)) (4.2.5) 
i=l 
M 
- 1 L log di - M log ( ( 1) . 
i=l 
In practice, we may observe some isolated nodes i whose degree di = 0. In this case, 
log di = -oo and the PA model is completely ruled out. However, these isolated 
nodes may be the results of observation error. Instead of ruling out the PA model 
completely, we add a finite penalty 8 for each isolated node. Namely, 
LpA (~; 1) = L~A (~; 1)- e I: 1 (di = o) , 
i 
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where 
LtA (gJ;!) = -~ Llogdi- Mlog((/) 
di>O 
and 1 ( ·) is an indicator function. An appropriate value of 8 can be determined 
through experiments, as we will elaborate in Section 4.4.1. 
The MLE for the parameter 1 can be easily calculated by taking the derivative of 
(4.2.5). Let <P(x) = :x((x)/((x) and q;-1 (x) be the inverse function of <P(x), then the 
MLE for the parameter of PA is :Y = q;-1 (- I.:,di>~Iog~). Let & be the MLE of the 
offset BA process andp be the MLE of the CHJ model, then :Y = &+3 = 1+(1-p)-1 . 
Besides, the offset BA process and the CHJ model should have the same maximum 
likelihood. Instead of distinguishing the BA and the CHJ model, we leverage similar 
ideas as in Chapter 3 and consider a combined model of the BA and the CHJ model. 
A graph is governed by the combined model if it is governed by either the CHJ or 
the BA model. 
Theorem 10. The combined random graph model of CHJ and BA models satisfies 
Condition 1 with the rate function defined as follows: · 
(4.2.6) 
where & = :Y- 3 and p = 1- (:Y- 1)-1 . 
Proof. Here we just give the outline of the proof. For convenience of notation, we let 
pEA = p~A (J.L(n) ~ J.L) be the probability of J.L(n) being close to J.L for the BA process 
(see eq. (4.2.1)). Similarly, let pCHJ = p~HJ (J.L(n) ~ J.L) be the probability of J.L(n) 
being close to J.L for the CHJ model. 
We define the probability law of the combined model to be p~A (J.L~n) ~ J.L) = 
max(PEA, pCHJ). p~A (J.L~n) ~ J.L) is small only when both pEA and pCHJ are 
small. We have 
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max (pBA
1 
pCHJ) · 
max ( e-nlsA(J.L ;&)' e-nlcHJ(J.LiP)) 
;:::::: e-nlpA(Mi') max (1, e-nA1) 
e-nlpA(J.L;)') 
' 
where A1 = IIsA(t-t;&) -IcHJ(t-t;fi)l. The last "equality" is due to the fact that 
e-nA1 asymptotically decays to zero wh~n n -t oo. This result shows that the new 
probability law p~A satisfies an LDP with the rate function IPA (t-t; i') defined in 
(4.2.6). D 
Generalized Likelihood Ratio Test 
We can use Generalized Likelihood Ratio Test {GLRT) to select the reference model. 
Let 1i0 be the hypothesis that ER model is the most appropriate model and 1{1 be 
the alternative hypothesis, then the GLRT is 
(4.2.7) 
where 'TJ is a prescribed threshold. 
4.2.5 A Formal Test for Graph Anomaly Detection 
In this section, we consider the problem of evaluating whether a graph g is normal, 
i.e., comes from the underlying random graph model with desirable parameters (1i0 ). 
Let ILg be the empirical degree distribution of the graph g. The rate function in 
Condition 1 provides a rigorous indicator of the normality of ILg · The rate function 
that should be used depends on the result of the model selection procedure. If the ER 
model is selected, we use IER (t-t; !J) as the rate function; Otherwise, we use IPA(t-t; i') 
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as the rate function. We present the following definition of the generalized Hoeffding 
test for this anomaly detection problem. 
Definition 11. (Generalized Hoeffding Test). Let 
{ 
IER (~-t, S) , if ER is selected, 
I (J-t) = 
IPA (J-t, i'), if PAis selected. 
The Hoeffding test [Hoeffding, 1965] is to reject 1-lo when g is in the set: 
( 4.2.8) 
where .A is a detection. threshold. Since 1(~-tg) satisfies Condition 1 regardless of the 
selected model, the Hoeffding test ( 4.2.8) satisfies the Generalized Neyman-Pearson 
(GNP) criterion [Dembo and Zeitouni, 1998]. 
4.3 Botnet Discovery 
The network anomaly detection technique in the previous section can only report 
whether there is a botnet. In order to learn more about the botnet , we develop the 
botnet discovery technique described in this section. The first challenge for botnet 
discovery is that a single abnormal SIG is usually insufficient to infer complete in-
formation of a botnet , including the botmasters and the bots in the botnet. As a 
result, we monitor windows continuously and store all abnormal SIGs in a pool A. 
The botnet discovery stage is triggered only when IAI > p . 
4.3.1 Identification of Pivotal Nodes 
We assume a sequence of abnormal SIGs A = { 91 , ... , giAI}. Detecting bots directly 
is non-trivial. Instead, detecting the leaders (botmasters) or targets is much simpler 
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because they are more interactive than normal nodes. Botmasters need to "command 
and control" their bots in order to maintain the botnet, and bots actively interact 
with targets or victims in a typical DDoS attack. Both leaders and targets, henceforth 
referred to as pivotal nodes, are highly interactive. Let G~ be an indicator of edge 
existence between node i and j in Yk· Then, fori= 1, ... , n, 
(4.3.1) 
represents the amount of interaction of node i with all other nodes in A. Henceforth, 
ei is referred to as the total interaction measure of node i. We present the following 
definition of pivotal nodes. 
Definition 12. (Pivotal Nodes). The set of pivotal nodes is N = { i : ei > T}, where 
T is a threshold. 
After identifying pivotal nodes, the problem is equivalent to detecting the community 
associated with the pivotal nodes. 
4.3.2 Construction of the Social Correlation Graph 
Compared with similar approaches in community detection, e.g., the leader-follower 
algorithm [Shah and Zaman, 2010], our method takes advantage of not only temporal 
features (SIG) but also correlation relationships. These relationships are characterized 
using a graph, whose definition is presented next. 
For i = 1, ... , n, let variable Xi represent the number of pivotal nodes in N that 
node i has interacted. For each Yk E A, we obtain a sample of Xi as x~ = L_iEN G~. 
Let xi= 1~1 2:.~1 X~ be the sample mean and (J (Xi) = VIAl-l L.l~l (x~- xi) 2 be 
the sample standard deviation of Xi for all i. The sample Pearson product-moment 
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Correlation Coefficient (PCC) is defined as 
{
0, 
X · X · -p( ~' J) - dAI [( k_ - . ) ( k _ - ·)] 
L..k= l xi X, xj X 1 
(IAI-l)a(Xi)a(Xj) ' otherwise. 
By definition, p(Xi , Xi) E [-1, 1] . p(Xi , Xi)= 1 corresponds to total positive corre-
lation, p(Xi, Xj) = 0 corresponds to no correlation, and p(Xi, Xi) = -1 corresponds 
to negative correlation. In addition, we let p (Xi, Xi) = 0 if the sample standard 
deviation of either Xi or Xi equals zero to avoid division by zero. 
Definition 13. (Social Correlation Graph). The Social Correlation Graph (SCG) 
C = (V ,Ec) is an undirected graph whose vertex set is V and whose edge set Ec = 
{ ( i, j) : IP (Xi, xj) I > Tp}, where Tp is a prescribed threshold. 
Because the behaviors of hots are correlated, they are more likely to be connected to 
each other in the SCG. Our problem is to find an appropriate division of the SCG 
to separate hots and normal nodes. Our criterion for "appropriate" is related to the 
well-known concept of modularity in community detection {Newman, 2004b,a, 2006}. 
4.3.3 Modularity-based Community Detection 
The problem of community detection in a graph amounts to dividing the vertices of 
a given graph into non-overlapping groups such that connections within groups are 
relatively dense while those between groups are sparse [Newman, 2004a) . 
The modularity for a given subgraph is defined to be the fraction of edges within the 
subgraph minus the expected fraction of such edges in a randomized null model. Al-
though itwas proposed as the ending criterion of a method, this measure later inspired 
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a broad range of community detection methods named as modularity-maximization 
methods. 
We consider the simple case when there is only one botnet in the network. As a 
result, we want to divide the nodes into two groups, one for bots and one for normal 
nodes. Suppose that si is an indicator of a bot defined as 
Si = {
1
' 
-1, 
node i is a bot, 
otherwise. 
Let d~ be the degree of node i in SCG C = (V, £c) fori = 1, ... , n and me = ~ :Ei d~ 
be the edge number of C. For a partition specified by s = (so, ... , sn), its modularity 
is defined as in [Newman, 2004a] 
1 n 
Q(s) =-~(A-·- N· ·)o(s· s·) 2m c ~ tJ tJ t' J ' 
i,j=l 
( 4.3.2) 
where o (si, si) = ~ (sisi + 1). It is easy to observe that ~ (sisi + 1) is an indicator 
of whether node i and node j are of the same type. Aii = 1 (IP (Xi, Xi) I > Tp) is 
an indicator for the adjacency of node i and node j. Nij is the expected ·number of 
edges between node i and node j in a null model. The selection of the null model is 
empirical, but the most common choice by far is the configuration model [Molloy and 
Reed, 1995] in which Nii = ~~~. The optimal division of vertices should maximize 
the modularity measure ( 4.3.2). 
4.3.4 Refined Modularity 
We introduce two refinements to the modularity measure to make it suitable for 
botnet detection. First, intuitively, bots should have strong interactions with pivotal 
101 
nodes and normal nodes should have weaker interactions. We want to maximize the 
difference. As a result , our objective considers the nodes' interaction to pivotal nodes. 
Let 
1 IAI .. 
ri = IAf LLeiG~ 
k=l j EN 
(4.3.3) 
denote the amount of interaction between node i and pivotal nodes weighted by the 
total interaction measure of pivotal nodes. We refer to ri as pivotal interaction mea-
sure of node i . Then Li risi quantifies the difference between the pivotal interaction 
measure of bots and that of normal nodes. A natural extension of the modularity 
measure is to include an additional term to maximize Li risi· 
Second, the modularity measure is criticized to suffer from low resolution, namely it 
favors large communities and ignores small ones [Fortunato and Barthelemy, 2007; 
Lancichinetti and Fortunato, 2011] . The botnet, however, could possibly be small. 
To address this issue, we introduce a regularization term for the size of botnets. It 
is easy to obtain that Li 1 (si = 1) = Li si~ 1 is the number of detected bots. Thus, 
our refined modularity measure is 
where w1 and w2 are appropriate weights. 
The two modifications also influence the results of isolated nodes with degree 0, which 
possibly exist in SCGs. By Definition 13, node i becomes isolated if a (Xi) = 0 or 
its correlations with other nodes are small enough. The placement of isolated nodes, 
however, does not influence the traditional modularity measure, resulting in arbitrary 
community detection results [Newman, 2004a]. This limitation is addressed by the 
two additional terms. If node i is isolated and ri = 0, then si = -1 in the solution 
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because of the regularization term w2 Li si~1 . On the contrary, if ri is large enough, 
si = 1 in the solution because of the term w1 Li risi· 
4.3.5 Relaxation of the Optimization Problem 
The modularity-maximization problem has been shown as being NP-complete [Agar-
wal and Kempe, 2008; Brandes et al., 2008]. The existing algorithms for this problem 
can be broadly categorized into two types: ( i) heuristic methods that solve this prob-
lem directly [Duch and Arenas, 2005], and ( ii) mathematical programming methods 
that relax it into an easier problem first [Agarwal and Kempe, 2008; Chan and Yeung, 
2011] . We follow the second route because it is more rigorous. 
M [M ln h M _ Aij d;d'j We define the modularity matrix = ij i,j=l, w ere ij - 2mc - (2mc)2 . Let 
s = (s1 , . .. , sn) and r = (r1 , ... , rn), then the modularity-maximization problem 
becomes 
max s'Ms + ( w1r'- ~2 1') s ( 4.3 .5) 
s.t . s; = 1. 
( 4 .3.5) is a typical non-convex Quadratically Constrained Quadratic Programming 
(QCQP) [D 'Aspremont and Boyd, 2003]. Let 
s I ss' 
Po M, 
W2 
qo w1r- -1. 2 
Using the technique in [D' Aspremont and Boyd, 2003], we can relax the problem 
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(4.3.5) to 
max Tr (SP 0 ) + q~s 
[: : l ~ 0, s.t. (4.3.6) 
sii = 1. 
Let X ~ . [ ~ . ~ ] and W ~ [ ~: ~ ] ; then the problem can be further trans-
formed as 
max Tr(XW) 
~ 0, 
s .t. (4.3.7) 
= 1. 
The problem above is a Semidefinite Programming (SDP) problem and produces an 
upper bound on the optimal value of the original problem. It is well known that SDPs 
are polynomially solvable and many solvers (CSDP [Borchers, 1999], SDPA [Fujisawa 
et al. , 1 995]) are available. 
Theorem 14. Denote by f* the optimal objective in (4 .3.5) and f;elax the optimal 
objective of the relaxed problem (4.3. 7). Let A~in be the smallest negative eigenvalue 
of W and A~in = 0 when W is positive semidefinite; Then 
Proof Let x ~ [ ~ ] and W ~ [ ;a ~ ] , then problem ( 4.3.5) is equivalent to 
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the following partitioning problem 
max x'Wx (4.3.8) 
s.t . xi = 1. 
W is a ( n + 1) x ( n + 1) symmetric matrix, not necessarily Positive Semidefinite 
(PSD). Eq. ( 4.3.7) is the SDP relaxation of the problem ( 4.3.8). Let .A~ be the 
smallest negative eigenvalue of W , and .A~in = 0 if W is PSD. Suppose P = W + gl 
is a regularized matrix, then P is PSD if 
(4.3.9) 
The new problem with regularization is 
max x'Px ( 4.3 .10) 
s.t. xi= 1, 
which is a MAXCUT problem if ( 4.3.9) is satisfied. Note that the regularized term 
gx' Ix is a constant for any feasible solution because x'Ix = I.:i x~ = n + 1. As a 
result, ( 4.3.8) and ( 4.3.10) should have the same optimal solution x* but different 
objective values. Suppose the fr~g and f* are the optimal objectives for problem 
(4.3.10) and (4.3.8), respectively. Then 
f * j* + nx*' Ix* reg ~ 
f* + g (n + 1). (4.3.11) 
The last equality is because x* must be feasible. The SDP relaxation of ( 4.3.10) is: 
max Tr(XP) 
s.t. 
{ ~ii ~ 0, =1. (4.3.12) 
Suppose X * is the solution of the relaxed problem (4.3.12), then 
( 4.3. 13) 
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if (4.3.9) is satisfied [Ben-Tal and Nemirovski, 2001]. Besides, we have 
Tr (X*P) Tr (X* (W + gl)) 
Tr (X*W) + gTr (X*) 
fr:lax + Q ( n + 1) . 
Combining ( 4.3.11), ( 4.3.13), and ( 4.3.14), we have 
2 
-(fr*etax+g(n+1)) ::; f*+g(n+1) 
7r 
( 4.3.14) 
(4.3.15) 
for Q ~ ->.~in. The lower bound in Theorem 14 can be proved by letting g = -).~in 
and reorganizing the terms in ( 4.3.15). The upper bound in Theorem. 14 is a standard 
property of SDP relaxation. 0 
Note that the lower bound depends on the properties of W. In a special case that W 
is positive semidefinite, (4.3.5) becomes a MAXCUT problem and the lower bound 
degenerates to the bound of the the MAXCUT problem in [Ben-Tal and Nemirovski , 
2001]. 
Randomization 
The SDP relaxation ( 4.3.6) provides an optimal solution together with an upper 
bound on the optimal value of problem (4.3.5) . However, the solution of the SDP 
relaxation ( 4.3.6) may not be feasible for the problem ( 4.3.5). To generate feasible 
solutions we use a randomization technique. 
If (S*,s*) is the optimal solution of the relaxed problem in (4.3.6), then S*- s*s*' 
must be a covariance matrix. If we pick x = ( x1 , ... , Xn) as a Gaussian random vector 
with x,......, JY(s*, S*- s*s*'), then x will solve the non-convex QCQP in (4.3.5) "on 
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average" over this distribution. It means: 
max E [x'Mx + (w1r'- ~2 1') x] 
s.t. E [xn = 1, Vi. 
As a result, we can sample x with a normal distribution JY(s*, S*- s*s*') and get 
feasible points by taking :X = sgn(x). We sample 10,000 points and pick the point 
that maximizes f(x) = x'Mx + ( w1r'- ~2 1') x. 
4.4 Experimental Results 
Our experimental results include two parts. First, in order to get a better understand-
ing of the model-selection technique in Section 4.2.4, we validate it using a model that 
can be tuned to behave like either the PA or the ER model. Second, we apply our 
network anomaly detection approach to some real-world botnet traffic. Meanwhile, we 
also compare the performance of our botnet discovery approach, a modularity-based 
community detection technique, with some existing community detection techniques. 
4.4.1 Validation of Model Selection using a Mixed Model 
We define the following random graph model. To generate a graph Ymix = (Vmix, Emix) 
with this model, we split the vertex set Vmix into two subsets VER and VPA· Then 
graph YER = (VER, EER) and YPA = (VPA, EPA) are generated by the ER model and 
the PA model, respectively. The edge set of Ymix is then Emix = £ ER U £ p A. 
We let !VERI = lVPAl and generate a sequence of graphs using the random graph 
models described above. Taking some samples ~ = { d1 , ... , d1 ~1 } from the graphs, 
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we can assume that the maximum likelihoods of ?2 for the ER and the PA models 
are the same, namely max,a { LER (?2; ,8)} =max,.. { LpA (?J; f')}. It means 
e L 1 (di = 0) = max {LtA (?J; !')}-max {LER (?2; ,B)}. 
. 7 ,8 
(4.4.1) 
t 
We can use ( 4.4.1) to estimate 8 approximately. Fig. 4.2 shows the relationship of the 
number of isolated nodes and the right hand side of ( 4.4.1). In our experiment, g ER 
is generated with the ER G(n,p) model where p = 0.001. gPA is generated with the 
classical BA process, namely p(t) - 0, ,B(t) - 1. The sample size 1?21 varies from 800 
to 20,000. We use the least-square methods to estimate e and the value is 2.439260. 
Fig. 4.3 shows the max,.. {LPA (?2; !')}- max,a {LER (?2; ,B)} when the ratio of nodes 
generated by the PA model changes from zero to one. The curve correctly reflects 
the trend. 
The way of estimating 8 described above could be generalized for real-world datasets. 
We can ask experts to give estimates of max7 {LPA (?2; !')}- max,a {LER (?2; ,B)} for 
each ?2 and Li 1 (di = 0) is available from the sample ?2. Again, we can use the least 
square method to estimate e. 
4.4.2 Description of Real-world Datasets 
In this paper, we mix some real-world botnet traffic with some real-world background 
traffic. For the real-world botnet traffic, we use the "DDoS Attack 2007" dataset 
by the Cooperative Association for Internet Data Analysis (CAIDA) [CAIDA, 2013]. 
It includes traces from a Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attack on August 4, 
2007. The DDoS attack attempts to block access to the targeted server by consuming 
computing resources on the server and by consuming all of the bandwidth of the 
network connecting the server to the Internet. 
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Figure 4.2: Estimate of 8. The x-axis is the number of isolated nodes in sample !?) 
and they-axis shows max,{L~A(!?);/)}- maxf:i{LER(!?);,B)}. Red points show the 
sample points and the dash line shows y = ex' where 8 is the least square estimate 
of8. 
The total size of the dataset is 21GB and the dataset covers about one hour (20:50:08 
UTC to 21:56:16 UTC). All background traffic has been removed by the creator of 
the dataset. The dataset consists of two parts. The first part is the traffic when the 
botnet initiates the attack (between 20:50 UTC and 21:13 UTC). In the initiating 
stage, the bots probe whether they can reach the victim in order to determine the set 
of nodes that should participate in the attack. The traffic of the botnet during this 
period is small, thus, it is very challenging to detect it using only network load. The 
second part is the attack traffic which starts around 21:13 UTC when the network 
load increases rapidly (within a few minutes) from about 200 Kb/s to about 80 Mb/s. 
With this significant change of transmission rate, it is trivial to detect botnets when 
the attack starts (after 21:13 UTC). In this paper, we select a 5-minutes segment 
from the first part , i.e., during the time when the botnet initiates the attack. The 
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Figure 4.3: Change of log-likelihood under different ratio of YPA and YER· The x-axis 
is the IVPAI/ (!VERI+ IVPAI). They-axis is max-y {LPA (.@; 1)}- max~ {LER (.@; ,8)}. 
total number of bot IP addresses in the selected traffic is 136. 
For the background traffic, we use trace 6 in university of Twente traffic traces data 
repository (simpleweb) [Barbosa et al., 2010]. This trace was measured in a 100 
Mb/s Ethernet link connecting an educational organization to the Internet. This is a 
relatively small organization with around 35 employees and a little over 100 students 
working and studying at this site (the headquarter location of this organization). 
There are 100 workstations at this location which all have 100 Mbit/s LAN connec-
tion. The core network consists of a 1 Gbit/s connection. The recordings took place 
between the external optical fiber modem and the first firewall. The measured link 
was only mildly loaded during this period. The background traffic we choose lasts 
for 3, 600 seconds. The botnet traffic is mixed with background traffic between 2, 000 
and 2, 300 seconds. 
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4.4.3 Results of Network Anomaly Detection 
We first divide the background traffic into 10-second windows and create a sequence 
f§background of 360 background SIGs. We apply the model selection technique described 
in Section 4.2.4 to f§background· 
We first randomly sample 50 SIGs from f§background and sample degrees of 20 nodes 
in each SIG uniformly. As a result, our total sample number l!i'l = 1, 000. In our 
experiment, we choose 8 = 2.43926. The MLE of PA model is :Y = 1.82303242 and 
its log likelihood LPA (!i'; 'Y) = -3, 072.58. The MLE of ER model is S = 0.0252 
and its log likelihood LER(!i'; S) = -643.78. We choose TJ = 0 and assume no prior 
knowledge for the model. ER model is selected according to the rule (4.2.7) . 
Fig. 4.4-A shows the detection results. The blue '+' markers are IER(I-ti; {3) for each 
window i, i = 1, ... , 360, where 1-ti is the empirical degree distribution of SIG i . The 
red dash line shows the threshold >. = 0.18. According to rule ( 4. 2. 8), There are 36 
abnormal SIGs, namely IAI = 36. There are 30 SIGs that have botnet traffic and 29 
SIGs are correctly identified. The SIG 20 corresponding to time range [2, 000, 2, 010] is 
missed. Being the start of the botnet traffic, this range has very low botnet activity, 
which may explain the miss-detection. In addition, there are two groups of false 
alarms-3 false alarms around 3,000 s and 4 false alarms around 3,500 s. Fig. 4.4-
B shows the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve of the detection rule 
( 4.2.8). 
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Figure 4.4: Figure A shows the rate function value IER( J.Li; ~) for each window i. 
The x-axis is the startng time of each window. The background traffic lasts for 3600 
seconds and the botnet traffic is added between 2,000 and 2,300 seconds. Figure B 
shows the ROC curve. The x-axis is the false positive rate and the y-axis is the true 
positive rate. 
4.4.4 Results of Botnet Discovery 
The botnet discovery stage aims to identify bats based on the information in A. 
The first step is to identify a set of pivotal nodes. Recall that the total interac-
tion measure ei in ( 4.3.1) quantifies the amount of interaction in A of node i with 
other nodes. The set of pivotal nodes is N = { i : ei > T }, where T is a prescribed 
threshold. Let emax be the maximum total interaction measure of all nodes and 
yeNorm = { ed emax : i = 1, .. . n} be the normalized set of total interaction measures. 
Fig. 4.5 plots yeNorm in descending order and log-scale y-axis. Each blue "+" marker 
represents one node. The blue curve in Fig. 4.5, being quite steep, clearly indicates 
the existence of influential pivotal nodes. The red dash line in Fig. 4.5 is the chosen 
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Figure 4.5: Sorted amount of interaction in A defined by (4.3.1). y-axis is in log-scale. 
The red dash line is the threshold Ewe picked up. 
threshold E, which results in 3 pivotal nodes. Only one pivotal node (the one with 
maximum total interaction measure) belongs to the botnet. The other two pivotal 
nodes are active normal nodes. These two falsely detected pivotal nodes correspond 
to the two false-alarm groups described in Section 4.4.3. 
Our dataset has 396 nodes, including 136 bots and 260 normal nodes. Among the 
396 nodes, only 213 nodes have positive sample standard deviations. Let Vp = 
{ i : a- (Xi) > 0} be the set of all nodes with positive sample standard deviations, 
Fig. 4.6 plots the correlation matrix of these nodes. We can easily observe two corre-
lation groups from Fig. 4.6 . 
We calculate the SCG C using Definition 13 and threshold Tp = 0.3 . In the SCG 
C, there are 191 isolated nodes with degree zero. The subgraph formed by the rest 
205 nodes has two connected components (Fig. 4.7-A). Fig. 4.7-A plots normal nodes 
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Figure 4.6: The correlation matrix [P (Xi, Xi )J .Ev ·Ev (plotted by pcolor command 
2 p,J p 
in pylab python package). 
as blue circles and bots as red squares. Although the bots and the normal nodes 
clearly belong to different communities, the two communities are not separated in 
the narrowest part. Instead, the separating line is closer to the bots. 
We apply our botnet discovery method to C. The result (Fig. 4.7-B) is very close to the 
ground truth (Fig. 4.7-A). As comparison, we also apply other community-detection 
methods to the 205-node subgraph. 
The first method is the vector programming method proposed by Agarwal et al. [Agar-
wal and Kempe, 2008], which is a special case of our method in which w1 = 0 and 
w2 = 0. This approach, however, misses some bots (Fig. 4.7-C). 
The second method is walktrap method by Pons and Latapy [Pons and Latapy, 
2005; Csardi and Nepusz, 2006], which defines a distance measure for vertices based 
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Figure 4.7: Comparison of different community detection techniques on SCG. Fig. 
A shows the ground-truth communities of bots and normal nodes. Fig. B is the 
result of our botnet discovery approach. Fig. C is the result of vector programming 
method proposed by Agarwal et al. [Agarwal and K,empe, 2008]. Fig. Dis the result 
of walktrap method [Pons and Latapy, 2005] with three communities. Fig. E is the 
result of Newman's leading eigenvector method [Newman, 2006] with 3 communities. 
Fig. F is the result of the leading eigenvector method with 5 communities. In figure 
A-C, red squares are bots and blue circles are normal nodes. In figure D-F, red squares 
indicate the group with highest average pivotal interaction measure, while blue circles 
indicate the group with lowest one. 
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on random walk and applies hierarchical clustering [Ward Jr, 1963]. When the de-
sirable number of communities, a required parameter, equals to two, the method 
reports the two connected components as results, a reasonable yet useless result for 
botnet discovery. To make results more meaningful, we use walktrap to find three 
communities and ignore the smallest one that corresponds to the smaller connected 
components (right triangles in Fig. 4.7-D). The community with higher mean of piv-
otal interaction measure is detected as the botnet, and the rest nodes are normal. 
The walktrap method separates bots and normal nodes in the narrowest part of the 
graph, a reasonable result from the perspective of community detection (Fig. 4.7-D). 
However, a comparison with the ground-truth reveals that a lot of normal nodes are 
falsely reported as bots. 
The third method is the Newman's leading eigenvector method [Newman, 2006; 
Csardi and Nepusz, 2006], a classical modularity-based community detection method. 
This method first calculates the eigenvector corresponding to the second-largest eigen-
value of the modularity matrix M , namely the leading eigenvector. The solution 
s = ( s 1 , ... , sn) is then constructed by letting si be the sign of the ith element 
of the leading eigenvector. The method can be generalized for detecting multi-
communities [Newman, 2006]. Similar to the walktrap method, the leading eigenvec-
tor method reports two connected components as results when the desirable commu-
nity number is two. We also use this method to find three communities and ignore the 
smallest one. Again, the community with higher mean of pivotal interaction measure 
is detected as the bot net . 
Different from previous methods, the eigenvector method makes completely wrong 
prediction of the botnet. The community whose majority are bots (blue circles in 
Fig. 4.7-E) is wrongly detected as the normal part and the community formed by rest 
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Normal Mean Bot Mean Diff'erence 
Ground Truth 0.0021 0.0241 0.0220 
Our Method 0.0017 0.0235 0.0218 
Walktrap 0.0019 0.0212 0.0193 
3-LEV 0.0106 0.0184 0.0078 
Table 4.1: Statistics of amount of pivotal interaction measures. 
nodes is wrongly detected as the botnet. Despite being part of the real botnet, the 
community of blue circles in Fig. 4.7-E actually has lower mean of pivotal interaction 
measure, i.e., less overall communication with pivotal nodes. 
After dividing the SCG C into five communities using the leading vector approach for 
multi-communities [Newman, 2006], we observe that the botnet itself is heterogeneous 
and is divided into three groups. Both the group with the highest mean of pivotal 
interaction measure (Group II in Fig. 4.7-F) and the group with the lowest mean 
(Group I in Fig. 4.7-F) are part of the botnet. 
Because of the heterogeneity, some groups of the botnet may be misclassified. On 
the one hand, the leading vector method wrongly separates Group I from the rest as 
a single community, and merges Group II & IV with the normal part (Group III) . 
Because Group I has the lowest pivotal interaction measure, it is wrongly detected as 
normal, causing Group II, III, IV to be detected as the botnet. On the other hand, 
the vector programming method wrongly detects a lot of nodes in Group II, which 
should be bots, as normal nodes. 
By taking the pivotal interaction measure into consideration, the misclassification can 
be avoided. In our formulation of the refined modularity (4.3.4), the term w1l:i risi 
maximizes the difference of the pivotal interaction measure of the botnet and that of 
the normal part. Owing to this term, our method makes little mistake for nodes in 
Group II since they have high pivotal interaction measures. 
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Let yr- = {ri: si = -1} and~+ = {ri: si = 1} be the set of pivotal interaction 
measures for normal nodes and bots. Table 4.1 shows the mean of yr- (Col. 1) and 
~+ (Col. 2) for ground truth (Row 1), our method (Row 2), walktrap method (Row 
3), and leading eigenvector method with 3 communities (3-LEV, Row 4), respectively. 
The difference between the mean of .9'/ and~- (Col. 3 of Table 4.1) of 3-LEV, whose 
result is unreasonable, is significantly smaller than rest methods. In comparison, the 
difference in our method is much larger and closer to the ground truth. 
Chapter 5 
Dynamic Decision Making for Stochastic 
Systems 
5.1 Problem Formulation 
A Markov Decision Process (MDP) is the model of a discrete time stochastic control 
process. At each time step, the process is in some state and the decision maker may 
choose any action that is available in that state. The process responds at the next 
time step by randomly moving into a new state, and giving the decision maker a 
corresponding reward [Bertsekas, 1995]. Consider an MDP with a finite state space 
X. and an action space 1U. Let xk EX. and uk E 1U be the state of the system and the 
action taken at time k, respectively. Let g(xk , uk) be the one-step reward of applying 
action uk while the system is at state xk. Let x 0 be the initial state. Let p(xk+llxk , uk) 
denote the state transition probabilities (which are typically not explicitly known) ; 
that is, p(xk+llxk , uk) is the probability of transition from state Xk to state xk+l given 
that action uk is taken while the system is at state xk. We assume that {xk} and 
{xk, uk} are ergodic Markov chains. 
The policy candidates are assumed to belong to a parameterized family of Random-
ized Stationary Policies (RSPs) {J.to : 0 E JR.n} . That is, given a state x E X. and an 
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n-dimensional parameter vector (} , the policy applies action u E 1IJ with probability 
tto( ulx). As noted in [Kanda and Tsitsiklis, 2003b], the optimal policy in a param-
eterized family of RSPs might depend on the starting state. Therefore, a precise 
statement of our problem requires the probability distribution of the initial state. 
Let Po,x denote the probability distribution for the Markov chain { xk, uk} given the 
parameter(} and the starting state x and Eo,x denote the corresponding expectation. 
The objective of optimizing an MDP is to maximize a "performance" or "overall 
reward" criterion a((}) which can be one of the following: 
Average Reward: The long term average reward for a policy tto and a starting 
state xis 
T-1 
lim Tl L Eo,x [g(xk , uk)]. 
T--too 
k=O 
(5.1.1) 
Discounted Reward: For this criterion, p is a fixed discount factor. The discounted 
reward associated with a policy tto and a starting state x is defined as 
T-1 
lim~ lEox [g(xk, uk)]. 
T--too L....t ' (5.1.2) 
k=O 
Total Reward: Suppose there is a special termination state x* and T* is the time 
when the system reaches x*, then the total reward associated with a decision policy 
tto and a starting state x is defined as 
T* L Eo,x [g(xk , uk)]. (5.1.3) 
k=O 
The goal is to maximize a((}) over all possible (J 's. Kanda shows that the discounted 
reward and the total reward can be treated as the average reward on an artificial 
MDP [Kanda, 2002). For convenience of description, we will focus on the average 
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reward and present conclusions for the discount reward and the total reward cases 
directly. 
The state-action value function Q9 : X x 1U --+ 1R of a policy J-Lo is defined as the 
expected future reward given the current state x and the action u. It is well known 
that Qo is the unique solution of the Poisson equation [Meyn et al., 2009; Kanda, 
2002] with parameter 6: 
Qo(x, u) = g(x, u)- ii(6) + LP(ylx, u)J-Lo(vly)Qo(y, v). (5.1.4) 
y,v 
Furthermore, the optimal state-action value function Q(x, u) = max9 Q9 (x, u) satis-
fies a modified Bellman equation 
Q(x, u) = g(x, u)- ii(6)- LP(Yix, u) m9XQ(y, u) 
u 
y 
and a policy which takes actions that maximize Q(x, u) is optimal. 
This dissertation describes several actor-critic methods for the optimization problem 
defined above. The general structure of actor-critic methods [Kanda, 2002] is illus-
trated by Figure 5.1. As suggested by the name, actor-critic algorithms have two 
learning units, an actor and a critic, interacting with each other and with the envi-
ronment during the iterations of the algorithms. The actor has a vector of tunable 
parameters (} that parameterizes a set of policies and generates a control using the 
policy (RSP) associated with its current parameter value. For each iteration, the 
critic updates its approximation of the value function corresponding to the current 
policy of the actor, and the actor updates its parameter vector using its observations 
of the environment and the information obtained from the critic. 
State 
Xk 
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·reward 
9k 
System 
Figure 5.1: Actor-critic methods. 
5.2 The Gradient of the Overall Reward 
Action 
Uk 
An intuitive way to solve the optimization problem described above is to use the so-
called gradient ascent method. All methods in this dissertation fall into this category. 
As a first step, we need to estimate the gradient of the overall reward a( 0) with respect 
to the policy parameters 0 , i.e., the policy gradient. Hereby, we will use the gradient 
operator 'V to represent the gradient with respect to (} . Let now 
'ljJ 9 (x, u) = 'V In J.Lo ( ulx), (5.2.1) 
where 'lj; 9 (x, u) = 0 when x, u are such that J.Lo( ulx) - 0 for all O's. It is assumed 
that 'ljJ 9 (x , u) is bounded and continuously differentiable. Since ln J.Lo ( ulx) is the 
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information associated with the action u at the state x , '!fJ 0 (x, u) characterizes how 
this information changes with 6. We write 'I/J 0 (x, u) = ('1/JMx, u), .. . , '1/J(j(x , u)) where 
n is the dimensionality of 6. For any 6 E IR.n, we define the inner product ( ·, ·) 0 of 
two real-valued functions Q1 , Q2 on X x U, viewed as vectors in JRIXII1UI , by 
(5.2.2) 
x,u 
where TJo(x, u) is the stationary probability for the state-action pair (x, u) for the 
Markov chain {xk, uk} under RSP f-Lo· Let 11·11 be denote the norm induced by the 
inner product (5.2.2) on JRIXII1UI. 
Recall that the state-action value function Q0 : X x 1IJ--+ JR. of a policy f-Lo is defined 
as the expected future reward given the current state x and the action u. Q0 is the 
unique solution of the Poisson equation (5.1.4) with parameter 6. The policy gradient 
\7 a( 6) can be estimated using the following theorem. 
Theorem 15. (Gradient of the Overall Reward}. The policy gradient of all three 
types of rewards in (5.1.1}, (5.1 .2}, and (5.1.3} can be expressed as 
a a( 6) i ~=(Qo,'l/J0 ) 0 , i=1, .. . ,n, 
J 
(5.2.3) 
where '1/J~ stands for the i th component of '1/J 0 . 
Proof See [Marbach and Tsitsiklis, 2001; Konda, 2002]. 0 
Suppose Yo is the space spanned by { '1/J~ : i = 1, ... , n}. (5.2.3) means that each 
component of \7a(6) can be represented as the inner product of Q0 with some vec-
tors in Y 0 . Because of the property of the inner product, it is sufficient to know the 
projection of Q0 onto Y 0 in order to compute \7a(6). One possibility is to approxi-
mate Q0 with a parametric linear architecture of the following form (see [Konda and 
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Tsitsiklis, 2003b]): 
Q~(x, u) = 1/J~(x, u)r*, (5.2.4) 
where r* = argminrEJRn IIQ~- Qollo and r* E lRn. With Qfj(x,u) defined in (5.2.4), 
we have 
(5.2.5) 
which means that Q0 is sufficient for estimating \7 a( 6). This dramatically reduces 
the complexity of learning from the space JRIXIIUI to the space JRn. Furthermore, 
the temporal difference algorithms can be used to learn such an r* effectively. The 
elements of 1f;9 (x, u) are understood as features associated with an (x, u) state-action 
pair, and are used to develop an approximation of the state-action value function Q9 . 
5.3 The LSTD Actor-Critic Method 
Our work is based on the work of Konda and Tsitsiklis, which uses Temporal Dif-
ference (TD) learning to learn the projection coefficient r* and updates (} accord-
ingly [Konda and Tsitsiklis, 2003b] . Since the Least Squares Temporal Difference 
(LSTD) method has been shown to provide far superior performance than TD, we 
apply it to the framework of actor-critic and propose an LSTD actor-critic algorithm. 
An LSTD actor-critic method has been proposed for the problem of average re-
ward [Paschalidis et al., 2009] . Our algorithm is targeted to the problem of total 
reward (5.1.3). The algorithm uses a sequence of simulated trajectories, each of 
which starts at a given x 0 and ends as soon as a special termination state x* is vis-
ited for the first time in the sequence. Once a trajectory is completed, the state of 
the system is reset to the initial state x 0 and the process is repeated. 
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Let xk denote the state of the system at time k. Let rk, the iterate for r * in (5.2.4), be 
the parameter vector of the critic at time k, fh be the parameter vector of the actor 
at time k, and x1c+1 be the new state, obtained after action uk is applied when the 
state is xk . A new action uk+l is generated according to the RSP corresponding to 
the actor parameter fh (see [Konda and Tsitsiklis, 2003b]). The critic and the actor 
carry out the following updates, where zk E JR_n represents Sutton's eligibility trace 
[Sutton and Barto, 1998], bk E JR_n refers to a statistical estimate of the single period 
reward, and Ak E JR.n xn is a sample estimate of the matrix formed by zk( 'lj;~k (xk, uk)-
'lj;~k (xk+l, Uk+l) ), which can be viewed as a sample observation of the scaled difference 
of the observation of the state incidence vector for iterations k and k + 1, scaled to 
the feature space by the basis functions. 
LSTD Actor-Critic . 
Initialization: 
Set all entries in z0 , b0 and r0 to zeros. Let A 0 be identity matrix and (}0 take some 
initial value, potentially corresponding to a heuristic policy. 
Critic: 
(5.3.1) 
[:, 1 
where .A E [0, 1) , rk = k' and finally 
(5.3.2) 
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Actor: 
(5.3.3) 
The LSTD actor-critic algorithm works by executing the critic and the actor steps 
alternatively until () converges, i.e ., IOk+l - ()k I ~ E, where E is a threshold. In the 
above, { 1d controls the critic step-size, while {,Bk} and r( r) control the actor step-
size together. An implementation of this algorithm needs to make these choices. The 
role of f(r) is mainly to keep the actor updates bounded, and we can for instance use 
r ( r) = { I ~II' if II r II > D , 
1, otherwise, 
(5.3.4) 
for some D > 0. {,Bk} is a deterministic and non-increasing sequence for which we 
need to have 
lim ,Bk = 0. 
k-too /k 
The convergence of the algorithm is stated in the following theorem. 
(5.3.5) 
Theorem 16. (Actor Convergence). For the LSTD actor-critic method with some 
step-size sequence {,Bk} satisfying (5.3.5}, for any E > 0, there exists some >. suf-
ficiently close to 1, such that liminfk IIVa(Ok)ll < E w.p.J. That is, ()k visits an 
arbitrary neighborhood of a stationary point infinitely often. 
Proof See [Estanjini et al., 2011b]. 0 
5.4 Robot Control in Uncertain Environments 
In this section we apply our algorithm to control a robot moving in a square-shaped 
mission environment. As shown in Figure 5.2, the scene consists of 2,500 small square 
regions. We model the motion of the robot in the environment as an MDP M: each 
region corresponds to a state of the MDP, and in each region (state), the robot can 
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take the following control primitives (actions): "North", "East", "South", "West", 
which represent the directions in which the robot intends to move. Depending on 
the location of a region, some of these actions may not be enabled, for example, in 
the lower-left corner, only actions "North" and' "East" are enabled. These control 
primitives are not reliable and are subject to noise in actuation and possible surface 
roughness in the environment. Thus, for each motion primitive at a region, there is a 
probability that the robot enters an adjacent region. The goal states X:a are marked 
by 'G' in Figure 5.2 (point [0, 49], [49, OJ, [49, 49]). An episode ends if the robot 
reaches one of the goal states. The robot will go back to the initial state x 0 (point [0 , 
OJ) when it reaches any unsafe state x E Xu (shown as black in Figure 5.2) no matter 
which action is taken. Our objective is to find the optimal policy that maximizes the 
expected total reward in an episode on Min which the reward function g(x, u) = -1 
if x E Xu and g(x, u) = 0, otherwise. This problem is closely related to robot motion 
control with Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) Requirement [Estanjini et al., 2011a; Ding 
et al., 2012; Wang et al., 2014]. It has been shown the the probability to satisfy 
an LTL requirement for a robot is equal to the reachability probability of the MDP 
defined above. For each RSP f-lo , the reachability probability R0 = l-~(O), where 
a(()) is the objective with reward function defined above. 
5.4.1 Designing an RSP 
To apply the LSTD actor-critic algorithm, the key step is to design an RSP f-lo ( ulx). 
In this case study, we define the RSP to be a Boltzmann distribution with two scalar 
parameters 01 and 02 . These parameters are used to provide a balance between safety 
and progress while applying the control policy. 
For each pair of states xi, x 1 E X:, we define d(xi, x 1 ) as the minimum number of 
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Figure 5.2: View of mission environment, the initial region is marked by 'S', the goal 
regions are marked by 'G' , and the unsafe regions are shown in black. 
transitions from xi to Xj. We denote Xj E N(xi) if and only if d(xi , Xj) :::; r n, where 
r n is a fixed integer given a priori. If Xj E N(xi), then we say xi is in the neighborhood 
of Xj, and r n represents the radius of the sensing range for each state. For each state 
x E X, the safety score is defined as the ratio of the safe neighboring states over all 
neighboring states of x , namely, 
I:yEN(x) Is(Y) 
safety(x) = IN(x) I , (5.4.1) 
where Is (y) is an indicator function such that Is (y) = 1 if and only if y E X \ Xu 
and Is(Y) = 0 otherwise. A higher safety score for the current state of robot means 
it is less likely for the robot to reach an unsafe region in the future. We define the 
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progress score of a state x E X as 
progress(x) = - min d(x, y) 
yEXc 
which is the negative minimum number of transitions from x to any goal state. 
Note that UJ = { u1 , u2 , u3 , u4}, which corresponds to "North", "East" , "South", and 
"West", respectively. We first define 
ai(O) = th(E[safety(f(x, ui))]- safety(x)) + 02 (E[progress(f(x, ui))]- progress(x)), 
where 0 = (01 , 02 ) and f(x, ui) is a random variable representing the next state 
under control ui· The probability distribution of f(x, ui) is p(·lx, ui) and E[·] is the 
expectation on this distribution. 
Note that ai(O) is defined to be the combination of the expected safety score of the 
next state applying control ui, and the expected improved progress score from the 
current state applying Ui, weighted by 01 and 02. The RSP is then given by 
eai(8)/T 
J.Le(uilx) = ~;=1 eai(8)/T' (5.4.2) 
which is a typical Boltzmann distribution and Tis the temperature of the distribution. 
There is a well-known tradeoff between exploitation and exploration in designing 
RSPs [Sutton and Barto, 1998] . A RSP will have higher exploitation if it is greedier. 
However, in each step, the exploration for undesirable actions are necessary because 
they may be desirable in the long run. High exploitation and low exploration may 
result in sub-optimal solution. In contrast, low exploitation and high exploration 
may reduce the convergence rate of the actor-critic algorithm. Tuning T in (5.4.2) 
in can effectively adjust the weight of exploration. High temperature results in more 
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exploration and vice versa. A large T also makes the RSP more randomized while a 
small T make the RSP more deterministic . 
5.4.2 Comparison of LSTD Actor-Critic with Exact Solution 
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Figure 5.3: Comparison of the LSTD actor-critic and the exact optimal solution. The 
dashed line represents the optimal solution (the maximal reachability probability) and 
the solid line represents the exact reachability probability for the RSP as a function 
of the number of iterations applying the proposed algorithm. 
We first obtained the exact optimal policy for this problem using the methods de-
scribed in [Lahijanian et al., 2010; Ding et al., 2011]. The maximal reachability 
probability is 99.9988%. We then used our LSTD actor-critic algorithm to optimize 
with respect to (} as outlined in Section 5.3. 
Define p0 (x) be the probability of reaching a goal state before reaching any unsafe 
states given the robot starts from state x and applies the RSP J..lO· We know Pe(x) = 0 
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if x E Xu and Po(x) = 1 if x E Xa. We can compute p0 (x) for all other states by 
solving the following set of linear equations 
Po(x) = :L::>to(ulx) LP(Yix, u)po(Y) (5.4.3) 
uElU yEX 
for all x E X\ (Xu U Xa). Note that the equation system given by (5.4.3) contains 
IXI-IXui-IXal number of equations and unknowns. 
We plot in Figure 5.3 the reachability probability of the RSP from the initial state 
(i.e., Po(x0 )) against the number of iterations in the actor-critic algorithm each time 
0 is updated. As 0 converges, the reachability probability converges to 90.3%. The 
parameters for this examples are: T = 1, rn = 2, ,\ = 0.9, D = 5 and the initial 0 is 
(50, -10) . We use fJk = k~k with c = 0.05 fork> 1. 
Chapter 6 
A Hessian Actor-Critic Method 
6.1 Introduction 
Both the TD methods proposed in [Konda and Tsitsiklis, 2003b] and the LSTD actor-
critic method described above use the so-called steepest gradient ascent to update the 
RSP. However, it is well-known that the steepest gradient ascent method has a slow 
convergence rate for ill-conditioned problems in which the reward function is sensitive 
to some parameters but not sensitive to the others. A common practice to boost the 
convergence rate for ill-conditioned problems is the Newton's method, i.e., to scale 
the gradient with the Hessian of the overall reward. 
This chapter establishes some theoretical results about the Hessian of the overall 
reward in MDPs, and describes a new type of actor-critic, named as Hessian Actor-
Critic (HAC) method, that has better performance especially for ill-conditioned prob-
lems [Wang and Paschalidis, 2014a]. Our method is based on the LSTD actor-critic 
method described in the previous section and has the following improvements: ( i) 
In the critic part, we extend the critic to incorporate second order information (i.e., 
the Hessian matrix of the reward function). (ii) In the actor part, we use Newton's 
method with a decreasing damping ratio to update the policy, which can improve the 
rate of convergence for ill-conditioned problems. 
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6.2 The Hessian of the Overall Reward 
Both of the TD and LSTD actor-critic methods are variants of stochastic steepest gra-
dient ascent methods and take advantage of (5.2.3) to estimate the V a( 9). However, 
steepest gradient ascent methods are known to suffer from slow rate of convergence 
for ill-conditioned problems. Newton's method is a natural extension of the steepest 
gradient ascent method for ill-conditioned problems but it requires an estimate of the 
Hessian matrix V~a(9). In this section, we derive an estimate for V~a(9). 
Henceforth, we ignore the subscript 9 in V~ when it does not cause confusion, and 
we consistently use n to denote the dimension of the parameter 9 . In addition, to 
simplify the notation, a lot of equations are represented using functional notation. 
Denote by 1 a function that assigns the value 1 to all state-action pairs in X x lU and 
Po an operator of taking expectation after one transition. More precisely, for any 
real-valued or vector-valued function f defined on X x lU, 
(Pof)(x, u) = LP(Yix, u)JLo(vly)f(y, v) (6.2.1) 
y,v 
for all (x, u) E X x lU. The Poisson equation (5.1.4) can be written in the following 
functional form: 
Qo = g- 6:(9)1 + PoQo. (6.2.2) 
Applying the operator V on a real-valued function g0 : X x lU --+ ~ parameterized by 
9 , we obtain a vector-valued function, abbreviated as V g0 :X x lU--+ ~n, which maps 
(x,u) to Vg0 (x,u) . For a vector-valued function fo: X x lU--+ ~m parameterized 
by 9, which can be denoted as f0 = (!J, ... , f0 ), we define Vf0 to be an n x m 
matrix-valued function whose ith column is V f~. 
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Lemma 17. For any vector-valued function f 0 : X x 1IJ --+ JR.m, we have 
Proof. For all state-action pairs (x, u) E X x 1IJ, we have 
'V(Pofo)(x, u) = '\7 ( ~p(ylx, u)!Lo(vly)fo(y, v)) 
LP(Yix, u)\7 (J-Lo(vly)fo(y, v)). 
y ,v 
(6.2.3) 
f.lo(vly)f0 (y, v) is a function defined on X x 1U, which is abbreviated as J-Lof0 . Using 
the chain rule and the definition of 'lj; 0 , we obtain 
\7 (J-Lofo) = J-Lo V'fo + \7 J-Lof~ 
= J-Lo ( V'fo + 1f; 0f~) . (6.2.4) 
The lemma can be proved by substituting (6 .2.4) to (6.2.3). D 
Lemma 17 provides a method to switch the Po operator and the \7 operator. Similar 
to the definition of 1f; 0 , let us define 
(6.2.5) 
where t.p0 (x,u) = 0 when x,u are such that J-Lo(ulx)- 0 for all O's. Since lnJ-Lo(ulx) 
is the information of decision u at state x, t.p0 is the Hessian matrix of this informa-
tion metric with respect to policy parameter 0. In addition, we define Q0 (x, u) = 
VQ0 (x, u) as the gradient of the state-action value-function with respect to 0. We 
write Q0 = (Q~ , ... , Q0). We prove a similar result of (5.2.3) for V 2a(O). 
Theorem 18. (Hessian of the Overall Reward}. Let cp~ : X x 1IJ--+ JR. be the scalar-
valued component in matrix-valued function t.p0 (x, u) with row position i and column 
position j and let Q~ be the j th scalar-valued component of the vector-valued function 
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Qo. For all types of rewards defined in (5.1.1}, (5.1.2), (5.1.3}, the second-order 
partial derivative of reward a( 0) with respect to 0 can be represented as: 
(6.2.6) 
for\:li,j = 1, ... ,n, where(·, ·) 0 is the inner product operator defined in (5.2.2). 
Proof We only outline the proof of Theorem 18 for the average reward case. Accord-
ing to Theorem 2.10 in [Konda, 2002], we have 
\7a(0)1 + \7Qo =Po ('l/JoQo + \7Qo), (6 .2.7) 
where 1 is a function that assigns the value 1 to all state-action pairs in X x 1U and 
\7Q0 is another notation for Qo. Defining vector-valued function f0 = 'lfl 0 Q0 + \7Q0 
and applying the \7 operator on both sides of (6.2.7), we get 
\7(\la(O)l + VQo) 
\72a( 0)1 + \72Qo 
V(Pofo), 
Po ( Vfo + 'l/J 0 f~) . (6.2.8) 
The last step switches the Po and \7 operator using Lemma 17. Taking inner product 
with 1 on both sides of (6.2.8) and using the fact \7f0 = \7('l/J0 Q0 ) + \72Q0 . We have 
\72a( 0) + (1, \72Qo) 0 = ( 1, Po ( Vfo + 'l/Jof~)) 0 
= (1, Vfo + 'l/J 0f~) 0 
= (1, \7(1/JoQo) + \72Qo)0 
+ ( 1, Qo'l/Jo'l/J~ + 'l/Jo VQ~) 
0 
(6.2.9) 
The first equality is because (1, h) 0 = (1, P0 h) 0 for any function h defined on X x 1U. 
Applying the chain rule and reorganizing the terms in (6.2.9), we obtain 
\72a(O) = ( Qo, 'l/Jo'l/J~) 
0 
+ (Qo, 'Po)o 
+ ( VQo , 'l/J~) 
0 
+ ( 1/Jo, VQ~) 
0 
(6.2.10) 
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D 
According to Section 2.4 and Section 2.5 of [Konda, 2002], the discounted reward and 
the total reward are equivalent to average rewards on an artificial Markov decision 
processes. As a result, we can use the same trick to prove the theorem for the 
discounted reward and the total reward cases. 
Theorem 18 states that the Hessian matrix of the overall reward V 2a( (}) can be 
decomposed into the sum of four terms, all of which have the form of inner products. 
The first two terms are the inner products of the state-action value function Q0 with 
'ljJ~'ljJ~ and cp~. Because of the similarity between the first two terms and (5.2.3), we 
can use similar techniques as the LSTD actor-critic method to estimate the first two 
terms. 
The last two terms require an estimate for Q0 = (Q~, ... , Q0). Note that Q0 is the 
solution of the Poisson Equation (5.1.4). According to Theorem 2.10 in [Konda, 2002], 
we have 
(6.2.11) 
Note that (6 .2.11) is the counterpart of the Poisson equation (5.1.4) for Q0 , in which 
P0 ('¢ 0 Q0 ) plays the role of one-step reward. However, this equation can not be 
directly used to estimate Qo because it is quite hard to obtain Po('¢0 Q0 ). To address 
this problem, we present the following theorem. 
Theorem 19. Suppose function Q0 :X x UJ -7 Rn is the solution of the equation 
(6.2.12) 
and Q0 :X x UJ -71Rn is the solution of {6.2.11}, then 
(6.2.13) 
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Proof. After applying the Po operator on both sides of (6.2.12) and using the fact 
that Pol = l, we get 
Compare (6.2.7) and (6.2.14) , we obtain P0Q0 = VQ0 . As a result , 
\ VQo - Qo, 1P~) 
0 
\ PoQo - Qo, 1P~) 
0 
\ -1PoQo + Va(O)l, 1P~) 
0 
- \ Qo, 1Po1P~) 
0 
+Va(O) (1, 1P~) 
0
. 
(6 .2.14) 
(6.2 .15) 
Let 7ro (·)be the stationary state probability of the Markov chain {xk}, then ry0 (x , u) = 
Jro ( x) J.Lo ( ulx), and 
(1, 1Po) 0 = L 'Tlo(x, u)1P0 (x, u) 
x ,u 
= L 7ro(x)V J.Lo( ulx) 
x ,u 
X U 
= 0, (6.2.16) 
where the last inequality comes from the fact that l:u J.Lo( ulx) = 1. The theorem can 
be proved by combining (6.2.15) and (6.2.16). D 
With Theorem 19, the explicit value of Po (1P 0 Q0 ) is no longer needed. (6.2.12) 
has the same structure with the Poisson equation (5.1.4) thus we can use similar 
techniques as the LSTD actor-critic method to estimate Q 0 . The right hand side of 
(6.2.13) is the first term of (6 .2.6) and can be estimated. 
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By symmetry, it is easy to verify that 
(6.2.17) 
Substituting (6.2 .13) and (6.2.17) into (6.2.10), we obtain a new estimate of the 
Hessian matrix \72a(O). 
Corollary 20. With the Q9 defined in {6.2.12}, the Hessian matrix of a(O) with 
respect to lJ can be represented as: 
(6.2.18) 
6.3 Function Approximation 
We can calculate Q9 and Q9 by solving (5.1.4) and (6.2.12). However, one challenging 
problem is that when X x 1U is very large, the computational cost to solve these 
equations is prohibitive. This problem can be addressed using function approximation 
techniques. One popular type of function approximation is to express Q9 and each 
component of Q9 with a linear combination of some feature functions. We choose 
a set of feature functions ¢ 9 = ( '1/J~, cp~ , '1/J~'l/J~), Vi, j = 1, . . . , n, ¢ 9 (x, u) is an N-
dimensional vector for Vx, u E Xx1U with N = (2n2 +n), where n is the dimensionality 
of 0. Similar to other actor-critic algorithms, the basis functions ¢ 9 needs to be 
uniformly linearly independent [Konda, 2002; Konda and Tsitsiklis, 2003b], which 
can be enforced by choosing a suitable structure of policies. Some additional features 
can be added depending on the particular application. This added flexibility could 
be useful in a number ways and has been discussed in [Konda and Tsitsiklis, 2003b]. 
Let ~9 be the space spanning ¢ 9 . Similar to [Konda, 2002], we choose the linear 
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approximation 
Q~(x , u) = ¢~(x , u)r, r E JR:No (60301) 
Let Iloilo denote the norm induced by the inner product operator (50202) for real-valued 
functions on JR:IXII1Uio According to [Konda, 2002; Konda and Tsitsiklis, 2003b], for 
r* = arg min IIQ~- Qollo, 
rEJRN 
(60302) 
and all i,j = 1, 0 0 0 ,n, we have 
(Q~·' '1/J~)e = (Qe, '1/J~)e' 
( Q~·' cp~- '1/J~~)o = ( Qe, cp~- '1/J~'l/J~)e 
Similarly, define the linear approximation of Q~, the ith component of Q9 , as 
-t; ' i i N Q0 (x, u) = ¢ 9 (x, u)t , t E JR: 0 (60303) 
For all i , j = 1, 0 0 0, n, if 
(603.4) 
then 
(60305) 
Function approximation reduces the computation cost while does not change the 
gradient 'Va(O) and the Hessian 'V2a(8)0 
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6.4 Hessian Actor-Critic Algorithm 
6.4.1 C r itic Step 
We use the Least Squares Temporal Difference (LSTD) to estimate r* and ti*, i = 
1 ... , n defined in (6.3.2) and (6.3.4). Let xk and uk denote the state and the action 
of the system at time k , respectively. zk E JRN is the eligibility trace, Ak E JRN x N is 
a sample estimate of the matrix formed by zk(¢~k(xk , uk)- ¢~k(xk+l , uk+l)), which 
can be viewed as a sample observation of the scaled difference of the features for time 
k and time k + 1. bk E JRN refers to a statistical estimate of the single period reward 
with eligibility trace zk. Let A 0 be an identity matrix, b0 and z0 be column vectors 
with all zeros. To estimate r*, we use the following Q-critic update 
(6.4.1) 
where wk = ¢ 0k (xk , uk) - ¢ 0k (xk+l , uk+l) and rk controls the critic stepsize. Let rk 
be the estimate of r* at time k, then 
{ Ak~1 bk+l rk+l = 
rk, 
(6.4.2) 
otherwise, 
where E is a small positive constant used to judge whether Ak+l is "ill-conditioned" 
or not. Ak should be invertible when k is large enough [Yu, 2006; Yu and Bertsekas, 
2009]. Let v 0 be a column vector with all zeros. To estimate ti*, i = 1, . . . , n defined 
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in (6.3.4), we use the following Q-critic update 
i = 1, ... ,n, (6.4.3) 
where q£ = r(rk)r~c/Jek (xk, uk)'l/J~k (xk, uk) is the observed partial derivative of a( 8) 
with respect to ()i· (k controls the stepsize of the Q-critic and f(rk) restricts the 
influence of the error in the estimate rk. Let ti be the estimate of ti* at time k. 
Similar to the Q-critic, we have 
(6.4.4) 
otherwise. 
fori = 1, ... , n. { 1k} and { (k} are the stepsizes for the Q-critic and Q-critic updates, 
respectively. Note that Sherman-Morrison update of a matrix inverse [Richter et al., 
2007] and the matrix determinant lemma [Harville, 2008] can be applied to reduce 
the computation cost of calculating A;~1 and det(Ak+I) in (6.4.2) and (6.4.4). 
6.4.2 Actor Step 
Let Qfj(x, u) = f(r)r'¢0 (x, u) and Q~i = r(ti)(ti)' ¢ 0(x, u) be our estimate of Q0 and 
Q~ for rand ti, Vi. The f(r) and r(ti) in the estimates restrict the influence of error 
in r and ti, Vi for ( 6.3.1) and ( 6.3.3). For convenience of notation, let T = ( t 1 , ... , tn) 
and Q.J = (Q~1 , ... , CJr). Define Ue,r,T to be ann x n matrix-valued function defined 
on X. x 1IJ that parameterized by ( () , r, T) and satisfies 
(6.4.5) 
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Let Iik be the estimate of the inverse of \72a(9) at time k and H 0 =I. The update 
rule for Hk is: 
{
t?Hk + u ;;1 if uk >- o 
Hk+l = 
Hk otherwise, 
(6.4.6) 
where{? E [0, 1] and uk = Vok.rk ,Tk (xk, uk)· Hk is positive definite (PD) because Hk 
is updated only when U k is PD. The actor update is: 
(6.4.7) 
where Hk = (1- Pk)Hk + Pklk. The usage of Pk is similar to the damping ratio in the 
Levenberg-Marquardt algorithm [More, 1978] . The estimate Hk is very noisy in the 
initial stages, during which Pk should be very close to 1 and Ik should play the main 
role. An example is Pk = 1/Xk. where Xk is the number of updates for Hk. Besides, 
{I'd and { (d control the stepsizes for the critics, while {,Bk} and f(rk) control the 
stepsize for the actor together. f(rk) should satisfy that, for some positive constants 
c1 < C2: 
(6.4.8) 
where 1·1 is the Euclidean norm. An example that satisfies these requirements is 
r(r) = min(1 , ~1 ) for some positive constant D . 
We say a stepsize rule {!k} is Square Summable but Not Summable (SSNS) if fk > 0, 
L~o R < oo and L~o !k = oo. For the algorithm to converge, { (k}, {I'd, and 
"C 
Cl) 
Cl) 
Q, 
tJ) Tk 
, r 
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Figure 6.1: Relationships between the critics and the actor. 
{,Bk} should be SSNS and satisfy 
for some d1 , d2 > 0. 
(6.4.9) 
The relationships of the critics and the actor are shown in Fig. 6.1. The Q-critic and 
the Q -critic generate estimates r k and T k = (t l, ... , t k'), which correspond to Q9 
and Q9 , respectively. Both critics converge faster than the actor in order to track 
the change of 0. In addition, because the observed derivative q1 depends on rk , the 
Q-critic is updated faster than the Q-critic asymptotically so that the Q-critic can 
track the change of r k. 
Theorem 21. {(k}, {,Bk} are two deterministic SSNS stepsize rules that satisfy 
L ( ,Bk ) d < oo for somed > 0. 
k (k 
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Let /k = ((k(A)112, then {!k} is also SSNS and {!k}, {,Bk}, {(k} satisfy (6.4.9). 
Proof. It is easy to observe that limk(,Bk/(k) = 0, so there exists a positive constant 
K such that for Vk > K, ,Bk ::; (k , then 
00 
00 
I:~~ = I: ck,ek ::; c2 + I: c~ < oo, 
k k k=K+l 
where cl = L~=O /k and c2 = L~=O ~~ are constants. Besides, let dl = d2 = 2d, 
then 
L:(,ek;,k)d1• = L:bk/(k)d2 = L:(.Bk/(k)d < oo. 
k k k 
D 
Theorem 21 simplifies the selection of stepsizes. We just need to select ,Bk and (k first 
and let /k = ( (k,Bk) 112 . 
6.5 Algorithm Convergence 
6.5.1 Linear Stochastic Approximation Driven by a Slowly Varying Markov 
Chain 
In this section, we generalize the theory of linear stochastic approximation driven 
by a slowly varying Markov chain [Kanda, 2002] to the case when the objective is 
affected by some additional parameters r. 
Let {yk} be a finite Markov chain whose transition probabilities depend on a param-
eter(} E IRn . Let {ho,r(·) : (} E IRn, r E JRP} be a family of m-vector-valued function 
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parameterized with 0 E JR.n and r E JR.P. Consider the following iteration to update a 
(6 .5.1) 
In the above iteration, sk E JR.m is the approximation vector. h 0,r(·) and Go(·) are 
m-vector-valued and m x m-matrix-valued functions parameterized by 0 , rand 0 , re-
spectively. Let E [·]be an operator to calculate expectation and 1·1 be Euclidean norm. 
In order to establish the convergence results, we make the following assumptions. 
Assumption 1. 1. The sequence { (k} is deterministic, non-increasing, and sat-
isfies that Lk (k = oo and Lk (~ < oo. 
2. The random sequence {Ok} satisfies IOk+l- Okl::; f3kNk for some process {Nk} 
with bounded moments, where {(3k} is a positive deterministic sequence such 
that Lk (f3k/ (k)d < oo for some d > 0. 
3. 8k is an m x m-matrix valued martingale difference with bounded moments. 
4. The (random) sequence { rk} satisfies irk+ I- rkl ::; /kNk for some nonnegative 
process { Nk} with bounded moments, where { /k} is a positive sequence such 
that Lkbk/(k)d < oo for some d > 0. 
5. rk converges to r(Ok) when k----+ oo, namely, limk-+oo Irk- r(Ok)l = 0, w.p.J . 
6. (Existence of solution to the Poisson Equation) For each 0 and r, there exists 
h(O, r) E JR.m, G(O) E JR.mxm, and corresponding m-vector and m x m-matrix 
function ho,r ( ·), Go ( ·) that satisfy the Poisson equation. That is, for each y, 
ho,r(Y) = ho,r(Y)- h(O , r) + (Poho,r) (y), 
Go(y) = Go(Y)- G(O) + (PoGo) (y). 
7. (Roundedness) For all 0 and r, we have max (i:h(O, r)j, IG(O)I) ::; C with some 
constant C. 
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8. (Boundedness in expectation) For any d > 0; there exists Cd > 0 such that 
supk E [[fek (yk) [d] ::; Cd and supk E [[gek>rk (Yk) [d] ::; Cd, where fe(-) represents 
Ge(·) and Ge(·) , and ge,r(·) represents he,r(·) and he,r(·). 
9. (Lipschitz continuity) For some constant C > 0, and for all f), 8 E ffi.n, there 
is IG(fJ)- G(8)1 ::; C[fJ- 8[. For all 0,8 E ffi.n and r,r E ffi.P, there is 
lii(fJ, r)- b.(8, r) I ::; C ([fJ- 8[ + [r- r[). 
10. (Lipschitz continuity in expectation) There exists a positive measurable function 
C(·) such that for every d > 0, supk E [C(yk)d] < oo. In addition, for all 
fJ , 8 E JRn, [fe(Y)- f0(y) I ::; C(y) [fJ- 8[, where fe( ·) represents Ge( ·) and G0( ·). 
For all fJ, 8 E JRn and r , r E JRP, [ge,r(Y)- g0,r(Y)[ ::; C(y) ([fJ- 8[ + [r- r[), 
where ge,r( ·) represents he,r ( ·) and he,r ( ·). 
I- 2 11. There exists a> 0 such that for all s E JRm and f) E JRn, s G (fJ) s 2:: a [s[ . 
We first establish the following lemma and then present two theorems about the 
convergence of (6.5.1). 
Lemma 22. { rk}, { (k}, {,Bk} are three deterministic positive sequences that satisfy 
the following relationships: 
Then 
k k 
L(max(rk>,Bk)/(k)d < oo for some d > 0. 
k 
L(max( /k, ,Bk)/(k)d 
k k 
k 
k k 
< 00. 
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The second equality is because the function f ( x) = xd is monotonically increasing 
in the range [0, oo) when d > 0. The first inequality is because both { (!k/ (k)d} and 
{ (f3k/ (k)d} are positive sequences. D 
Theorem 23. limk-+ooiG(lh)sk-h(lh,rk)l = 0 w.p.1 if Assumptions 1.(1-11} are 
satisfied. 
Proof. Define fh . [ ~ J + [ ~ J to be the collection of all parameters in (6.5.1) , 
then we can view (6.5.1) as 
We have 
llh+I -lhl + lrk+l- rkl 
< f3kNk + /kN'k 
< max(f3k, /k)(Nk + N'k). 
(6.5 .2) 
The last inequality is because f3k > 0, /k > 0, Nk and N'k are nonnegative process. 
Combined with Lemma 22, we can see Assumption 3.1.(1-3) in [Konda, 2002] are sat-
isfied. Besides, Assumption 1.(6-11) correspond to Assumption 3.1.(5-10) in [Konda, 
2002]. As a result, Theorem 3.2 in [Konda, 2002] holds thus 
(6.5.3) 
The left hand side of (6 .5.3) is equivalent to the left hand side of the theorem. D 
Theorem 24. limk-+oo IG (lh) Sk- h. (lh , r(lh)) I = 0 w.p.1 if Assumptions 1. (1-11} 
are satisfied. 
Proof. We have 
IG(lh)sk- h(lh, r(lh))l = 19 (fh) sk - _h. (lh, rk) + ~ (fh, rk)- !l (fh , r(lh))l 
::::; I G( lh)sk - h( lh, rk) I + lh(lh , rk) - h( lh, r( lh)) I-
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Besides, because of Assumption 1.(9), we have 
where Cis a constant. In addition, according to Theorem 23, 
0 < lim IG(lh)sk- h(lh, r(lh)) I k--+= 
< 0 + lim lii(lh, rk)- b.(Ok, r(lh)) I k--+= 
< 0 + c lim Irk- r(Ok)l k--+= 
0, 
so limk--+= I G( Ok)sk - h. ( ok, r( Ok)) I = 0. D 
6 .5.2 Critic Convergence 
In this section, we will use the results in Section 6.5.1 to prove the convergence 
of the Q-critic . and the Q-critic presented in Section 6.4.1. Before presenting the 
convergence results, we first state the following assumptions and definitions. 
Assumption 2. There exists a function L : X ---+ [1, oo) and constant 0 ~ p < 1, 
b > 0 such that for each 0 E :!Rn, 
VxEX, (6.5.4) 
where lx• (·) is the indicator function for the initial state x* and x 1 is the random 
variable for the state of the MDP after one transition. 
This assumption is the Assumption 2.5 of [Konda, 2002]. We call a function satisfying 
the inequality (6.5.4) a stochastic Lyapunov function. Let L: X x 1U---+ [1, oo) be a 
function that satisfies the following assumption. 
Assumption 3. For each d > 0 there is Kd > 0 such that 
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where U0 is the random variable of action for state x. 
Note that if a function is upper bounded by L, then all its steady state moments are 
finite . 
Lemma 25. If two functions LJ: X x lU-+ [1, oo) and L9 : X x lU-+ [1, oo) satisfy 
Assumption 3, then L1L9 also satisfies it. 
Proof For two random variables A and B, E [AB] < (1/2) (E[A2 ] + E [B2]) . As a 
result, we have 
where K{d and Kid are the bounding constants of f and g of 2d-moment. D 
Definition 26. We define D(2) to be the family of all function f0 (x, u) that satisfies: 
for all x EX and u E lU, there exists a constant K > 0 such that 
lfo(x, u)l :S KL(x, u) (6.5.5) 
for \f(} E IRn, and 
lfo(x, u)- f0 (x, u) I :S K 10- 91 L(x, u) (6.5.6) 
for VO, 0 E IRn. 
Lemma 27. If fo E D(2) and go E D(2), then fo +go E D(2) and f 0 g 0 E D(2). 
Proof The proof for f0 + g0 is obvious thus we focus on f 0 g0 . The inequality (6.5.5) 
can be proved using Lemma 4.3(f) of [Kanda and Tsitsiklis, 2003b]. To prove the 
inequality (6.5.6), 
lfogo- fogol :S lfollgo- gol + lgollfo- fol 
::; 2KJKgLJLg IO- 91 ' 
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where K 1 and L 1 are the bounding constant and the bounding function for f, and K 9 , 
L9 are the counterparts for g. According to Lemma 25, L1L9 also satisfies Assumption 
3, which completes the proof. D 
We assume ¢ 9 E D(2) , which is the same with Assumption 4.1 of [Konda, 2002]. This 
assumption ensures that the feature vector ¢ 9 = (¢~, ... ,¢if) as a function of the 
policy parameter (} is "well behaved." 
The critic consists of two parts: a Q-critic that estimates Q9 (see (6.4.1), (6.4.2)) 
and a Q-critic that estimates Q9 (see (6.4.3)). The Q-critic is exactly the same with 
LSTD actor-critic [Estanjini et al., 2012], whose convergence has already been proved. 
For the Q-critic, denote by V(M) a column vector concatenating all columns in a 
matrix M . The Q-critic can be written as in (6.5.1) if we let 
ho,r(Y) 
Go(Y) 
((vi)' , ... , (vk)') ' 
r(r)r' cp9(x, u)V ( z'l/J~(x, u)), 
[I], 
(6.5.7) 
where y = (x, u, z) and r = A - 1b. The stochastic process {zk} is related to the 
process { xk, uk} according to 
To prove the convergence of the Q-critic, we just need to verify Assumption 1.(1-
11). It is easy to observe that zk = 2:7~~ >..k- l- Icp91 (xz ,uz). First , we establish the 
following lemma. 
Lemma 28. For every d > 0, we have supk E [ L(xk , uk)d Jzkld] < oo, where L 
X. x 1U --7 [1, oo) is a bounded function that satisfies Assumption 3. 
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Proof. According to triangle inequality, we have 
k-1 d 
lzkld = L_xk- l-1 4>oz(xz ,uz ) 
l=O 
k-1 
~ L_xd(k-l-1) l4>oJxz,uz) ld 
l=O 
k- 1 
< K ""_xd(k-l-1) IL (x u) ld 
- 1 L...,. 1 z, l ' 
l=O 
for some bounded function L1 that satisfies Assumption 3 and some positive constant 
K 1 , where the last inequality is because ¢ 0 k E D(2). In addition, we can multiple 
L(xk , uk)d and take expectation E [·] on both sides, then 
E [IL(xk , uk)zkld] 
k-1 
~ K1L_xd(k- l-1)E [L(xk ,uk)dL1(xz,uz)d] . 
l=O 
Similar to the proof of Lemma 25, 
E [ L(xk, uk)d L1 (xz, uz)d] 
~ ~E [L(xk,uk) 2d] + ~E [L1(xz,uz)2d] 
< 00. 
(6.5.8) 
(6.5.9) 
Combining (6.5.8) and (6.5.9) , we can prove that E [IL(xk , uk)zkld] is bounded. D 
Lemma 29. Define the norm I · I of a matrix to be the norm of the column vector 
containing all elements in this matrix. Then under iteration ( 6. 4.1), we have 
IAk+l- A kl < "fkN;!, 
lbk+l - bkl < 'YkN~ 
(6.5 .10) 
(6.5 .11) 
for some process { N;!} and { Ni} with bounded moments, where "/k is the stepsize 
defined in {6.4.1}. 
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Proof. According to (6.4.1), we have 
Similar to Lemma 28, it can be verified that Ak has bounded moments. As a result, 
the norm of the right hand side should has bounded moments. We can prove the 
result for {bk} in the same way. D 
Lemma 30. Iff(·) is a locally Lipschitz continuous function on domain V. Let 
{ xk} be a sequence of random variables with bounded moments defined on V such that 
jxk+1 - xkl < /kNk for some {Nk} with bounded moments w.p.l. Then lf(xk+l)-
f(xk)l < /kN{ for some {N{} with bounded moments w.p.l. 
Proof. Since lxk+l- xkl < "fkNk, we can get /xk+l- xkl < oo w.p.l. Since {xk} has 
bounded moments, xk must be in a compact set w.p.l. for Vk [Planetmath, 2012]. 
Then it is easy to observe that lf(xk+l)- f(xk)l < Clxk+l- xkl < /kCNk for some 
constant C. The lemma can be proved by letting N { = C Nk. D 
Lemma 31. Let x = {A, b} be a vector of all elements in m x m matrix A and m x 1 
vector b. The function f(x) = A-lb is locally Lipschitz continuous with respect to 
A and b on the domain V = { x : det (A) 2:: E}, where E is a positive constant. 
Proof. Let A a to be the adjoint matrix of A. It is easy to observe that fa(x) =A ab 
is locally Lipschitz continuous as it is a polynomial function, so lfa(x1) - fa(x21 < 
Clx1 - x 21 for some constant C and x1 and x2 that belong to a finite interval. Since 
A -l =A a I det(A), we have 
lf(xl)- f(x2)l IA11hl- A;-1h2l 
lA~ hi/ det(A1)- A~b2/ det(A2) I 
< ~IA!b1- A~b2l 
E 
~ lfa(xl) - fa(x2) I 
E 
c 
< -lxl- x2l· 
E 
So f(x) = A-lb must be locally Lipschitz continuous on the domain V {x : 
det(A) > E}. D 
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Theorem 32. Under iteration {6.4.1} and {6.4.2}, 
(6.5.12) 
for some random sequence { Nk} that has bounded moments, where { lk} is the stepsize 
in (6.4.1}. 
Proof. Let V(A) be the column vector with all elements in A and x be the column 
vector with all elements in A and b , then x must have bounded moments and x can 
be decomposed as: 
So 
x = [ V~A) ] + [ ~ ] . 
IAk+l - Ak I + lbk+l - bk I 
< !k(Nt + Nf). 
The last equality is because the Lemma 29 and N;(+ N~ has bounded moments. Define 
the function f(x) =A - 1b, then rk = f(xk) = A;;1bk and we have det(Ak) ~ E by our 
choice. The theorem can be easily proved by combining Lemma 31 and Lemma 30. 0 
If we choose stepsize rules that are SSNS and satisfy (6.4.9), Assumption 1.(1) and 
1.(4) will be satisfied because of Theorem 32. According to (6.4.5), Uk has bounded 
moments because 'ljl8 (x, u), ¢ 8 (x, u), Qk, and Qi, Vi have bounded moments. Hk and 
Hk should also have bounded moments because in (6.4.6) the update is applied only 
when uk is positive definite . As a result , r(rk)r~</Jok(xk , uk)Hk'lflok(xk, uk) should 
have bounded moments thus Assumption 1.(2) holds . It is easy to observe that 
Assumption 1.(3) is satisfied. In addition, because the Q-critic converges, we have 
lim Irk- r(Ok)l = 0, w.p.1, 
k--+oo 
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which is Assumption 1.(5). 
For Assumption 1. ( 6-11), we can focus on ho,r (y) as Go (y) = [I] obviously satisfies 
all the requirements . Fori= 1, ... , n, let the function e~ = ¢0'1/J~. Because ¢ 0 E VC2) 
and 'l/Jo E V(2), we obtain e~ E V(2) according to Lemma 27. For any fixed rand fixed 
8, the Q-critic (6.5 .7) is equivalent to the Q-critic of an artificial Markov decision 
process with reward function 9~,r(x, u) = f(r)r' e~(x, u), i --:- 1, ... , n. As a result, 
the corresponding Poisson equation should have solutions, thus, Assumption 1.(6) is 
satisfied [Kanda, 2002] . 
For Assumption 1.(7-10), we denote h~,r(Y) = r (r) r' e~(x, u)z, i = 1, . .. , n, then 
ho,r(Y) is a concatenation of h~,r(y). It is easy to verify that if h~,r are bounded and 
Lipschitz continuous in expectation for all i = 1, ... , n, then ho,r should be bounded 
and Lipschitz continuous in expectation, too. 
Recall that e~ E VC2). Fori= 1, ... , n and each d > 0, 
s~p E [lh~,r (yk) ld] ::; (r(r) lrl)d x s~p E [le~(xk, uk) ld lzkld] 
::; (r(r) lrl)d Kd x s~pE [L(xk, uk)d izkid] 
for some function L that satisfies Assumption 3 and some positive constant K. Ac-
cording to requirement (6.4.8), r(r) lrl must be bounded. Using Assumption 3 and 
Lemma 28, we can get that h~,r satisfies Assumption 1.(8). 
It is easy to verify that the function f(x) = r(x)x is Lipschitz continuous and suppose 
its Lipschitz constant is Cr. In this part, we will prove that h~,r(Y) is Lipschitz 
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continuous in expectation. For all (}, 0 E :!Rn, r, f E JRP, and i = 1, . .. , n, 
lh~, .. (Y)- h~,r(Y)I ~ lr(r) r'e~(x,u)z - r(r)r'e~(x,u)zl 
~ lzl r(r) lr' (e~(x , u)- e~(x , u)) 1 
+ lzll(r(r)r- r(r)r)' e~(x , u)l 
~ lzl r(r) lrlle~(x, u)- e~(x , u) 1 
+ lzlle~(x, u)l Cr lr- rl. (6.5.13) 
Recall that e~ E V(2). Let K and L be the bounding constant and the bounding 
function for e~' then 
lh~,r(Y)- h~,r(Y)I ~ C(y) (IO- 61 + lr- rl), 
where C(y) = (f(r) lrl + Cr) KL(x, u) lzl . Using the fact that f(r) lrl is bounded 
and Lemma 28, it is easy to observe that E [C(y)d] < oo for each d > 0. As a result , 
ho,r satisfies Assumption 1.(10) . 
Similar to Section 5.2 of [Kanda and Tsitsiklis, 2003b], it can be shown that the 
steady-state expectation of h~,r equals to 
where 
00 
k=O 
z(O) = (1- .A)-1 (l, ¢o)o. 
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R,i ( 8, r) is the steady-state expectation of the "observed reward" g~ ,r. h. ( 8, r) is a 
concatenation of :hi(8, r) fori= 1, ... , n. 
Lemma 33. Consider iJ = (8 , r) as a combined parameter vector. Let iJC2) be the 
counterpart of 1J(2) for functions parameterized by iJ, then P; g~,r belongs to iJC2) for 
all nonnegative integer k. 
Proof. A simple observation is that 1J(2) ~ iJC2). Besides, Lemma 27 still holds for 
iJC2). Namely, a product function f0g0 E iJC2) if f 0 E iJC2) and g0 E iJC2). 
P; g~ r can be written as P; g~ r = r( r )r' P; e~. We first state that P; e~ E 1J(2) 
' ' 
according to Corollary 2.4 of [Konda and Tsitsiklis, 2003a]. To verify (6.5.5), we have 
To verify (6.5.6), we have 
jP;g~,r- P$g~,rl :S r(r) lriiP;e~- P$e~l + IP$e~llr- rl 
::; r(r) lrl KL 18-81 + KL lr- rl 
:S (r(r) lrl + 1) KL (18- 81 + lr- rl), 
where K and L are the bounding constants and the bounding functions of P;e~, 
respectively. 
Because g~ r E iJC2) and ¢ 9 E 1J(2), we get that R,i ( 8, r) and zi ( 8) are bounded and 
' 
Lipschitz continuous with respect to iJ ( cf. Corollary 5.3 of [Konda and Tsitsiklis, 
2003a]). It can be easily verified that (P;g~,r- R,i(8, r)l) ¢ 9 E iJC2) using Lemma 33 
and Lemma 27. Again, using Corollary 5.3 of [Konda and Tsitsiklis , 2003a], we can 
obtain that :hi(8, r) is bounded and Lipschitz continuous with respect to 0. As a 
result , h(8, r) satisfies Assumption 1.(7) and 1.(9) . The explicit form of ho,r is 
00 
ho,r(Y) = L Eo,x [ho,r(Yk)- h(8, r) I Yo= Y] . 
k=O 
The verification of ho,r(Y) for Assumption 1.(8) and 1.(10) is similar to that of [Konda, 
2002] and Section 6.2 of [Konda and Tsitsiklis , 2003a]. 0 
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6.5.3 Actor Convergence 
The actor update defined in (6.4.7) is similar to the actor update using the unsealed 
gradient. The difference is that the gradient estimate is multiplied by a positive 
definite matrix. This section will present the convergence results for this type of 
actors. Define 
Se(x, u) = H01'ljJ9 (x, u)¢~(x, u), 
where He is a positive definite matrix for all O's. Let S(O) = (l, S9 ) 9 and let r(O) be 
the limit of the critic parameter r if the policy parameter is held fixed to (} . Similar 
to [Konda, 2002], the actor update can be written as 
Define 
Ok+l Ok + f3kSe(xk, uk) (rkr(rk)) 
Ok + f3kS( Ok) (r( Ok)r(r( Ok))) 
+f3k (Sek(xk, uk)- S(Ok)) (rkr(rk)) 
+f3kS( Ok) (rkr(rk) - r( Ok)r(r( Ok))). 
S( Ok)r( Ok), 
(Sek(xk, uk)- S(Ok)) rkr(rk), 
S( Ok) (rkr(rk) - r( Ok)r(r( Ok))), 
then the actor update becomes: 
f(Ok) is the expected actor update, while ei1) and ei2) are two error terms due to the 
fact that the update is performed on a sample path of the MDP. Using Taylor's series 
expansion, one can see that 
for some constant C. 
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+.Bk 'V a( lh)' e~1 ) 
+.Bk 'Va (fh)' e~2) 
-C,B~ ISek (xk+l, uk+l) (rkr (rk))l2 
Lemma 34. (Convergence of the noise terms). It holds: 
~00 4 - (9 )' (1) 
• L..Jk=O fJk 'V a k ek converges w.p.l. 
l. ' (2) - 0 1 • 1mk ek - w.p .. 
Proof. Let e~1 ) = (eek (xk, uk)- e(9k)) rkf(rk), where ee(x, u) = 'l/; 0 (x , u)cp~(x, u) 
and e(9) = (1, ee)e = ( 'l/; 0 , ¢~ J 0 . Let e~
2) = e(9k)(rkf(rk)- r(9k)f(r(9k))) , then 
e~1 ) and e~2) are the two error terms for the actor update using the unsealed gradi-
ent [Konda and Tsitsiklis, 2003b]. It easily follows that to get e~1 ) = H;;e~1) and 
e~2) = H 0;ef). Besides, Sek (xk, uk) = H;;eek (xk, uk). The lemma can be proved by 
combining these facts with Lemma 6.2 of [Konda and Tsitsiklis, 2003b]. 0 
Lemma 34 shows that ei1) can be averaged out and ei2) goes to zero. As a result, the 
two error terms are negligible and the update is determined by the expected direction 
f( 9) in the long run. 
Lemma 35. We have f(9) = g(9) + c(.A, 9) , where g(9) is a function such that 
'V a( 9)' g( 9) ~ 0, and sup0 lc(.A, 9) I < C(1 -.A) for some constant C > 0 independent 
of .A . 
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Proof According to (5.2.3), Va(O) = (We, Qe)e = (We,¢~) e r. For A = 1, letting 
ee(x, u) = we(x, u)¢~(x , u) and e(o) = (we,¢~) e' we have 
Va(O)'f(O) v a( O)' S( O)r( 0) 
r( 0)' e( 0)' S( O)r( 0). 
- I -
We need to prove e ( 0) S ( 0) is positive semidefinite. We have 
( c/Je, W~) e ( H(/, We¢~) e 
H81e(o)'e(o) , 
where H91 is always positive definite by definition. Besides, e( 0)' e( 0) is positive 
semidefinite by construction, so e( o)' S( 0) is positive semidefinite, too. 
The proof for A < 1 follows the proof in [Konda and Tsitsiklis, 2003b]. Let us 
writer>·( 0) for the steady-state expectation of rk. Following the proof of [Konda and 
Tsitsiklis , 2003b], we have lr>.( 0)-r( 0) I ~ C0(1-A) for some positive constant C0 . Let 
g(O) = S(O)r(O) , where r (0) is the steady-state expectation of rk when A= 1. Then 
we can still get Va'(O)g(O) ~ 0. Besides, lf(O)- g(O)I = !S(O)(r>.(O)- r(O))I < 
C(1- A) for some C. 0 
Lemma 35 shows that the expected direction f( 0) is always a gradient ascent direction 
for A sufficiently close to 1. 
Theorem 36. (Actor Convergence) . For any E > 0, there exists some A sufficiently 
close to 1 such that the Hessian Actor-Critic algorithm satisfies limk~oo infk IVa(lh)l < 
E w. p.l. That is, Ok visits an arbitrary neighborhood of a stationary point infinitely 
often. 
Proof See Theorem 6.3 of [Konda and Tsitsiklis, 2003b]. 0 
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Figure 6.2: Comparison of HAC, LSTD-AC and QNAC method. 
6.6 Numerical Study 
We compare HAC with other actor-critic methods on a problem similar to that de-
scribed in Section 5.4. The only difference is that in this problem we generate a new 
set of transition probabilities. Fig. 6.2 shows the results of HAC, LSTD actor-critic 
(LSTD.:.AC, see Chapter 5 and [Estanjini et al. , 2011a]) and the Quasi-Newton Ac-
tor Critic (QNAC) algorithm (page 84 of [Konda, 2002]) . The radius of the sensing 
range r n = 3 and the temperature of Boltzmann distribution T = 5. The x-axis plots 
the number of iterations and y-axis plots the expected total reward in one episode. 
As shown in the figure, HAC takes less iterations to converge. Note that QNAC 
has almost the same form with the Online Natural Actor Critic (ONAC) algorithm 
proposed in [Richter et al., 2007]. QNAC estimates the Hessian matrix by analyzing 
successive gradient vectors while natural actor-critic uses the covariance matrix to 
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replace Hessian. LSTD-AC is the foundation of HAC but it only takes advantage of 
Va(O) while QNAC tries to estimate V 2a(O) in an intermediate way. None of them, 
as pointed out by [Kakade, 2001a], take advantages of information of VQ9 . 
Chapter 7 
Conclusion and Future Work 
7.1 On Anomaly Detection 
In this dissertation, we first present five complementary methods, based on SHT, 
SVM and clustering, that cover the common techniques for anomaly detection of 
networks whose normal behaviors is stationary. We develop two open source software 
packages to provide flow-level and packet-level validation datasets, respectively. With 
the help of these software packages, we evaluate all methods on a simulated network 
mimicking typical networks in organizations. We consider three flow-level anomalies 
and one packet-level DDoS attack. 
Through analyzing the results, we summarize the advantages and the disadvantages 
of each method. In general, deterministic and flow-based methods, such as flow 1-
class SVM and ART clustering, are more likely to have unstable results with higher 
false alarm rates but they can identify abnormal flows, namely they have better 
resolution. Stochastic and window-based methods, such as our model-free and model-
based methods, could yield more stable results and detect temporal anomalies better, 
but they have relatively poor resolution as they are not able to explicitly detect the 
anomalous network flows. In addition, deterministic and window-based methods, 
like window 1-class SVM offer parameters to adjust the tradeoff of resolution and 
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stability. This observation suggests that combining the results of all, instead of just 
using one method, can yield better overall performance. 
In addition, the statistical properties of normal traffic are time-varying for many net-
works. We formulate anomaly detection for time-varying networks as a binary com-
posite hypothesis testing problem for evaluating whether a sequence of observations 
is drawn from a family of Probabilities Laws (PLs). Then, two robust methods, one 
model-free and one model-based, are proposed to solve this proolem. We propose a 
two-stage procedure to estimate the PLs from a set of reference data. This procedure 
first estimates a large class of PLs from network data and then refines it to select a 
representative subset. The latter part formulates the refinement problem using ideas 
from set covering via integer programming. Our methods can generate a more com-
plete representation of the normal traffic and are robust to the non-stationarity in 
networks. 
For scenarios in which the nodes associated with an anomaly are required, we propose 
a novel framework that analyzes the social relationships, modeled as Social Interac-
tion Graphs (SIGs) and Social Correlation Graphs (SCGs), of nodes in the network. 
We apply this framework to the problem of botnet detection. Compared to previous 
methods, our method has three novelties. First, to the best of our knowledge, our 
method is the first method to introduce social network analysis to the field of botnet 
detection. Second, our method is applicable to both botnets of network computers 
and botnets of social accounts. In addition, it can be generalized to more types of net-
works, such as email networks and biological networks [Newman et al., 2002; Newman, 
2009]. Third, we propose a refined modularity measure that is suitable for botnet 
detection. The refined modularity also addresses some limitations of modularity by 
adding regularization terms and combining information in SIGs and SCGs. 
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There are some interesting future research directions related to the anomaly detection 
methods described in this dissertation. First, the recommended threshold for the 
Hoeffding test in Section 2 is -~log E, where E is a desirable false alarm rate and 
n is the number of flows in a window. Using this threshold, the false alarm rate of 
the Hoeffding test converges to E when n goes to infinity. However, in practice, the 
number of flows in a window could be small, which results in a large error if we use 
the recommended threshold. An interesting future direction is to propose a more 
accurate threshold for small number of flows. 
Second, our model-free and model-based stochastic methods assume that all the ob-
servations belong to a finite alphabet :E. Namely, the underlying stochastic process 
is discrete. It will be useful if we can generalize the results to continuous stochastic 
processes whose probability distributions have some parametric forms. 
Last, although the robust anomaly detection methods consider multiple patterns for a 
set of flows, each flow is governed by at most one pattern. It is interesting to consider 
the case when a flow is governed by a combination of several patterns. 
7.2 On Sequential Decision Making 
In this dissertation, we first introduce the LSTD learning to the actor-critic structure 
for total reward problem and propose an LSTD actor-critic method. We then apply 
the LSTD actor-critic method to a problem of robot motion control. 
In addition, we propose a general estimate for the Hessian of the overall reward with 
respect to the parameters. Based on this estimate, we present a novel actor-critic 
algorithm named Hessian Actor-Critic algorithm which uses a direct estimate of the 
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Hessian matrix to improve the rate of convergence for ill-conditioned problems. Based 
on the LSTD actor-critic method [Estanjini et al., 2011a; Paschalidis et al., 2009], 
our algorithm extends the critic to approximate the Hessian and revises the actor to 
update the parameters using Newton's method. We compare our algorithm with the 
LSTD actor-critic method and the QNAC method [Konda, 2002] on an application 
of robot motion control. The result shows that HAC can achieve a better rate of 
convergence. 
The actor-critic methods rely heavily on the choice of features used in Randomized 
Stationary Policies (RSPs). The feature set should be representative yet parsimo-
nious. Most existing actor-critic methods leave the burden of feature selection to the 
users and assume such "well-behaved" features. However, due to the large amount 
of factors in decision making processes, it is hard for humans to identify the impor-
tant features. In many cases, we can observe the decision making processes of some 
experts. For example, collision avoidance in flights can be naturally modeled as a 
sequential decision making problem, and birds are good at these problems by nature. 
We can observe the behaviors of the birds but we know little about their policies. It 
is interesting to propose an automatic method to learn the important features using 
some observations of the experts. 
References 
Abu Rajah, M., Zarfoss, J., Monrose, F., and Terzis, A. (2006). A multifaceted 
approach to understanding the botnet phenomenon. In Proceedings of the 6th 
ACM SIGCOMM on Internet Measurement - IMC '06, pages 41-52. 
Agarwal, G. and Kempe, D. (2008). Modularity-maximizing graph communities via 
mathematical programming. The European Physical Journal B, 66(3):409-418. 
Akamai (2013). The Net Usage Index by Industry. http: I /www. akamai. com/html/ 
technology/nui/industry/index.html. 
Al-Hammadi, Y. and Abdulla, A. (2010). Behavioural Correlation for Malicious Bot 
Detection. PhD thesis , University of Nottingham. 
Amari, S.-I. (1998). Natural gradient works efficiently in learning. Neural computa-
tion, 10(2) :251-276. 
Anderberg, M. R. (1973). Cluster analysis for applications. Technical report , DTIC 
Document. http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix= 
html&identifier=AD0770256. 
Barbosa, R. R. R., Sadre, R. , Pras, A., and Meent, R. (2010). Simpleweb/university 
of twente traffic traces data repository. http: I /doc. utwente. nl/71273/ . 
Barford, P., Kline, J ., Plonka, D., and Ron, A. (2002). A signal analysis of net-
work traffic anomalies. In Proceedings of the 2nd ACM SIGCOMM Workshop on 
Internet measurment, pages 71-82. ACM. 
Ben-Tal, A. and Nemirovski, A. (2001). Lectures on modern convex optimization: 
analysis, algorithms, and engineering applications, volume 2. SIAM. 
Berenji, H. and Vengerov, D. (2003). A Convergent Actor-Critic-based FRL Algo-
rithm with Application to Power Management of Wireless Transmitters. IEEE 
Transactions on Fuzzy Systems, 11(4):478-485. 
Bertsekas, D. P. (1995). Dynamic programming and optimal control, volume 1. 
Athena Scientific. 
Bertsekas, D. P. (1999). Nonlinear programming. Athena Scientific. 
165 
166 
Bertsekas, D. P., Borkar, V., and Nedic, A. (2003). Improved Temporal Difference 
Methods with Linear Function Approximation. Technical Report 2573, LIDS RE-
PORT. 
Bertsekas, D. P. and Tsitsiklis, J. (1996). Neuro-Dynamic Programming. Athena 
Scientific. 
Bhatnagar, S., Sutton, R., Ghavamzadeh, M., and Lee, M. (2007). Incremental 
Natural Actor-Critic Algorithms. Neural Information Processing Systems (NIPS). 
Bilgin, A., Elison, J., Gansner, E., Hu, Y., Koren, Y ., and North, S. (2013). 
Graphviz-graph visualization software. http: I /www. graphviz. orgl. 
Binkley, J. and Singh, S. (2006). An algorithm for anomaly-based botnet detec-
tion. Proceedings of USENIX Steps to Reducing Unwanted Traffic on the Internet 
Workshop (SRUTI), pages 43----:48. 
Borchers, B. (1999). CSDP, A C library for semidefinite programming. Optimization 
Methods and Software, 1(1):1-10. 
Boyan, J. (1999). Least-squares Temporal Difference Learning. In Proceeding of the 
16th International Conference on Machine Learning. 
Boyan, J. (2002) . Technical update: Least-squares temporal difference learning. 
Machine Learning, 49(2-3):233-246. 
Bradtke, S. and Barto, A. (1996). Linear Least-squares Algorithms for Temporal 
Difference Learning. Machine Learning, 22(2):33-57. 
Brandes, U. , Delling, D., Gaertler, M. , Gorke, R., Hoefer, M., Nikoloski, Z., and 
Wagner, D. (2008). On modularity clustering. IEEE Transactions on Knowledge 
and Data Engineering, 20(2):172-188. 
Brown, D. J., Suckow, B. , and Wang, T. (2002). A survey of intrusion detection 
systems. Department of Computer Science, University of California, San Diego. 
Bu, Z., Bueno, P., Kashyap, R., and Wosotowsky, A. (2010). The New Era of 
Botnets. White paper from McAfee. https: I lwww. botnets. fr/imageslblb5l 
Wp-new-era-of-botnets.pdf. 
GAIDA (2013). The GAIDA UCSD "DDoS Attack 2007" Dataset. GAIDA. http: 
llwww.caida.orgldatalpassivelddos-20070804_dataset.xml. 
Carpenter, G. A. and Grossberg, S. (1987). ART 2: self-organization of stable 
category recognition codes for analog input patterns. Applied Optics, 26(23):4919-
4930. 
167 
Cassandras, C., Panayiotou, C. G. , Diehl, G., Gong, W.-B., Liu, Z. , and Zou, C. 
(2000) . Clustering methods for multi-resolution simulation modeling. In Pro-
ceedings of SPIE's 14th Annual International Symposium on Aerospace/ Defense 
Sensing, Simulation, and Control. 
Chan, E. Y. K. and Yeung, D.-Y. (2011). A convex formulation of modularity maxi-
mization for community detection. Proceedings of the Twenty-Second international 
joint conference on Artificial Intelligence, 3:2218-2225. 
Chandola, V., Banerjee, A., and Kumar, V. (2009). Anomaly detection: A survey. 
ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR) , (September):1-72. 
Chen, Y., Qian, J., and Saligrama, V. (2013). A new one-class SVM for anomaly 
detection. In IEEE International Conference on Acoustics, Speech and Signal 
Processing (ICASSP}, pages 3567-3571 . IEEE. 
Choi, J. and Sethuraman, S. (2013). Large deviations for the degree structure in 
preferential attachment schemes. Annals of Applied Probability, 23(2):722-763. 
Chung, F., Handjani, S., and Jungreis, D. (2003). Generalizations of Polya's urn 
Problem. Annals of Combinatorics, 7(2):141-153. 
Collevecchio, A., Cotar, C. , and LiCalzi, M. (2013). On a preferential attachment 
and generalized Polya's urn model. Annals of Applied Probability, 23(3):1219-1253. 
Combs, G. and Others (2007). Wireshark. http: I /www. wireshark. org/. 
Cortes, C. and Vapnik, V. (1995). Support-vector networks. Machine Learning, 
20(3):273- 297. 
Crovella, M. E. (2000). Performance characteristics of the world wide web. In 
Performance Evaluation: Origins and Directions, pages 219- 232. Springer. 
Csardi, G. and Nepusz, T. (2006) . The igraph software package for complex network 
research. Interlournal, Complex Systems, 1695(5). 
Csiszar, I., Cover, T. M. , and Choi, B.-S. (1987) . Conditional limit theorems under 
Markov conditioning. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, 33(6):788- 801. 
D'Aspremont, A. and Boyd, S. (2003). Relaxations and randomized methods 
for nonconvex QCQPs. http: I /web. stanford. edu/ class/ ee364b/lectures/ 
DLDrelaxations.pdf. 
Daswani, N. and Stoppelman, M. (2007). The anatomy of Clickbot .A. In Proceedings 
of the first conference on First Workshop on Hot Topics in Understanding Botnet. 
168 
Dembo, A. and Zeitouni, 0. (1998). Large Deviations Techniques and Applications. 
Springer, 2nd edition. 
Dietrich, C., Rossow, C., and Pohlmann, N. (2013). CoCoSpot: Clustering and 
recognizing botnet command and control channels using traffic analysis. Computer 
Networks, 57(2):475-486. 
Ding, X. C., Smith, S. L., Belta, C., and Rus, D. (2011). LTL control in un-
certain environments with probabilistic satisfaction guarantees. ar Xiv preprint 
arXiv:1104.1159. 
Ding, X. C., Wang, J., Lahijanian, M., Paschalidis, I. C., and Belta, C. A. (2012). 
Temporal logic motion control using actor-critic methods. In 2012 IEEE Interna-
tional Conference on Robotics and Automation (ICRA), pages 4687-4692. 
Duch, J. and Arenas, A. (2005). Community detection in complex networks using 
extremal optimization. Physical Review E, 72(2):027104. 
Egele, M., Stringhini, G., Kruegel, C., and Vigna, G. (2013). COMPA: Detecting 
Compromised Accounts on Social Networks. In !SOC Network and Distributed 
System Security Symposium (NDSS}. 
Eriksson, B., Barford, P., Bowden, R., Duffield, N., Sommers, J., and Roughan, 
M. (2010). Basisdetect: a model-based network event detection framework. In 
Proceedings of the 10th ACM SIGCOMM conference on Internet measurement, 
pages 451-464. ACM. 
Estanjini, R. M., Ding, X. C., Lahijanian, M., Wang, J., Belta, C. A., and Pascha-
lidis, I. C. (2011a). Least squares temporal difference actor-critic methods with 
applications to robot motion control. In 50th IEEE Conference on Decision and 
Control and European Control Conference (CDC-EGG}, pages 704-709. IEEE. 
Estanjini, R. M., Ding, X. C., Lahijanian, M., Wang, J., Belta, C. A., and Paschalidis, 
I. C. (2011b). Least squares temporal difference actor-critic methods with appli-
cations to robot motion control. available at http: I I arxi v. orgl absl 1108. 4698. 
Estanjini, R. M., Li, K., and Paschalidis, I. C. (2012). A least squares temporal dif-
ference actor-critic algorithm with applications to warehouse management. Naval 
Research Logistics (NRL), 59(3-4):197-211. 
Fortunato, S. and Barthelemy, M. (2007). Resolution limit in community detection. 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 
104(1):36-41. 
169 
Fujisawa, K., Kojima, M., Nakata, K., and Yamashita, M. (1995). SDPA SemiDef-
inite Programming Algorithm. Technical Report B-308, Department of Mathe-
matical and Computing Science, Tokyo Institute of Technology. http: I /wwr.r. is. 
titech . ac : jp/-kojima/articles/b-308.ps.Z. 
Gajjar, G., Khaparde, S., Nagaraju, P., and Soman, S. (2003). Application of 
actor-critic learning algorithm for optimal bidding problem of a GenCo. IEEE 
Transactions on Power Engineering Review, 18(1):11- 18. 
Geramifard, A., Bowling, M., Zinkevich, M., and Sutton, R. (2007). iLSTD: Eligibil-
ity traces and convergence analysis. In Advances in Neural Information Processing 
Systems 19: Proceedings of the 2006 Conference, volume 19, page 441. MIT Press. 
Glynn, P. W. ( H)86). Stochastic approximation for monte carlo optimization. In 
Proceedings of the 18th conference on Winter simulation, pages 356- 365. ACM. 
Goebel, J. and Holz, T. (2007). Rishi: Identify bot contaminated hosts by IRC 
nickname evaluation. In Proceedings of the first conference on First Workshop on 
Hot Topics in Understanding Botnets, page 8. Cambridge, MA. 
Grondman, I. and Busoniu, L. (2012). A Survey of Actor-Critic Reinforcement 
Learning: Standard and Natural Policy Gradients. IEEE Transactions on Systems, 
Man, and Cybernetics, Part C: Applications and Reviews. 
Gu, G., Perdisci, R., Zhang, J ., Lee, W., and Others (2008a). BotMiner: clustering 
analysis of network traffic for protocol-and structure-independent botnet detection. 
In Proceedings of the 17th USENIX Security Symposium, pages 139-154. 
Gu, G., Porras, P., and Yegneswaran, V. (2007). 
infection through IDS-driven dialog correlation. 
Security Symposium, pages 167-182. 
BotHunter: Detecting malware 
In Proceedings of 16th USENIX 
Gu, G., Zhang, J., and Lee, W. (2008b). BotSniffer: Detecting botnet command and 
control channels in network traffic . In Proceedings of 15th Annual Network and 
Distributed System Security Symposium. 
Gyongyi , Z. and Garcia-Molina, H. (2005). Web spam taxonomy. In First interna-
tional workshop on adversarial information retrieval on the web (AIRWeb 2005}. 
Hareesh, I., Prasanna, S., Vijayalakshmi, M., and Shalinie, S. M. (2011) . Anomaly 
detection system based on analysis of packet header and payload histograms. In 
2011 International Conference on Recent Trends in Information Technology (ICR-
TIT}, pages 412-416. IEEE. 
170 
Hartigan, J. A. and Wong, M. A. (1979). Algorithm AS 136: A K-Means Clustering 
Algorithm. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society. Series C (Applied Statistics), 
28(1): 100-108. 
Harville, D. A. (2008). Matrix algebra fmm a statistician's perspective. Springer. 
Henderson, T. R., Lacage, M., Riley, G. F., Dowell, C., and Kopena, J. B. (2008). 
Network simulations with the ns-3 simulator. SIGCOMM demonstration. 
Hoeffding, W. (1965). Asymptotically optimal tests for multinomial distributions. 
Annals of Mathematical Statistics, 36:369-401. 
Kakade, S. (2001a). A natural policy gradient. Advances in neural information 
processing .systems, 14:1531-1538. 
Kakade, S. (2001b). Optimizing average reward using discounted rewards. In Com-
putational Learning Theory, pages 605-615 . Springer. 
Khamassi, M., Lacheze, L., Girard, B., Berthoz, A., and Guillot, A. (2005). Actor-
Critic Models of Reinforcement Learning in the Basal Ganglia: From Natural to 
Artificial Rats. Adaptive Behavior, 13(2) :131-148. 
King, A., Huffaker, B., Dainotti, A., and Claffy, K. C. (2014). A coordinated view 
of the temporal evolution of large-scale internet events. Computing, 96(1):53-65. 
Konda, V. R. (2002). Actor-critic Algorithms. PhD thesis, MIT, Cambridge, MA. 
Konda, V. R. and Tsitsiklis, J. N. (2003a). Appendix to "On Actor-critic algorithms". 
http://web.mit.edu/jnt/www/Papers/J094-03-kon-actors-app.pdf . 
Konda, V. R. and Tsitsiklis, J. N. (2003b). On Actor-Critic Algorithms. SIAM 
Journal on Control and Optimization, 42(4):1143-1166. 
Lahijanian, M., Wasniewski, J., Andersson, S. B., and Belta, C. (2010). Motion Plan-
ning and Control from Temporal Logic Specifications with Probabilistic Satisfac-
tion Guarantees. In IEEE International Conference on Robotics and Automation 
(ICRA), pages 3227-3232. 
Lakhina, A., Crovella, M., and Diot, C. (2005). Mining anomalies using traffic feature 
distributions. ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review, 35:217-228. 
Lancichinetti, A. and Fortunato, S. (2011). Limits of modularity maximization in 
community detection. Physical Review E, 84(6):066122. 
Leavitt, N. (2010). Network-usage changes push internet traffic to the edge. Com-
puter, 43(10):13- 15. 
171 
Lehmann, E. L. and Romano, J. P. (2005). Testing statistical hypotheses. Springer. 
Lemos, R. (2006). Bot software looks to improve peer-age. http://www. 
securityfocus.com/news/11390. 
Lippmann, R., Haines, J. W., Fried, D. J ., Korba, J., and Das, K. (2000a). The 1999 
DARPA off-line intrusion detection evaluation. Computer networks, 34. 
Lippmann, R. P., Fried, D. J., Graf, I., Haines, J. W ., Kendall, K. R. , McClung, 
D., Weber, D., Webster, S. E., Wyschogrod, D. , Cunningham, R. K. , and Oth-
ers (2000b). Evaluating intrusion detection systems: The 1998 DARPA off-line 
intrusion detection evaluation. In Proceedings of the 2000 DARPA Information 
Survivability Conference and Exposition, volume 2, pages 12- 26. IEEE. 
Lloyd, S. P. (1982) . Least squares quantization in pcm. IEEE Transactions on 
Information Theory, 28:129-137. 
Locke, R., Wang, J., and Paschalidis, I. (2012). Anomaly Detection Techniques for 
Data Exfiltration Attempts. Technical Report 2012-JA-0001, Center for Informa-
tion & Systems Engineering, Boston University. 
Lu, W. and Ghorbani, A. a. (2009). Network Anomaly Detection Based on Wavelet 
Analysis. EURASIP Journal on Advances in Signal Processing, 2009(1):837601. 
Manevitz, L. M. and Yousef, M. (2002). One-class SVMs for document classification. 
Journal of Machine Learning Research, 2:139-154. 
Marbach, P. and Tsitsiklis, J. (2001). Simulation-based Optimization of Markov 
Reward Processes. IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, 46:191-209. 
Meyn, S. P. , Tweedie, R. L., and Glynn, P. W. (2009). Markov chains and stochastic 
stability, volume 2. Cambridge University Press Cambridge. 
Molloy, M. and Reed, B. (1995). A critical point for random graphs with a given 
degree sequence. Random structures and algorithms, 6(2-3):161-180. 
More, J . (1978). The Levenberg-Marquardt algorithm: implementation and theory. 
Numerical analysis, 630:105-116. 
Mukherjee, S. (2013). Large deviation for the empirical degree distribution of an 
Erdos-Renyi graph. arXiv preprint arXiv:1310.4160, pages 1-23. 
Nedic, A. and Bertsekas, D. (2003). Least Squares Policy Evaluation Algorithms 
with Linear Function Approximation. Discrete Event Dynamic Systems: Theory 
and Applications, 13:79-110. 
172 
Neustar (2012). DDoS Survey Q1 2012: When Businesses Go Dark. 
http://www.neustar.biz/enterprise/docs/whitepapers/ddos-protection/ 
neustar-insights-ddos-attack-survey-q1-2012.pdf. 
Newman, M. (2004a). Detecting community structure in networks. The European 
Physical Journal B- Condensed Matter, 38(2):321-330. 
Newman, M. (2004b). Fast algorithm for detecting community structure in networks. 
Physical Review E, 69(6):066133. 
Newman, M. (2006). Finding community structure in networks using the eigenvectors 
of matrices. Physical Review E, 74(3):036104. 
Newman, M. (2009). Networks: an introduction. Oxford University Press. 
Newman, M., Forrest, S., and Balthrop, J. (2002). Email networks and the spread 
of computer viruses. Physical Review E, 66(3):35101. 
Paschalidis, I. C. and Guo, D. (2009). Robust and distributed stochastic localiza-
tion in sensor networks: Theory and experimental results. ACM Transactions on 
Sensor Networks, 5(4). 
Paschalidis, I. C. , Li, K. , and Estanjini, R. M. (2009) . An actor-critic method 
using least squares temporal difference learning. In Proceedings of the 48th IEEE 
Conference on Decision and Control, held jointly with the 28th Chinese Control 
Conference, pages 2564- 2569. 
Paschalidis, I. C. and Smaragdakis, G . (2009). Spatia-temporal network anomaly 
detection by assessing deviations of empirical measures. IEEE/ ACM Transactions 
on Networking (TON), 17(3) :685-697. 
Paxson, V. (1999). Bro: a system for detecting network intruders in real-time. 
Computer Networks, 31(23):2435- 2463. 
Pearson, K. (1901). LIII. On lines and planes of closest fit to systems of points in 
space. The London, Edinburgh, and Dublin Philosophical Magazine and Journal 
of Science, 2(11):559-572. 
Peters, J. and Schaal, S. (2006). Policy Gradient Methods for Robotics. In Pro-
ceedings of the 2006 IEEE/RSJ International Conference on Intelligent Robots and 
Systems. 
Peters, J. and Schaal, S. (2008) . Natural Actor-Critic. Neurocomputing, 71:1180-
1190. 
173 
Planetmath (2012). Relation between almost surely absolutely bounded random 
variables and their absolute moments. http: I /planetmath . org/si tes/defaul t/ 
files/texpdf/38346.pdf. 
Ponemon Institute LLC (2014). White paper of privileged user abuse & 
the insider threat. http: I /www. trustedcs. com/resources/whi tepapers/ 
Ponemon-RaytheonPrivilegedUserAbuseResearchReport.pdf. 
Pons, P. and Latapy, M. (2005). Computing communities in large networks using 
random walks. Computer and Information Sciences-ISCIS 2005. 
Qian, J. and Saligrama, V. (2012). New statistic in p-value estimation for anomaly 
detection. In 2012 IEEE Statistical Signal Processing Workshop (SSP), pages 
393-396. IEEE. 
Richter, S. , Aberdeen, D., and Yu, J. (2007). Natural actor-critic for road traffic 
optimisation. In Proceedings of 2006 Conference on Neural Information Processing 
Systems (NIPS), pages 1169-1176. 
Roesch, M. and Others (1999). Snort-lightweight intrusion detection for networks. 
In Proceedings of the 13th USENIX conference on System administration, pages 
229- 238. Seattle, Washington. 
Rossell, D. (2012). An ART Network Anomaly Detection Tool. http: I /people. 
bu . edu/drossell/network.html . 
Samejima, K. and Omori, T. (1999). Adaptive internal state space construction 
method for reinforcement learning of a real-world agent. Neural Networks, 12:1143-
1155. 
Sandvine (2013). Global Internet Phenomena Report 1H-2013. https: 
//www.sandvine.com/downloads/general/global-internet-phenomena/ 
2013/sandvine-global-internet-phenomena-report-1h-2013.pdf. 
Scholkopf, B., Platt, J. C., Shawe-Taylor, J. C., Smola, A. J. , and Williamson, R . C. 
(2001). Estimating the Support of a High-Dimensional Distribution. Neural 
Computation, 13(7):1443-1471. 
Shah, D. and Zaman, T . (2010). Community detection in networks: The leader-
follower algorithm. arXiv preprint arXiv:1011.0774, pages 1-13. 
Shorr, T . and Moon, J. (2007). A hybrid machine learning approach to network 
anomaly detection. Information Sciences, 177(18):3799-3821. 
Singh, A. (2012). Social Networking for Botnet Command and Control. PhD thesis, 
San Jose State University. 
174 
Sommers, J., Bowden, R., Eriksson, B., Barford, P., Roughan, M., and Duffield, N. 
(2011) . Efficient network-wide flow record generation. In Proceedings of 2011 
IEEE INFOCOM, pages 2363- 2371. IEEE. 
Stampar, M. (2013). Data Retrieval over DNS in SQL Injection Attacks. arXiv 
preprint arXiv:1303.3047. 
Strayer, W. T ., Walsh, R., Livadas, C., and Lapsley, D. (2006). Detecting botnets 
with tight command and control. In Proceedings of 2006 31st IEEE Conference on 
Local Computer Networks, pages 195-202. IEEE. 
Su, X. and Zhang, D. (2012) . Botnet detecting method based on clustering flow 
attributes of command and control communication channel. Dianzi Yu Xinxi 
Xuebao( Journal of Electronics and Information Technology), 34(8):1993-1999. 
Sutton, R. (1988). Learning to Predict by the Methods of Temporal Differences. 
Machine Learning, 3:9-44. 
Sutton, R. and Barto, A. G. (1998). Reinforcement Learning: An Introduction. MIT 
Press. 
Thomas, K. and Nicol, D. D. M. (2010) . The Koobface botnet and the rise of social 
malware. In Proceedings of 2010 5th International Conference on Malicious and 
Unwanted Software (MALWARE), pages 63-70. IEEE. 
Thompson, K., Miller, G. J., and Wilder, R. (1997). Wide-area Internet traffic 
patterns and characteristics. IEEE Network, 11(6):10-23. 
Titchmarsh, E. E. C. (1986). The Theory of the Riemann Zeta-functions. Oxford 
University Press. 
Wang, J. (2012a). IMALSE:Integrated MALware Simulator and Emulator. https: 
//github.com/hbhzwj/imalse. 
Wang, J. (2012b). SADIT:Systematic Anomaly Detection of Internet Traffic. https: 
//github.com/hbhzwj/SADIT. 
Wang, J., Ding, X. C., Lahijanian, M., Belta, C. A., and Paschalidis, I. C. (2014). 
Temporal logic motion control using actor-critic methods. International Journal 
of Robotics Research (submitted). 
Wang, J. and Paschalidis, I. C. (2014a). A Hessian actor-critic algorithm. In 53rd 
IEEE Annual Conference on Decision and Control (CDC). 
Wang, J. and Paschalidis, I. C. (2014b). Robust anomaly detection in dynamic 
networks. In 22nd Mediterranean Conference on Control €3 Automation. IEEE. 
175 
Wang, J. and Paschalidis, I. C. (2014c). SoBotDet: Botnet detection based on 
anomaly and community detection in social graphs . In 52nd Annual Allerton 
Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing. 
Wang, J . and Paschalidis, I. C. (2014d). Statistical traffic anomaly detection in 
time-varying communication networks. IEEE Transactions on Control of Network 
Systems (submitted). 
Wang, J ., Rossell , D., Cassandras, C. G ., and Paschalidis, I. C. (2013). Network 
anomaly detection: A survey and comparative analysis of stochastic and determin-
istic methods. In Proceedings of 52nd IEEE Annual Conference on Decision and 
Control (CDC), pages 182-187. IEEE. 
Ward Jr, J . H. (1963) . Hierarchical grouping to optimize an objective function. 
Journal of the American Statistical Association, 58(301):236-244. 
Wikipedia (2004). Curse of dimensionality - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. 
http://en .wikipedia.org/wiki/Curse_of_dimensionality. 
Yu, F., Xie, Y., and Ke, Q. (2010). SBotMiner: Large Scale Search Bot Detection. 
In Proceedings of the third ACM international conference on Web search and data 
mining - WSDM '10, page 421 , New York, New York, USA. ACM Press. 
Yu, H. (2006). Approximate solution methods for partially observable Markov and 
semi-Markov decision processes. PhD thesis, MIT. 
Yu, H. and Bertsekas, D. P. (2009) . Convergence Results for Some Temporal Differ-
ence Methods Based on Least Squares. IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, 
54(7): 1515-1531. 
CURRICULUM VITAE 
Jing Wang 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
177 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
178 
•  
 
  
 
